LiveBall Sports

To most Mets fans delight, Kiko Calero was signed to a minor-league deal that could earn him up to $1.5 million.  Many across the internet including those at Fangraphs and the Hardball Times have speculated on why he didn’t sign earlier. Naturally, the conclusion was that there were some rather large concerns about the health of his arm and shoulder. Still, most thought that the risk was more than worth the small cost he was commanding in the market and any team who landed him would get a ’steal’. Well, the Mets seem to have inked a solid reliever to a rather small contract. Calero has a career 9.6 K/9 and 132 ERA+, and if he performs near that level for a good portion of the season, he will easily be worth his value. Nevertheless, the Calero situation has shone light on the greater reliever market which helps explain the relative lack of interest.

Relief Pitcher as a Position

In today’s major leagues, there are two primary roles which garner a lot of money and attention, the closer and the left-handed setup man. A player who can fill either of these roles effectively and has historically proven the ability to do so will likely earn a larger amount of money than other relief pitchers. While Calero has been good, his ’stuff” isn’t terribly impressive and probably keeps him from being considered a closer candidate.  Additionally, the role of a bullpen ‘anchor’ is often given a slight premium, although these players are in many cases insurance policies for the current closer.

Look around the league this offseason and you’ll see some examples of this. John Grabow got a 2-year $7.5 million deal, Jose Valverde landed a 2-year $14 million contract, and Fernando Rodney got $11 million over two years. Each of these players is left-handed or has shown the ability to consistently get saves in the past.

The Age Factor

Calero is 35 years old. At that age, some decline is likely, especially given the fact that 2009 was his best year.  But the concern about his age goes beyond just the projected 2010 performance. For players with an injury, the potential payoff of a successful and healthy season is not just in the current year, but in a future contract. For Calero, there is less of a chance that he will be healthy and productive at age 36, 37 and 38, lowering the potential return for taking such a risk.

The Utility of the Back of the Bullpen

While a strong left hander, a closer and another ‘anchor’ are important bullpen ‘positions’ for a lot of teams, the rest of the bullpen often has a different shape. Teams would like to employ cheap and home-grown options and often have the choice of many young relievers and future starters who need major league experience. Once again, this goes beyond the current season, but also has an eye on the future. A reliever who doesn’t fill the critical roles in a bullpen is taking up space which could be used to develop arms that can pay huge dividends later on. If an older reliever becomes ineffective over the course of a season, they are often ’stuck’ using him and cannot replace him without a release. It’s interesting to point out that the new Calero contract allows for him to be sent to the minor leagues freely.

Conclusions

These three factors show that the reasons for the lack of interest in Calero can be explained not just by injury, but by market forces as well. Some may argue, and with a lot of merit, that some of the valuations such as the ability to ‘close’ are not really indicative of the player’s value. For the most part, I agree.  Calero was a great deal for the Mets in 2010, and should solidify their bullpen greatly. For those wondering why he came cheap,  it can best be attributed to arbitrary distinctions amongst relievers in the market, a scope beyond 2010 (despite the fact that the contract is only for one year), and as many have said before, the injury risk.

The Chicago Cubs are far from a young team at the moment.  As currently constructed, Geovany Soto is the only everyday starter who will be under the age of 29 at season’s end.  However, for the first time in a while, the Cubs appear to have a  relatively strong minor league system with some talents that could contribute in the near future.  In addition, several contract expirations will force a decision of the part of new ownership and possibly change the face of the team.

Who Could Be Leaving

It seems like Aramis Ramirez and Derrek Lee have been stationed at the corners for a decade.  Over the years, we’ve seen Dusty Baker and Lou Piniella try to squeeze any productive left handed bat between them in the lineup whether it be Jacque Jones, Kosuke Fukudome, Jeromy Burnitz or Milton Bradley.  While these players have come and gone or changed roles, Lee and Ramirez have been a consistent duo.  Derrek Lee bounced back from a rough 2008 to to put together his best year since his ‘05 season in 2009.  The bad news is, he’ll be 35 by the end of this season when his contract expires.  Looking forward, years like 2008 look a lot more likely than 2009.

For Ramirez, he has a large player option for 2011 with a mutual option in 2012.  He took a hometown discount when he signed the extension and likely won’t fetch any more on the open market.  Since arriving, he has been the most consistent contributor for the Cubs, even maintaining a .905 OPS last year despite coming back from a shoulder injury.  Ramirez is 3 years younger than Lee and will more than likely outlast him on the north side.

Additionally, Kosuke Fukudome is signed through 2011 and will be turning 34 around the beginning of the 2012 season.  Unless he shows continued improvement in his early 30’s over the next couple of years, the initial 4-year deal will likely be the only one he receives from the Cubs.

Besides those big three players, Ryan Theriot is on a year-to-year basis, recently losing the first arbitration hearing the Cubs have had in nearly two decades.  Jeff Baker and Mike Fontenot are by no means long-term solutions, and Marlon Byrd just signed a 3 year deal.  As for Alfonso Soriano, he’s not going anywhere.

On the starting pitching front, Ryan Dempster and Carlos Zambrano are locked up for a good while, Randy Wells has just a year of service time accrued and Ted Lilly is finishing up the last year of what’s been a very productive deal (2007 playoffs aside).

What’s to Come

If you haven’t heard of Josh Vitters, Starlin Castro or Jay Jackson, they are the hottest prospects in the Cubs’ system. Castro has held his own at age 19 in AA ball, but will need at least a year to work on his defense and develop some power before anyone can consider playing him full-time at shortstop. Josh Vitters has displayed a great swing with tremendous power in A ball, but leaves a lot to be desired with his defense and BB rate. Jay Jackson has been outstanding in the high minor leagues, registering a 10.1 K/9 and 2.95 ERA over his brief minor league career. One also has to mention former top pick Andrew Cashner who excelled in his first minor league shot at starting. Still though of by many as a future reliever, he is said to be working on a changeup and will be starting in the minors this year. Another former top pick, Tyler Colvin put together a solid ‘09, but has the same problem as Vitters with a low BB rate.

