LiveBall Sports

I refuse to religiously post mock updates on LiveBall Sports.

So here’s the plan: this is going to be THE OFFICIAL LiveBall Sports 2010 NFL Mock Draft.  It will remain this way until there is hard evidence to suggest the mock is out of date.  If a team trades a pick, it’s out of date.  If I want to add a round to it, but I decide the first round is too inaccurate to just add to it, it’s out of date.  If a team declares who it is taking, and it is in conflict with what my mock projection says (this will not happen–the declaration that is, not the incorrect part), it is out of date.  As long as the mock is not dated, it remains the official LiveBall Sports mock draft.

That is all.

1.  St. Louis Rams:  Sam Bradford, QB, Oklahoma

If this doesn’t happen, either the rest of the league is wrong on Bradford or the Rams are.  I don’t care how good Ndamakong Suh is, there is really no possibility that Bradford gets away from the Rams.

Read more…

Now isn’t the time for 2010 football season prognostication.  It’s time to focus on baseball projections and the March Madness tournament and the NFL Draft.  Primarily.

But before the point of no return is reached, I thought this would be a good time to identify a few football teams who underachieved the expectations of their fan bases in 2009, but actually would make pretty good playoff sleepers in 2010.  The key to this exercise is to separate the twenty teams that missed the playoffs into four categories:

1. Teams that performed poorly and don’t have very much talent in reserve (example: St. Louis)
2. Teams that performed poorly, but have the talent to compete in the near future
3. Teams that performed well above their actual winning percentage in 2009 (example: Washington)
4. Teams who performed well enough to make the postseason in 2009, but lost out on tiebreakers (example: Houston)

This article is concerned primarily with teams from groups #2.  Teams from groups #2, and #3 are both going to figure to be competitive this year, but I’m trying to identify the teams who will actually make the leap forward in 2010.  Not the teams who could have been competitive in 2009 under different circumstances.  The “hot” picks for the playoffs are going to come pretty exclusively from group #4, as this is just the way that the mind of the prognosticator works.

I’ve chosen to look at just ten teams as “underachievers” from 2009.  The bottom eight teams in the NFL last year were pretty well defined by any objective system: Chicago, Tampa Bay, Seattle, Kansas City, Seattle, Oakland, St. Louis, and Detroit were the bottom eight teams rated by both Generic Win Probability and DVOA.  I have chosen to add to this list of eight teams small market Jacksonville and Buffalo, because both featured units (Buffalo – offense, Jacksonville – defense) that belonged in the same class of the other bad teams.  No team on this list managed so much as a .500 record last year, however, it is not exhaustive of the sub .500 teams.  Washington went 4-12, and Miami went 7-9, but it’s pretty much in agreement that those teams belong lumped in closer to the .500 teams (Tennessee, Cincinnati, and San Francisco types) than to the underachievers.

Denver is pretty much in it’s own category as an overachieving team that, in a large ten game sample to finish the year, did not outpace it’s 2-8 record.  They could easily be in this discussion if treated like a 2-8 team instead of an 8-8 team, but somewhere, the team that started 6-0 still remains.

The next step is to try to separate which teams have the talent, and which teams are still caught in the middle of a rebuilding project with no clear direction.  Oakland comes to mind as a team with no clear direction (or purpose…the Raiders don’t really even exist to make money).  Kansas City and St. Louis are teams where the only talent on the roster has come from the first round of the last four NFL drafts.  The talent development has been uninspired.  There’s a little bit more promise right now in Buffalo and Cleveland, but in both cases, that could be just empty promise.

The remaining five teams are the five teams I feel are best suited to make a playoff push in 2010, despite poor performance in 2009.

5.  Jacksonville Jaguars

Jacksonville is a bit directionless right now, but they are unquestionably one of the more talented teams on this list.  David Garrard has an aging skill set, but as a proven leader and relatively consistent quarterback, he’s not a weakness, and more importantly, he has given the Jags back to back 16 start seasons.  He’s well removed from his magical 2007 season, but the Jags infused their offense with offensive tackles last season, who should help solidify his line this year.

Jacksonville’s issue has been defense ever since they drafted S Reggie Nelson, who appears a bust at this point.  But with the tenth overall pick, Jacksonville appears that they will have the option between picking a potential superstar at receiver, such as Dez Bryant, or a corner like Joe Haden, or another potential defensive superstar.  Jacksonville doesn’t pick in the second round, but the team at the heart and center of the Tebow debate might be willing to throw in their 2011 first rounder for the right to get in position to draft him.