Further down the line are players like shorstop Hak-Ju Lee and outfielder Brett Jackson who had great seasons in 2009. Both show tremendous skills and have a strong chance to reach the majors. Other players like SP Chris Carpenter, SP Chris Archer, OF Kyler Burke and 2B Ryan Flaherty could also contribute down the line.

The Plan

The first decisions will have to be made at the end of the 2010 season.  With Derrek Lee’s contract expiring and Josh Vitters close, but not completely ready for the majors the Cubs have a few options.  Lee is entering into a free agent class of first basemen that includes Paul Konerko, Adam Dunn and Lance Berkman to name a few.  Because of this and the current market, Lee could be brought back at a large discount in a 2-year deal.  However, another possibility could lie in what becomes of Chad Tracy or Micah Hoffpauir this year.  If either show the ability to produce, they could be used as stop-gaps while Vitters develops fully.  While some might say this is a risky proposition, it is equally risk to expect continued production out of a first baseman in his mid-30’s.  With Vitters’ arrival in either 2011 or 2012, the Cubs could begin Aramis Ramirez’s transition to first base, unless Vitters does not improve at third in which case it would become his home.  Xavier Nady is another possible stop-gap solution who will likely come cheaper, with less years attached, and more positional flexibility if he is signed beyond 2010.

If Ryan Theriot becomes too expensive, the team can also go with current AAA shortstop Darwin Barney, or go with Andres Blanco in the short run if he shows improvement.  Both could produce at Theriot levels at younger ages without blocking Starlin Castro’s arrival.

At the same time, Ted Lilly’s rotation spot could easily be filled by Jay Jackson with several other starters waiting in the wings.

After 2011, Kosuke Fukudome will either be extended or move on to another team.  If the Cubs are to continue to get younger, this would be an opportunity for either Brett Jackson or Tyler Colvin to begin playing in the OF.  At the same time, some other aforementioned minor leaguers could be ready to fill unexpected holes in the rotation, the outfield or infield.

In many ways, this transition could be seamless, as long as management isn’t insistent on holding onto older players.  While it is risky to assume production out of young players, it is equally risky to invest a large amount of money in an aging veteran.  Additionally, with the money freed up through expiring contracts, there will be enough available to resign younger players and even look to plug holes temporarily through free agency.  A lot is still in the air, though.  Will Ramirez opt to remain a Cub?  Will Soriano produce at all in the final five years of his contract?  Will Soto return to his 2008 form and become one of the better catchers in the game?  These are critical questions whose answers will ultimately force  the Cubs’ decision makers to either find some in-house, young solutions or search for temporary and expensive answers in free agency.

A good bench is often cited as one of those necessities for a championship baseball team.  However, we are too often given vague descriptions of what truly constitutes a solid unit.  Is it good pinch runners and late inning defensive replacements?  A good pinch hitter that can negate the value of an opposing left handed reliever?  Or is it guys who can fill in in the case of injury?  Well, of course it’s all of the above in some way or another, but in this article we can hopefully start to create a systematic approach to filling out a roster.

A bench player’s value is determined by a variety of factors which arise from unique situations.  These include platoon partnering, pinch hitting, spot starting in place of a resting starter and replacing an injured starter.  One has to also consider the opportunity cost of development for younger players who could be receiving greater playing time in the minor leagues.

A general manager should look to start building his bench with players who can provide the most value.  The potential value is not just determined by being a superior talent, but also the potential playing opportunities.  In addition, there is some exclusivity as the multiple players cannot perform the exact same role off the bench.  The value of a player who excels at pinch running is hindered by having a teammate with similar skills as they can’t both be employed in all high leverage situations.  As a result, the GM has to examine how an addition will marginally affect the total team performance, rather than just the player’s individual contribution.  In order to properly evaluate the value of a player, we should look at each component of his value.

Platoon Partnering

A platoon partner is a split between a starter and bench player, but we’ll call him a bench player assuming that a team already has a starter at every position.  This role provides arguably the most value of any bench position, possibly improving production by 100 points in OPS over a few hundred plate appearances.  Take the current Cubs 2B platoon of Jeff Baker and Mike Fontenot as an example.

Baker (career)
vs. LHP .285/.346/.543/.889
vs. RHP .262/.316/.411/.727

Fontenot (career)
vs. LHP .232/.286/.344/.630
vs. RHP 272/.348/.435/.783

It’s pretty clear that the Cubs are getting a pretty solid increase in production with the career numbers showing a 269 point improvement against left handed pitching and a smaller 66 points against righties. Not only does a platoon situation help produce runs in the starting lineup, but the platoon partner is also available for perform other bench functions which we’ll look at later.  It’s pretty obvious that a player that provides a potentially large platoon advantage should have high priority on the bench.

Injury Replacement/Spot Starter

While some might think that pinch hitting is the next important function at the bench, I would argue that an injury replacement or spot starter is more important.  This is because a player has many more potential opportunities to contribute in place of a starter than as a player getting a few plate appearances per week.  Using this reasoning, the best bench option is clearly not the best hitter or fielder, but the player who has the greatest chance to contribute positively.  This would have a tendency to favor outfielders over first basemen and would require some evaluation of the injury risk for the starting lineup.  Using the Cubs case again, Micah Hoffpauir is an inferior choice to Chad Tracy, not because he is a worse hitter, but because he can only provide positive replacement value at 1st base where the relatively durable Derrek Lee plays and rarely skips a start.  Meanwhile, Tracy can play 1st or 3rd at least averagely and even play in the likely event of an Alfonso Soriano injury or off day.  A player with multiple position flexibility (which means not just playing the defensive positions, but playing them well enough to actually add value to the team) also allows for better utilization of the rest of the bench, increasing team value.

Pinch Hitting

Pinch hitting is important, but in most cases, finding a good pinch hitter shouldn’t be the first priority.  Platoon partners and positional backups would be able to handle most situations, and the premium paid for better hitters would far exceed the marginal benefit in a small amount of plate appearances.  Nevertheless, a bench that completely lacks a hitter who can hit right handed pitchers well, or a starter with a terrible platoon split and no platoon partner both create noteworthy opportunities to add value.  If this is a unique need for a team, then it may be worth it to add a player primarily for this purpose.

Pinch Running/Defensive Replacement

While often cited as important elements of a bench, a pinch runner or defensive replacement will have an insignificant impact on the team.  The value is somewhat increased with a particularly slow or defensively inept team, but this role should not be actively pursued as there are extremely few actual situations where a substitution makes any difference.  Additionally, there are almost always players already occupying the platoon partner or backup roles that are capable of pinch running or playing defense.  This role would likely be the main reason for the 2010 Cubs to add Sam Fuld to the roster, despite the fact that he would add little platoon advantage, replacement value over other members of the team, or pinch hitting value.

Opportunity Cost of Development

Finally, adding a player to the 25 man roster in a bench role will almost certainly limit his at bats compared to starting in the minor leagues.  This is an important issue particularly for teams not expecting to contend since a win in the current year is valued at a lesser value than future wins.  Also, players in the minor leagues can still have value as backups on the depth chart in the event of a longer term injury.  On the whole, teams should keep their younger players in the minor leagues and avoid the hindrance of development.  Such is the case with the Cubs and Tyler Colvin.  While he could provide great value as 4th outfielder, it’s clear he has a lot to gain from another year in the minors.

Altogether, a bench should be made up of a players who can contribute positively in the greatest number of potential situations.  This goes farther than the simple addition of good players, but also considers where and when these players could fill in and have an impact.  Additionally, flexibility allows for greater utilization of all players off the bench in situations where they are best equipped to add value.

I’m not a basketball guy by any means, but the devotion of die-hard basketball fans to the value of a big man–even when field goal percentage is at an all time high–has always struck me as a bit perplexing.  Of course, having an interior threat is a huge advantage.  In general, the best teams have the strongest interior threats.  This is because the best teams have the best players, in general.  Having four strong players can separate the great teams from the other contenders.  And I don’t think any team has perfected the five guard offense, which means that interior players are obviously valuable.  The best players in the NBA, and even in college these days, all seem to be either guards or smaller forwards.  The proliferation of the three point shooting game has been one critical element, but it appears to me that to win in today’s game, you need not only to be able to play offense on the perimeter, but that defense on the perimeter might be even more important.

I’m most definitely a football guy, as the post distribution on this here sight might have had you guessing.  In football, a sustainable running game is huge competitive advantage over teams who can’t run the ball, but the best five offenses in the game every year are all throw-first teams, and the bottom five offenses every year all lack the ability to throw the football.  Perfecting the running game can separate you from the other ten teams around the median, all of which can throw the football, but need that balance to be able to sustain drives.

Running can make the difference between winning and losing in football, but it doesn’t make the difference between the Raiders and the Chargers.  If the Raiders woke up tomorrow morning with an offense that could sustain a 4.6 YPC average, they would still not be the favorite in the division, or really even a threat.  They would become much less of a pushover for the Chiefs, but the Chargers would just do what they have always done to them (the Raiders haven’t beaten SD since 2003 — the year before Drew Brees became Drew Brees).  It seems silly to cite a declining running game as the reason for underachieving expectations in football.  Sure, the decline might have been a factor, but no team is throwing all of it’s eggs in that basket at this point.  It’s a crutch.

It’s no secret that excelling at middle infield has become sort of a forgotten art in baseball.  There are great infielders in the game today, among them Derek Jeter, and Chase Utley, and Dustin Pedroia.  2009 was a year where all sorts of second basemen and shortstops got in on the fun: Aaron Hill, Ben Zobrist, and Marco Scutaro all had excellent years by any standard.

But baseball execs do not speak with words.  They use dollars to communicate.  And the dollars show that the most valuable players in the game don’t play the middle infield.  The highest paid players in baseball do two things primarily: they pitch and they hit.  Second basemen who can hit get paid like corner outfielders…while corner outfielders who can get get paid like first basemen and top pitchers.

But the most striking thing about middle infielders and salary structure might be that, with the exception of the elite players at those positions, salary structure seems to correlate best with how long these guys have been with their organization.  Orlando Hudson signed with Minnesota last week for one year-$5 million just a year after signing with the LA Dodgers for one year-$3.4 million.  The point of mentioning this is not to suggest that $5 million dollars is chump change or that Hudson should be paid more for what he offers.  Hudson has the 6th highest contract value on the Twins according to Cot’s Baseball Contracts.  He and shortstop JJ Hardy are about $2 million behind Carl Pavano in 2010 salary.  And the Twins are one of the only teams in baseball who value their middle infielders in the tier right behind their superstars, Joe Mauer and Justin Morneau.  They are also, coincidentally, a team that is quite comfortable simply going with farmhands at the position year after year if they don’t have an “elite” option.

Hudson is a similar player in career value to A’s second baseman Mark Ellis, who is the third highest paid player on cash-strapped Oakland.  Ellis is one of two players for the A’s who commanded a contract extension beyond arbitration years.  Oakland, historically, plays the baseball market very well (if you’re reading this article, you probably won’t ask for a reference regarding that claim), but it’s very safe to say that Mark Ellis probably would not have been able to beat $12 million on the open market without signing for 4+ years.  I’m confident this is because, while even in a bad year Ellis can justify his contract (value of a marginal win aside), the league wide perception is that even the league’s worst teams have a farmhand that is worth at least as much as Ellis.

Placido Polanco was able to land 3 years-$18 million this offseason, which is obviously a bigger contract than Ellis or Hudson have been able to land, but not on a per-year basis.  Polanco is well worth the money spent, but one of the biggest underlying factors in the move for Philadelphia is that now, Chase Utley can be moved to a position where his contract doesn’t stand out quite as much from the rest of the pack.  The Polanco deal actually decreases the average contract for a second baseman significantly.