The talent of players such as Mike Sims-Walker and Maurice Jones-Drew is pretty undeniable.  The Jacksonville offense will not be below average as long as Jones-Drew and Garrard are healthy, so once again, they’ll be competitive if they can throw a defense together.

4.  Tampa Bay Buccaneers

The Buccaneers sit in a really good spot to make a splash in the draft, with regard to landing an impact player, being one of three teams on this list of five who figures to have acquired their franchise quarterback last offseason.  In Josh Freeman, they might end up having the best of the bunch.  Problem is that Tampa Bay is neither productive on the lines right now, nor at the receiver position.  They’re on this list because that’s fixable.  It’s not like they’ve shunned the offensive line over past years, although Donald Penn and Jeremy Trueblood are a below average tackle combination, and the entire unit was lackluster.  The offensive line might need to draft an anchor, such as Russell Okung, but it wouldn’t be terribly shocking if they were a strength in front of Freeman next year.  The team could also draft another Oklahoma State player, Bryant, with the 3rd overall pick.

The defense needs to get better play from it’s safeties, but moving Jermaine Phillips back there and getting back a healthy Will Allen should do the trick.  The 3rd overall pick is also an excellent spot with regards to landing a game changing defensive tackle in this draft.

3.  Seattle Seahawks

I picked Seattle to go to the super bowl last year, but this designation is about more than just saving face.  The Seahawks are without a left tackle after Walter Jones (probably) retired, but with a left tackle, Seattle already has the bits and pieces of a very strong line.  They weren’t able to run the ball last year with any consistency, but that issue can be solved by getting a running back in the draft.  A bigger problem is that, even with protection, Matt Hasselbeck struggled to 1) stay healthy, and 2) be productive.  It’s hard to watch great players go through the part of their career where they are hurting their team, but it appears that Seattle is at that point with Hasselbeck, who is 35.  This doesn’t really appear to be a receiver issue either.  As odd as it is to say, it appears that the two largest weaknesses on the Seahawks are at left tackle and quarterback.

The defense is a lot easier to figure out.   Seattle’s front seven is as good as advertised, but the only pass rusher of the bunch is Darryl Tapp.  Seattle needs a secondary pass rushing threat, or preferably, someone who is good enough to make Tapp the secondary threat.  And also, the secondary is complete garbage.

But the remaining talent of the Seahawks is still undeniable, and at the very least, this coaching change should bring in someone who is actually interested in fixing the problems that the organization can diagnose.

2.  Chicago Bears

By acquiring Jay Cutler in a trade last offseason, the Bears made the future of the organization into the present.  And by hiring Mike Martz to run the offense, a move that I feel is inspired if not incredibly obvious, the Bears figure to have their best offense in 2010 since, maybe ever.

As bullish as I am about that offense, the defense is going to be a concern if the Bears are going to surprise their division and make the playoffs.  For the amount of resources the Bears put into their defensive line, basically a high pick every season, they’re getting very mediocre results from it.  The linebackers are quite good, and should return Brian Urlacher in the middle this year in place of Hunter Hillenmeyer, but like Seattle, there’s no consistent complementary pass rusher, and the secondary is largely garbage.

The Bears will always been competitive in cold weather, but I believe an improvement in their results on the road will make them a very dangerous team next year.

1.  Detroit Lions

This is the team that’s not like the others.  The Lions have been horrendous forever, and though they had an honorary “winning season” in 2007 (7-9 record), Detroit posted a generic win probability of 28%, which is horrendous.  Not quite as bad as their next “season“, but still awful.  The tricky thing with projecting the Lions for mass improvement in 2010 is that, I have to admit, the 2009 Lions were no better than the 2008 Lions.  Both teams had a projected 2-14 record based on both their pythagorean records and win probabilities, but only one was lucky enough to be historically bad.  The Lions may have vastly overachieved in 2007, but they haven’t been anywhere near that level since.

One trend is clear about the Lions: when they won in 2009 (the two games they did win, plus the Vikings game that they were alive in the third quarter of), Matt Stafford was successful.  To project a massive improvement in the Lions from 2009 to 2010, it goes without saying that Stafford is going to have to be successful a lot more frequently.  And, certainly, he can be.  The Lions had a surprisingly good offensive line last season, giving Stafford plenty of time to make his decisions.  In part because of Stafford’s wildness, no Lions receiver enjoyed a strong 2009 season, even after Calvin Johnson was a pro bowl alternate on the 2008 0-16 team.  Stafford is going to have to be more productive in 2010, but he can do that if his receivers help him.  There just wasn’t very much of that for the 2009 Lions.