Right now, the second highest-paid second baseman in the game is Robinson Cano, who is something like the 7th highest paid position player on his own team.  The first and third largest second baseman contracts in MLB history (according to Cot’s, and excluding Utley) belong to Brian Roberts, a former Orioles farmhand turned superstar, turned overpaid leadoff man.  In fact, the most valuable second basemen in the game tend to be as noteworthy on the open market as the light-hitting second basemen whose only true value to a baseball team is their ability to play other positions.

To this point, the focal point has been on second baseman, but the same phenomenon is found in the shortstops market as well.  The biggest difference is that overall salary structure is much higher for the shortstops because having the ability to stand out there at short and hit homers has created an overvalued player of sorts. Michael Young, the player I have linked to here, has actually exceeded his contract in terms of marginal value every year since coming up in 2002, according to FanGraphs.  But at the price of a premium shortstop, Young is now a third baseman coming off a career year with the bat.  It seems doubtful he will ever be worth the yearly value of his contract for it’s duration.

Like at second base, there’s no market here below the elite level (Jose Reyes/Miguel Tejada/Hanley Ramirez/Jimmy Rollins/etc).  Marco Scutaro got two years-$12.5 million on the open market from Boston, and he was the best of the free agent class by far.  Those who make it to the elite level are not there because of defense, and tend to be moved to a position that maximized the value that teams have overpaid for.  Derek Jeter is a rare exception, for reasons that have to do in large part with intangibles.

While teams have been quicker to pull the hook on shortstops than on their second baseman (based on anecdotal, but pretty clear turnover at the SS position), teams are still by and large satisfied with limited production at the position as long as the incumbent can field the position.  Turnover at the shortstop position tends to happen not when a player isn’t hitting, because each organization is loaded with shortstops who can’t hit above 7th or 8th in the major league lineup.  But when a player ceases to be a true shortstop, and is redefined as a light-hitting baseball player without a position (not to be confused with the much more valuable utility player who can still play a poor man’s shortstop off the bench), then teams move on without that player.  This tends not to happen as much with second baseman.

Turnover, however, is not really what I’m talking about.  Like the second baseman, the salary structure is completely out of whack at shortstop.  The aforementioned Twins have in consecutive years 1) extended farmhand Nick Punto for $4 million a year for two years, and then 2) not only offered arbitration to Stephen Harris, but bought out his first two years.  The only way either Punto or Harris will see extended time at shortstop this year is if a much more justifiable gamble on JJ Hardy doesn’t pay off, but both moves are still bad for optimal salary structure.  Meanwhile, defensive whiz Adam Everett has now played for the Tigers for $1 million and then $1.55 million in consecutive years, both open market contracts.  Jack Wilson, another defense-first player, will make $5 million a year over the next two years for the Mariners (he at least knows how to hold a bat).  Another open market contract.

These shortstops are coming on the extreme cheap for two reasons: because players are receiving extensions through arbitration for simply being a good organizational soldier, and because the obscenely low middle infielder replacement level standard seemingly justifies any extension on a shortstop (you’re still the exception here, Dayton Moore).  Organizations across the country have always been thin on shortstops who are actually prospects as shortstops, but pretty much everyone who plays the position for a whole year finishes with positive value, based on his positioning if nothing else.

Players who actually provide defensive and offensive value at shortstop (such as Scutaro) should be in much higher demand than the market suggests they are, but middle infielders are simply not paid as other baseball regulars, at least not to be regulars.  It’s the reason that Scott Boras can look at Dave Dombrowski in the eye and suggest that 2-3 WAR player Johnny Damon should receive his $7 million dollars in a lump sum instead of deferred payments, and the team that couldn’t afford (2.5-3 WAR) Polanco can’t just laugh in his face.  Damon is being offered more money for the 2010 season than either Curtis Granderson or Polanco made one year ago, has no other offers on the table, and yet, it’s the contract’s net present value–not dollar amount–that is keeping the sides apart.

Middle infield wins and corner outfield/infield wins are simply not valued on the same scale.  Having organizational goodwill does nothing for an outfielder that cannot hit or field.  Replacement level outfielders are much more likely to be non-tendered in their arbitration years than similar valued infielders.  It’s simple: outfielders, third basemen, and first basemen are still the currency of baseball.  While the defensive market is valued pretty well on the whole, players are still paid by their value to a batting order.  And while there is clearly a difference between players that hit 7th, 8th, or 9th in a strong lineup, and those who hit there in a weak one, the differences are not reflected monetarily in players that can’t hit higher in the order on that weaker lineup.

Which returns us to the original question: are middle infielders in baseball the equivalent of the post defender in modern basketball, or run defenders in modern football?  Are the differences between the best baseball teams and worst baseball teams pretty much independent of the players who play in the middle infield for those teams?  I ran a quick regression on shortstops and second baseman 2009 WAR vs. team wins, and I found that, overall, there’s a weak correlation between this one year sample, and team wins in 2009 (r-squared = 0.21).  The correlation is significantly stronger with shortstops than with second baseman.  It’s not a very large sample, but based on the evidence, it seems tentatively okay to conclude that teams do win largely independent of their two middle infielders, and of second baseman in particular.  That’s not saying much, but you could probably predict wins a lot better looking at the value of a team’s three best hitters or three best pitchers than their middle infielders.

So when you evaluate a move such as the Cardinals taking OF Skip Schumaker and turning him into a full time second baseman, you can kind of see the attitude by baseball executives towards those middle infielders encapsulated.  The move means little in terms of good-for-team or bad-for-team, rather, it’s an example of a team going out of its way to keep a player within the organization.  Schumaker didn’t make very much difference in the outcome of the NL Central–which was won by St. Louis.  The Cards failed to advance in the playoffs because Albert Pujols slugged .300 and Chris Carpenter and Joel Pinero combined to give up 8 earned runs in 9 innings.  Maybe if they invested heavily in middle infielders, they could have made it a round further.  Or maybe next time, Pujols will hit two homers in three games.  Superstars will always decide the outcome of small sample occurrences, and the available evidence suggest that, while the salary structure of the middle infielder might be off, it’s probably not worth holding your breath until they get equal treatment under salary law.

Because of the way that the Yankees and Red Sox dominante all coverage of baseball, and because of the perception of the “East Coast” bias in sports, particularly in baseball, the idea of divisional dominance tends to be limited to two specific discussions.

1. The American League over the National League
2. The AL East above all

The last two years, those have been particularly relevant to reality.  The National League has really struggled to produce any sort of conference dominance, despite winning the 2008 World Series, and since the Tampa Bay Rays have managed to join the elite teams in baseball from the same division as the Yanks and Sauxs, the AL East has been the primarily dominant division in baseball.

This year, another competitive division rises to meet the challenge posed by the AL East.  It’s not going to spell the end of the American League’s dominance over the National League, but this division should help to take some of the attention off the AL East and work to dispel the East Coast Bias.

I’m talking about the AL West.  You knew that because you read the title.

When talking about the strength of the AL East, oftentimes the weakness of teams at the bottom of that division can get lost in the discussion of powerhouses at the top of that division.  The biggest difference there would have to be the potential, predictable decline of the Toronto Blue Jays.  They’re without Roy Halladay, without Alexis Rios, and without Marco Scutaro this year.  With only minor improvement expected from the Orioles, and the reasonable prediction of decline for the Rays after two years, I suspect that the weakness at the bottom of this division will get lost in the shuffle of another Yankees-Red Sox pennant race.

Team-for-team, there’s no weakness in the AL West.  They’re strong at the top, where the Angels remain the favorite despite numerous losses, but only a hair ahead of the hard-charging Mariners, who had one of the more interesting offseasons in recent memory, adding a whole slew of talented baseball players including Cliff Lee, Milton Bradley, Chone Figgins, and re-signed star pitcher Felix Hernandez to a long term deal, and also extended defensive minded 2009 acquisitions Jack Wilson and Franklin Gutierrez.  It’s a division that could easily go to either of those two teams, but it wouldn’t be a stretch to see the A’s at the top of the division either.

The A’s could be right there behind the strength of an outfield that’s strong and deep, as long as their infielders can stay healthy.  The A’s are less reliant on the street free agent type veterans that they have been in past years, such as Jason Giambi, Adam Kennedy, and Nomar Garciaparra.  They’re still reliant on a very young pitching staff, but between a cavernous home ballpark and the aforementioned athletes in that spacey outfield, the A’s are well hedged against this inexperience thanks to the $10 million they gave Ben Sheets.  Really, the key for this team is getting more productivity out of Mark Ellis than they did last year when he was injured and ineffective.

Then there’s the Rangers, who are coming off their best season since the A-Rod days.  A team that had won half their games or more only once since 1999 managed to hold onto second place in this division, and they’ve made a committment to improve their pitching, which was reinforced by the $7.5 million contract they gave to Rich Harden, which appears to be a steal when you consider that Sheets got $10 million from the A’s.  The kicker is that both are major injury concerns, and if one can pitch much more than the other, than the extra money the A’s spent might be worth it.

Texas could always slug the crap out of the baseball though, which makes them an average team even if their hopes for their rotation do not materialize.  This is essentially the difference between the AL West and the other strong divisions.  If we accept that the Rangers are the 4th place team in this division, there’s no real weakness here from top to bottom.

The biggest question I have is how we can adjust for the fact that the AL West has only four teams.  On some level, it feels fundamentally incorrect to just declare this the strongest divison, team to team, and then not mention that each team in this division has to play more inter-divisional games than every other team in baseball.  It’s true.  Each team plays 18 games against every other team in it’s division.  For AL West teams, that’s (18 x 3 = 54).  For, say NL central teams, that’s (18 x 5 = 90).  For every other division, it’s in the middle of that at 72.

Still, there’s been a huge influx of talent into this division, and with the exception of John Lackey who is now with Boston, talent that left teams here never left the division.  Chone Figgins is now with Seattle, for example.  Cliff Lee is stronger than Lackey.  And the Angels are so strong in the farm system that they can replace what they are losing with Figgins and Lackey, which is more talent at the big league level in this division.  Given these observations, the safe if controversial conclusion is that the AL West is baseball’s strongest division going into the 2010 MLB season.

If you’re a Yankees fan, the prospect of your team receiving an all-star caliber outfielder such as Curtis Granderson–without having to rent a dump truck and fill it with Benjamin’s–has to be the next best thing to winning the World Series.  Not that you needed the consolation.

New York acquired Granderson yesterday in a three team deal with the Arizona Diamondbacks and Detroit Tigers, sending OF Austin Jackson and RP Phil Coke to Detroit, and SP Ian Kennedy to the Diamondbacks.  In the same deal, the Tigers also send SP Edwin Jackson to the D-Backs, receiving SP Max Scherzer and RP Daniel Schlereth.

That’s a lot of pieces for the Tigers, who certainly must have a high projection for the future on Max Scherzer as the centerpiece of the deal, but when a team like the Yankees can get Granderson as cheaply as they were able to: first of all, Granderson is chump change for the Yanks through 2012, not to mention they gave up two functional spare parts and a 23 year old outfielder with a league average projection, it’s a fantastic trade.  But it also means that the other parties come out as net losers in the deal.  And there’s plenty of losing to go around.

I have a bigger problem with the trade on the Tigers end than the D-Backs end, which is not to say that they won’t both lose the deal.  The Tigers gave up not just Granderson, but also SP Edwin Jackson, who emerged as a 2nd starter in their rotation with a 3.62 ERA.  It should be noted that Jackson greatly overachieved his peripherals, scoring only a 4.28 FIP, and that projections for Jackson this year predict that 4.28 to be a best-case scenario for 2010 (before adjusting for his move to the NL west).  But when you are the Tigers, and you give up two well established players who, between arbitration raises and contracts and the like, cost you less than $10 million to keep for the season, you need to get a strong return.