The defense, per usual, is a concern and will prevent them from being a truly serious contender.  But the Lions will be able to outscore a lot of teams in 2010, and perhaps they can outscore opponents given just the talent that is currently there.  And that makes them different from the other bottom of the barrel finishers in 2009.  St. Louis, Kansas City, Oakland, and perhaps Cleveland and Buffalo aren’t going to be winning any shootouts against quality teams this year.  The Detroit Lions very well might.  Which makes them a controversial, but defensible surprise choice to push for the NFL playoffs in 2010.

When NFL free agency was in it’s infancy, the institution of a free market system in the NFL completely changed the way the business side of the game worked.  A lot like the business of social media serves to prove today, no one disagreed that free agency was a valuable tool to anyone who could learn how to work the system, it’s just that no one really knew what they were doing.

Some teams figured it out sooner than others.  The Packers signed DE Reggie White to a 4 year-$17 million contract in 1993, which would have been the equivalent of $25 million when adjusted for inflation in 2008.  For reasons involving league revenues, NFL salaries have inflated far faster than the value of a standard traded good in the US.  When the salary cap debuted in 1994, the maximum spent per team could not exceed $34.6 million.  In 2009, the salary cap was officially listed at $128 million per team, but due to violations in the prior year regarding salary floors, it was effectively closer to $134 million per team.  League salaries have increased nearly 300% over the salary cap era.  Inflation in the dollar accounts for only a 50% increase over the timeframe.

In today’s NFL cap dollars, White’s deal is worth an equivalent of $16.5 million per year, or 4 years-$66 million.  This is not dissimilar to the value of Albert Haynesworth’s contract with the Washington Redskins (7 years-$100 million), except there’s an even greater percentage of Haynesworth’s money that’s effectively fictitious.

The point of this analysis is to show that a team like the Eagles might have been able to value White’s contribution to the team in terms of wins, and then reached the very logical conclusion that there’s no way an NFL defensive player is worth that much money.  The exact same arguments have been brought against the Redskins brass this year, particularly in the wake of a 4-12 season.  It’s coincidence that “highest paid” type deals have remained so proportional in value to the beginning of free agency.  Now consider: White was a first team AP all-pro 6 straight years from 1986 to 1991.  In 1992, he was a second team all-pro in a contract year, and he finished behind Minnesota’s Chris Doleman and teammate Clyde Simmons in the AP voting.  It wouldn’t have been indefensible to see White’s age and factor that into a value analysis.  Haynesworth signed with Washington at age 28.  White signed with GB at age 32.

And you know what, when Reggie White went to Green Bay, he never had consecutive 10+ sack seasons until the very end of his tenure there.  That record contract he signed: he was extended before he won the super bowl with the Packers.  Of course, Clyde Simmons ended up posting a 5 sack season in 1993, and then leaving Philadelphia.  Reggie White is one of the most valuable players in NFL history–probably one of the five most valuable–and this analysis isn’t to say he’s not.  It’s to show that Green Bay may have in-fact overpaid for White on the open market.  This doesn’t make his loss any easier for Philly fans to swallow, as the Eagles won 8 and 7 games the two years following his departure.  Titans fans aren’t relishing their 8-8 finish this year after getting rid of Haynesworth, but the same argument holds: it’s possible that the Redskins overpaid, even after factoring in market conditions.

The simile here is about uncharted waters.  When free agency was in it’s infancy, lineman started collecting contracts once thought preposterous for players of that position.  Agents were laughed at for suggesting that a player who doesn’t touch the football should earn seven figures in a single season.  Fifteen years later, Steve Hutchinson, an offensive guard, signed for a half million dollars over seven years.  Hutchinson is now reaching the backloaded end of that contract with the Vikings, and they’re more dependent now on his production than at any point before.

Hutchinson got lucky.  His contract expired following the 2005 season, which happened to be perfectly timed with all this contract madness.  Because it gets at the heart of what I’m really writing about tonight: this CBA and the uncapped year.

The whole idea with CBA agreements is that two sides representing the entirety of the NFL labor market come to a compromise that allows both to reap the benefits equally (or if not equally, at least fairly) of a product that is a cash cow in the US.  The issue in 2006 was that there was no safeguards or soft landings in the extension the sides agreed to in 2002.  The NFL financial landscape was relatively static from 1993 to 2002, but following this point, revenues shot through the roof creating a dynamic market situation where large market teams and small market teams were no longer on a level playing field: only litigation (such as revenue sharing) could maintain the competitive balance of the NFL.  And up until that point, parity was as much a part of football as referees or fines.

Parity, though, had to be the first thing to go.  Officially, the NFL had kept it’s salary cap after agreeing to a labor deal that was positively received at the time, but the practical idea of a salary cap was violated by the actual agreement.  Ask the Commish’s Al Lackner puts it thusly:

In 2005, it was set at $85.5 Million. Last year it was originally set to be approximately $94.5 Million. However, an extension to the CBA brought with it a new formula, which saw an expansion to approximately $102 Million. The cap in 2007 was $109 Million. In 2008 it was $116.7 Million. In 2009 it will be approximately $127 Million , which is up from the $123 originally projected.

The game was awash in cash from 2003-2005.  The cap had been written to move with league revenues, but it wasn’t out of proportion until after this agreement.  From $34.6 million in 1994 to $85.5 million in 2005 is a significant jump, an average of $4.5 million a year, or basically one additional highly paid player per team, per year.  Since 2006?  An average of $8.5 million per year.  The rate of increase in the salary has doubled since 2006.  Trust me when I say that team payrolls have not increased by an average of nearly 10 million dollars per year.  Why do you think small market teams like Jacksonville, Kansas City, and Buffalo are paying players like David Garrard, Matt Cassel, and old Terrell Owens, respectively, $6-9 million a year?  If you’re thinking about the kind of cost-benefit analysis that Green Bay and Washington did on premier defensive players in the first and last years of the salary cap era, you’re missing the point.

After the 2005 season, the salary cap failed to be a salary cap.  Yes, teams like Carolina, Denver, and Washington had some of their veteran releases dictated by creating salary cap room to function with, but the vast majority of teams (read: everyone else) have either been functioning independent of the cap, or trying to be in compliance with the salary floor.

What’s most flooring about the whole process, pardon the pun, is that in 2009, the NFL’s salary floor was a preposterous 87% of the cap value.  In other words, the league salary floor was $112 million in 2009.  In 2007, the SALARY CAP was $109 million.  Being an owner of a small market franchise in the NFL is one of the toughest jobs in sports.

The cap came into being as a ploy by the owners to limit salaries in the new free labor market system in the NFL.  Now, it’s a major drain on the bottom line for the bottom third of owners in the NFL.  Large market owners are okay with this because it forces small market teams to spend their shared revenue and then some, but the small market franchises would be more valuable in the absence of a cap/floor.  And then if there was going to be a repealing of the floor, it would be a good chance for the large market owners to try to get out of shared revenues.

And so we arrive at the uncapped year in such a dynamic market.  The union doesn’t want to give back any of the gains it made in 2006.  The small market owners need the cap to function like it did in the past, or they need it gone entirely.  And the large market owners, who pretty much win as long as there is still football, just want things to be sustainable for the future.  The party who really have no stake in the golden goose at this point, the small market owners, are a distinct minority between two much larger parties who are trying to come to a compromise that probably doesn’t exist.

Whether they will agree to something in time to save 2011 football is a case for another day.  Let’s look into the crystal ball and see who might benefit in this highly dynamic free agency year.  The league legislated any number of protective measures to prevent salaries from exploding to irreplaceable levels at 2010.  Preventive measures against 4th and 5th year pros, measures against the most successful teams from 2009, and of course, the removal of the salary floor.  Will it work?

I think it will work.  Nothing can prevent desperate teams from giving out dumb contracts to undeserved players, but in terms of players that are comfortably above the league average, I see about 15 names available in free agency.  About 5 players on that list are expected to receive the franchise tag and remain with their current teams for another year.  Among the players actually expected to hit the market, we’re talking about DE Julius Peppers, TE Ben Watson, WR Kevin Walter, RB Darren Sproles, QB Chad Pennington, and DE Kyle Vanden Bosch.  Peppers was going to be the highest paid player in this class regardless, but he probably won’t see Haynesworth money.  Watson, Walter, and Sproles should all sign lucrative deals somewhere, but none are going to be too far above the $6-$8 million per year range.  Pennington isn’t going to get a deal longer than 2-3 years and the chance to compete for a job.  VandenBosch’s value is down from it’s peak two years ago, as is Packers DE Aaron Kampman.