Austin Jackson is a very solid prospect in center, but I think it would surprise a whole lot of observers if he ever developed into a guy who could replace Granderson in total value.  Even if he starts his career in the majors with Detroit in 2010.  Scherzer, on the other hand, is kind of a scary proposition in a trade.  He’s not as established as Jackson, but he’s cheaper, and under team control, and it’s a trade that the Tigers could win with the Diamondbacks.

I’m just not so sure they will.  Scherzer is a strong prospect, but at 25, he’s likely as good, but not better, than his strong peripherals suggest.  He should be able to fit right in the middle of the rotation, behind Rick Porcello and Justin Verlander.  He’ll also have to hold up in the American League now, instead of pitching in the cushy NL West.  On the other hand, he should get to start against the Royals four times as often.  Jackson did it in the AL, and I think he will have great success for the Diamondbacks.

With that in mind, the Tigers have cheaply stacked their 40-man roster with reliable arms at virtually no cost, which was important to the Tigers, but it came at the expense of two of their difference makers from the 2009 season.

I’m not enthralled with what the D-Backs received in this deal, but I don’t think this trade is particularly meaningful to them either way.  They had Scherzer, now they have Jackson.  Eh.  Doubt the experience will make up for the salary difference.  Ian Kennedy is more of a flier than anything.  If you can flip Daniel Schlereth for a league average starter, excellent!  If Kennedy pitches more like he did in a small sample big league appearance for the Yankees, there’s not a whole lot here.  I’m not sure the return in this deal was worth taking on payroll in Jackson’s arbitration figure, but if Kennedy gives you more than Billy Buckner was giving, then the deal and payroll increase was worth it.

If I were Dave Dombrowski of the Tigers, I would have waited this one out.  I never really saw a Granderson trade as a great option to shed salary, and while I absolutely can see what he sees in Austin Jackson, this might have been less costly if the D-Backs weren’t involved.  I like Scherzer, personally, but this trade just doesn’t do it for me, and the Tigers sure gave up a heck of a lot to get him.

On top of that, the Tigers have a lot of options to shed 2010 payroll that wouldn’t have meant trading Granderson.  Now, they’ll need Magglio Ordonez and Brandon Inge to pick up the slack, among others, and frankly, I don’t see that happening.  I do, however, see the Yanks headed back to the top of the AL East, thanks to a shrewed move here to land one of the three best centerfielders in the AL.

One of the main things I have found with regards to contract values, especially in football, is that the teams who write the contracts prefer to value players with long term upside…even if they are trying to fill an immediate term need.  As the thought process goes, you may not be able to predict what your organizational strategy will be four years down the road, but if you pay a premium for a younger player with upside, you’re less likely to be stuck with dead-weight on the back end.

This is probably fallacious.  If you are making an investment to address an immediate team need or concern, the process is inherently short-sighted.  This need could be addressed through a player development channel, but the organization remains willing to throw cash at the problem so they don’t have to wait for the solution.  This is a fine approach when used sparingly, but don’t be fooled:  what happens on the back end of the deal could very well be someone elses’ mess.  Acquisitions need to be graded on how they affect the present value of the franchise, not by which move looks less-bad four years down the road.

With respect to this year’s baseball hot stove, I’m proposing the research question: when does it make sense for a team to buy now, and overpay later?  If there’s a hypothetical 35 year old centerfielder who is on the verge of needing to move to a corner outfield position to be viable defensively, under what conditions should be loosely required to out-bid the market for the services of said player.  If he’s in demand, the player can turn his present value into a long term deal.  Teams know that that the same player in the corner outfield will result in an overpaid asset for 3 years or so, and then of course there is all the sunk cost decisions that will go into that at the time.  The proper move may very well be to end up eating the cash on the back end.

Each team has a strict payroll limit that ownership will hold them to, but football franchises have figured out that by promising money in future seasons (via the P5 signing bonus), they can get a year or two of the player-asset to fill a very specific role, and eat the consequences later.  Baseball franchises appear much slower to figure out the same thing, partially because some of the contract value can be recouped in football, while in baseball, the entire remaining contract is a sunk cost.

This analysis will specifically address baseball players in the current labor market who are clearly past their prime.  It is well known that all players listed below will not be as valuable in four years as they are right now, and also that it would be in the interest of all franchises to sign older players to shorter-term deals.  But taken from the small market franchise perspective, the only way you can beat a team with more cash to spend out for a specific free agent without settling is to get creative with the contract.  Offering 4 year-$28 million deal is more lucrative to a 35 year old position players than getting a 2 year, $18 million dollar contract, even though the per-year value of the contract is greater in the second offer.  That’s what a small market team would have to do to outbid a large market team.

But why not let those big-spenders set the market, and then settle for the comparable scraps?  Well, then you can end up with Jose Guillen or Matt Morris, and you’re not saving much money in the process.  At that point, everyone would agree the small market team is better off going strictly through player development channels.

Type A Free Agents will be ignored in this analysis.  And to reiterate: the long term value of the player is being ignored here, as we’re trying to determine who has enough value in 2010 and 2011 to justify some dead money in future seasons.

Jim Thome, DH Even for an American League team with an opening at DH, it’d be impossible to justify more than a single year on Jim Thome.  He has no value as a baserunner, a fielder, or a singles hitter at this point: he’s all on base ability, and left-handed power.  In the NL, that’s barely worth a roster spot.  In the AL, there won’t be very much of a market for that, but you could still get a 7-inning a game middle of the order lineup out of him.  No reason to overpay.

Vladimir Guerrero, DH This is an interesting one, because Vlad is a 34 year old who has the body of a 39 year old, sort of like Thome.  He’s not completely valueless outside of his bat, as he can still run from point A to point B before the sun goes down, and you could stick him in the outfield 20 times a season, and have additional right-handed power in the middle of the order.  But no, he’s not the kind of player who you would want in the lineup this year badly enough to pay him through 2012, and it’s mostly due to his free swinging style going out of style.  He figures to be a run generator for the next two or three years or so, but since this isn’t about his future value, his present value isn’t worth a premium.

Hideki Matsui, DH Might be a moot point if Matsui goes back to Japan, but if I’m a team who has no real middle of the order threat, Matsui is the kind of player you could justify a three or four year deal on to squeeze him in under a tight budget.  Something like 4/$28MM.  I don’t view him as a huge attrition risk, really, just a guy who happened to hit lefty at the new Yankee Stadium for a season where he didn’t really play the field.  Matsui does hit to all fields, so if he stays in the US in 2010, he’s a very productive player, if not a productive outfielder.

Jason Giambi, 1B/DH Not much difference between Giambi and Thome at this point except that the team that invests in Thome knows precisely what they are getting, and can plan for that.  Giambi’s bat might end up being a complete wash-out at this point, given his declining power numbers.  On the other hand, he’s not the horrendous baserunner Thome is, and he still knows which hand the glove goes on.  Still, you wouldn’t offer anything more than one year for any reason.

Carlos Delgado, 1B Offensively, there’s nothing really desirable left here.  Defensively, there never really was much desirable to begin with, but what he had is still there.  Right now, Delgado is right at replacement level, which means that you could justify a contract only if the farm system is just bare with any sort of bat work.  No multi-year deals: if you can’t develop a replacement level first baseman but every five years, you might be the Kansas City Royals.  Still, if you must, there’s some standard upside here, which makes him a better fit than, say, Ross Gload.

Gary Sheffield, RF/DH Nope.  The Mets benefitted from offering him the minimum, and the Tigers would have probably been better off with him than without him, but he’s 41 years old now, and doesn’t have much value left.  Even a two year deal would be pretty preposterous at this point.

Brian Giles, RF His power has diminished much in recent years, but a lot of that is because of where he was playing his home games.  To me, Giles is the kind of the inspired gamble that could really make a team this year.  He really crashed hard, and unexpectedly, last season.  Full disclosure here: I’ve always liked Giles, but despite a crash in UZR and power totals, in my mind, he’s more likely to see a rebound here than further attrition, and most teams should have room in their budgets to fit him in.

Mike Cameron, CF I almost had to disqualify Cameron because he seems certain to land a two or three year deal, as he can still get it done defensively.  He’s worth up to a five year deal in my opinion because for at least one more year, he’s instant runs both produced and saved.  He probably won’t play past age-40 though, so in return for a team offering him financial security for the rest of his career, you can save that money on the back end, and he’s only going to cost $5/6 MM per year.

Mark DeRosa, 3B/OF/2B DeRosa is another good investment, although he’s older than you think (he’s 35).  He’s precisely the kind of player who can help a small market team “win now” and he’s probably worth a lot of money up front.  Listing him as a second baseman at this point is pretty charitable; he can stand there, if you’d like.  His best defensive position is in right field, and though he’s more costly than say, Giles, you can justify three or fours years on a contract because he’s a safe bet for this year if not the future.

Adam Kennedy, IF Kennedy was an May waiver claim for the A’s and was the best hitter on the team for about half a season.  That’s not a good reason to give the guy a multiple year deal.  He could be worth up to three or four million dollars this season, in total, but there’s no power here, and the defense is not what it used to be.

Nomar Garciaparra, IF Don’t remember why I included him.

Jamey Carroll, 2B I say no, just because all of his value is in defense and baserunning, and while that contributes to wins all the same, when you are talking about guys who can get you over the top, Jamey Carroll just doesn’t do it for me.  Don’t get me wrong: since 2006, Fangraphs estimates his value at close to $25 million dollars.  On a one year deal, I’d offer him as much as $5 million to be my starting second baseman/backup shortstop.  But I don’t think I would overbid that with a multi-year deal for Jamey Carroll.

Miguel Tejada, SS/3B Yes.  He has to be viewed as a third baseman in the free agent market, but when you consider that this move will put him behind the Chone Figgins and Adrian Beltre’s of the world, guys who are all-world defenders at third base, Tejada could be just as good as these guys, possibly for longer, and at a fraction of the cost.  One of my biggest problems with positional baselines is it screws up the projection of players like Tejada who do the late-career SS to 3B move, but Tejada is underrated as a defender, and while his move would hurt his offensive value according to positional baselines, he doesn’t actually lose that value.  Put simply, he will outplay his contract this next season, and probably at least one season after that.  A six year deal would not be crazy, unless it pushes above $48MM.

Alex Cora, SS Cora has a run of the mill glove, and is the last person on this list I would want on a long term deal.  He doesn’t offer anything with the bat except the ability to hit from both sides.

Adam Everett, SS On the other hand, Everett offers rare glove work, but he has also become a progressively more useful offensive player.  When you put him up against the baseline of a league average player, the increased plate appearances make his aggregate offensive values look like he’s reached career low levels, but in reality, he’s now playing more than he ever has since leaving Houston.  Most teams don’t have a shortstop as strong as Everett, and I would be surprised if he didn’t get a multi-year deal this Hot Stove season.

It really depends on the free agent.  Deferring payroll to future seasons can be a useful tool for building a team in excess of what your teams’ payroll situation and farm system can accomplish.  The key is to find a player with a relatively low attrition rate and some pop left in the bat, and offer the right guy a contract that is over the market value, but does not cost as much on a per year basis as some of the larger market teams are willing to pay.  This payroll could come back to bite in the future, but only if the team is unsuccessful at winning now.

If your team can land the right free agent piece, it helps to discount future dollars and allows for systematic organizational improvement.

Joe Posnanski with this Greinke-bit in his coronation column in the K.C. Star this morning:

The Cy Young Award press tour was not something he wanted to do. He didn’t even answer the Cy Young call because he did not recognize the number on his cell phone.

That comes just hours after Sam Mellinger (also of the Star) relays this bit to us via Twitter:

Zack on whether he’s thought about Cy Young since season ended: “Not really. I’ve been playing this World of Warcraft game.”