On my “79 scale”, (79 is a fringe starter, while league average ranges from 82-85) I have no player in this free agent class rated above 92, and only five players at a 90 or above, with no less than two of those players expected to wear the franchise tag or otherwise not hit the market.  Last year I had 10 players with a 90 rating, with four getting the franchise tag.

Let’s review last year’s list.  Of the 6 players who changed teams with a rating of 87 or higher by my system, only one (Leonard Weaver) made the pro bowl with his new team.  Two, Derrick Ward and Chris Canty, did not make any noticeable impact with their new teams.  The other three (Haynesworth, TJ Houshmandzadeh, and Jim Leonhard) all had an impact with their new teams, but none were even as much as a pro bowl alternate.  The best free agent signing of last offseason was probably Bart Scott to the New York Jets, or maybe Jason Brown with the Rams.

Haynesworth might still end up being a great signing for the Redskins, but for right now, he’s a good case defense for why the uncapped year isn’t about to significantly alter the NFL’s salary structure in one season.  Peppers is getting his money, and a bunch of other unrestricted free agents will cash in with large market teams, but that’s not the uncapped year working.  That’s just NFL free agency.

What about old faces in new places?  The Jets signed a pair of Ravens last offseason, and then installed Rex Ryan’s pressure-heavy schemes in New York.  They led the NFL in total defense.  Maybe players with an “in” can capitalize on the uncapped year?

Let’s see.  Mike Shanahan is in Washington now, and he brought Jim Haslett as his DC.  Dick Jauron is coaching the secondary in Philadelphia.  Mike Martz is the offensive coordinator in Chicago.  Jim Zorn is coaching the quarterbacks in Baltimore.  Maybe they’ll take some players with them.

This is good news for Ben Hamilton, former Denver Broncos guard, and Casey Rabach, former Redskins center.  They will be taken care of this year.  Barry Sims might be able to get a job with the Bears now, as may Brandon Manumaleuna.  And if Marc Bulger gets cut, there’s a backup job available in Chicago.

It’s obvious though that there will not be any bidding over the players who have scheme “ins” with a new franchise.  The one thing that is really clear about free agency this year is that there are no bargains.  But beyond that, there’s about ten players worth getting into a bidding war over.  Total.  80% of the players eligible for free agency are past the valuable portion of their careers, and the remaining 20% is looking at a bidding pool that is reduced by 75% this year.  Money isn’t going to fly all over the place, and teams aren’t going to forget about the draft because they can buy mature talent.

It’s still true that the labor situation and markets are very dynamic at this time, but the craziness has already ensued.  It’s possible that the market will continue to correct this year, but teams were going nuts in free agency from 2006-2008.  The beneficiaries were not Darren Sproles and Kyle Vanden Bosch.  The beneficiaries of the dynamic market were Steve Hutchinson, LeCharles Bentley, Edgerrin James, Nate Clements, Asante Samuel, Darren Howard, Adam Archuleta, Nate Burleson, Adalius Thomas, Daniel Graham, and Michael Turner.

Yes, the uncapped year means less restrictions on team budgets, but any team that feels an increased sense of freedom in 2010 has missed the boat–by four years.

The Chicago Cubs are far from a young team at the moment.  As currently constructed, Geovany Soto is the only everyday starter who will be under the age of 29 at season’s end.  However, for the first time in a while, the Cubs appear to have a  relatively strong minor league system with some talents that could contribute in the near future.  In addition, several contract expirations will force a decision of the part of new ownership and possibly change the face of the team.

Who Could Be Leaving

It seems like Aramis Ramirez and Derrek Lee have been stationed at the corners for a decade.  Over the years, we’ve seen Dusty Baker and Lou Piniella try to squeeze any productive left handed bat between them in the lineup whether it be Jacque Jones, Kosuke Fukudome, Jeromy Burnitz or Milton Bradley.  While these players have come and gone or changed roles, Lee and Ramirez have been a consistent duo.  Derrek Lee bounced back from a rough 2008 to to put together his best year since his ’05 season in 2009.  The bad news is, he’ll be 35 by the end of this season when his contract expires.  Looking forward, years like 2008 look a lot more likely than 2009.

For Ramirez, he has a large player option for 2011 with a mutual option in 2012.  He took a hometown discount when he signed the extension and likely won’t fetch any more on the open market.  Since arriving, he has been the most consistent contributor for the Cubs, even maintaining a .905 OPS last year despite coming back from a shoulder injury.  Ramirez is 3 years younger than Lee and will more than likely outlast him on the north side.