The primary question of this blog–if there was one–for about two months was, “seriously, how could you not love Zack Greinke?”  Well, the BBWAA spoke, and color me impressed and pleasantly surprised.  They do love Zack Greinke.

And by record margins as well.  25/28 first place votes for a guy who won only 16 games?  I’d have to think that even if CC Sabathia had won 20 games, Greinke would still have had enough pull to win.

The only question that Zack has to answer next season would be: is the best yet to come?

Hey, you never know.  I’m not going to bet on it, but I’m even less inclined to bet against it.

Major League Baseball got what they wanted in this World Series match-up: they got the defending champs against the franchise that has won more titles than any other in history.  They got all the storylines and the intrigue that October, er, November baseball is supposed to be about.  When you consider that this league has had to suffer through (in recent years) Tigers-Cardinals, Red Sox-Rockies, and the intriguing but still terrible Rays-Phillies matchup, these two large market franchises playing each other are good for baseball.

What’s good for baseball is not always good for the national fan though, and I simply do not care about Phillies-Yankees.  I wish I could, but I’m thinking if I’m sitting around on Thursday night, I’ll be more inclined to watch the college football or UFL games than the World Series.

And that’s just the way it’s been for me in most years.  I love baseball.  I just haven’t gotten caught up in the playoffs since, oh, I’d say 2005.  I lived in the Chicago locality when the Cubs made their NLCS run in 2003, and when the White Sox won it all in 2005.  I lived in Michigan when the Tigers made their 2006 run.  As a fan of a team who hasn’t been to the postseason in my lifetime, I’ve had every reason to get caught up in the baseball postseason despite not ever having a dog in the fight.  It’s just never been all that importnant to me.  And now with the Yankees and Phillies matching wits in the Fall classic, it’s going to be just another off-season where I won’t be able to tell you off the top of my head who the world champion was.

Which does not mean I don’t have an opinion on what will transpire.  I’ll tell you this: the best pitcher in this series is not CC Sabathia, it’s Cliff Lee.  I don’t think the Yankee’s line-up is appreciably more dangerous than Philly’s.  And I don’t think you can say at this point that the Philadelphia bullpen is a liability.  It may not come down to it, but how much better of a job has Charlie Manuel done in the playoffs that Joe Girardi?

In my mind, the key players in this series are: Yankees outfielders Johnny Damon and Nick Swisher, and Phillies LHP Cole Hamels.  When the Yankees have had prolonged hitting slumps, it’s because they’ve been lacking in production from their outfielders, as you would expect.  I certainly don’t see a pitching advantage for the Yankees, maybe a negigible defense advantage, but if both Damon and Swisher have big series, they’ll be tough to beat.

Cole Hamels was great in the playoffs last season, but his up and down regular season (exemplified by a very good 1.29 WHIP, but a pedestrian 4.32 ERA), has led to three relatively disappointing playoff starts.  In this series, all he has to do is provide more production for the Phillies than Andy Pettite can give the Yankees.  If he does that, the Phillies have the stronger rotation, a very competent bullpen, and the edge in the series.

I’m picking the Phillies over the Yankees, in seven games.

Playoff baseball has never been known for it’s relative disparity, but it’s somewhat fitting that every team that made it to the LCS had it’s playoff ticket pretty much punched by the end of July.

And for the teams who were in September playoff races?  0-3 for the Red Sox, the Twins and the Rockies.

But it was the most intriguing playoff matchup where the disparity was the most obvious: the Dodgers and the Cardinals.  The Cardinals actually entered the series as a slight favorite in the eyes of vegas, but after the Dodgers managed to beat Chris Carpenter in Game 1, and did it convincingly, there was little doubt who the better team was.

At it’s very core, playoff baseball comes down to pitching matchups.  Not just pitching matchups; the quality of a team’s defense and hitting plays a major role in the story of every World Champion.  But for the teams who get eliminated short of the point that they expected to get to, you can usually boil the series down to the single game where a team entered with a pitching advantage, and left with a loss.  When the Cardinals sent Carpenter and Adam Wainwright to the mound in back to back games and lost them both, even their most die-hard fans realized that they weren’t going to be able to send it back.

For the Minnesota Twins, they understood they were overmatched in Game 1 at Yankee Stadium.  But they were a team that had to feel like they could rebound the following game with Nick Blackburn pitching against the streaky A.J. Burnett.  And when the game came down to the ninth inning with Joe Nathan on the mound, it was a virtual certainty that the series would shift to Minneapolis in a 1-1 tie.  Only, the middle of the Yankee lineup is unlike anything Nathan gets to face in the AL Central.  In just under two innings of work, the Bronx Bombers ousted Nathan, and saddled him and his team with a crushing defeat.

The Colorado Rockies did win the pitching matchup they needed to, when Aaron Cook and staff narrowly outdueled Cole Hamels and staff.  But they also knew they needed to rely on 27 year old Jason Hammel to win against J.A. Happ.  But Hammel, like Happ, could only last 3 innings and change, and that’s an advantage to the better team: the Phillies.  It didn’t help matters that the Phillies teed off on Rockies closer Huston Street in consecutive games while Phillies closer Brad Lidge matched wits with his best stuff.

But it’s the California Angels of Los Angeles of Anaheim that have the best one-two punch right now.  Going into the series, I would have said that Boston held a pitching advantage, and consequently a small advantage in the series.  But with John Lackey and Jered Weaver at their best right now, I don’t think anyone is going to beat the Angels the rest of the year.  Well, maybe in a game.  But not in a series.

The one flaw in the Angels’ armour appears to be the bullpen, but even that appears to be simply better right now than it was in the regular season.  There’s no questioning the talent of the lineup, which scored more runs since the all-star break than it did prior to it.

I think Cliff Lee will drive the Phillies past the Dodgers in the NLCS, but I don’t think they’ll be a match for the Angels, who are the most dangerous team in baseball right now, and consequently, my (belated) World Series pick.