Additionally, Kosuke Fukudome is signed through 2011 and will be turning 34 around the beginning of the 2012 season.  Unless he shows continued improvement in his early 30′s over the next couple of years, the initial 4-year deal will likely be the only one he receives from the Cubs.

Besides those big three players, Ryan Theriot is on a year-to-year basis, recently losing the first arbitration hearing the Cubs have had in nearly two decades.  Jeff Baker and Mike Fontenot are by no means long-term solutions, and Marlon Byrd just signed a 3 year deal.  As for Alfonso Soriano, he’s not going anywhere.

On the starting pitching front, Ryan Dempster and Carlos Zambrano are locked up for a good while, Randy Wells has just a year of service time accrued and Ted Lilly is finishing up the last year of what’s been a very productive deal (2007 playoffs aside).

What’s to Come

If you haven’t heard of Josh Vitters, Starlin Castro or Jay Jackson, they are the hottest prospects in the Cubs’ system. Castro has held his own at age 19 in AA ball, but will need at least a year to work on his defense and develop some power before anyone can consider playing him full-time at shortstop. Josh Vitters has displayed a great swing with tremendous power in A ball, but leaves a lot to be desired with his defense and BB rate. Jay Jackson has been outstanding in the high minor leagues, registering a 10.1 K/9 and 2.95 ERA over his brief minor league career. One also has to mention former top pick Andrew Cashner who excelled in his first minor league shot at starting. Still though of by many as a future reliever, he is said to be working on a changeup and will be starting in the minors this year. Another former top pick, Tyler Colvin put together a solid ’09, but has the same problem as Vitters with a low BB rate.

Further down the line are players like shorstop Hak-Ju Lee and outfielder Brett Jackson who had great seasons in 2009. Both show tremendous skills and have a strong chance to reach the majors. Other players like SP Chris Carpenter, SP Chris Archer, OF Kyler Burke and 2B Ryan Flaherty could also contribute down the line.

The Plan

The first decisions will have to be made at the end of the 2010 season.  With Derrek Lee’s contract expiring and Josh Vitters close, but not completely ready for the majors the Cubs have a few options.  Lee is entering into a free agent class of first basemen that includes Paul Konerko, Adam Dunn and Lance Berkman to name a few.  Because of this and the current market, Lee could be brought back at a large discount in a 2-year deal.  However, another possibility could lie in what becomes of Chad Tracy or Micah Hoffpauir this year.  If either show the ability to produce, they could be used as stop-gaps while Vitters develops fully.  While some might say this is a risky proposition, it is equally risk to expect continued production out of a first baseman in his mid-30′s.  With Vitters’ arrival in either 2011 or 2012, the Cubs could begin Aramis Ramirez’s transition to first base, unless Vitters does not improve at third in which case it would become his home.  Xavier Nady is another possible stop-gap solution who will likely come cheaper, with less years attached, and more positional flexibility if he is signed beyond 2010.

If Ryan Theriot becomes too expensive, the team can also go with current AAA shortstop Darwin Barney, or go with Andres Blanco in the short run if he shows improvement.  Both could produce at Theriot levels at younger ages without blocking Starlin Castro’s arrival.

At the same time, Ted Lilly’s rotation spot could easily be filled by Jay Jackson with several other starters waiting in the wings.

After 2011, Kosuke Fukudome will either be extended or move on to another team.  If the Cubs are to continue to get younger, this would be an opportunity for either Brett Jackson or Tyler Colvin to begin playing in the OF.  At the same time, some other aforementioned minor leaguers could be ready to fill unexpected holes in the rotation, the outfield or infield.

In many ways, this transition could be seamless, as long as management isn’t insistent on holding onto older players.  While it is risky to assume production out of young players, it is equally risky to invest a large amount of money in an aging veteran.  Additionally, with the money freed up through expiring contracts, there will be enough available to resign younger players and even look to plug holes temporarily through free agency.  A lot is still in the air, though.  Will Ramirez opt to remain a Cub?  Will Soriano produce at all in the final five years of his contract?  Will Soto return to his 2008 form and become one of the better catchers in the game?  These are critical questions whose answers will ultimately force  the Cubs’ decision makers to either find some in-house, young solutions or search for temporary and expensive answers in free agency.

A good bench is often cited as one of those necessities for a championship baseball team.  However, we are too often given vague descriptions of what truly constitutes a solid unit.  Is it good pinch runners and late inning defensive replacements?  A good pinch hitter that can negate the value of an opposing left handed reliever?  Or is it guys who can fill in in the case of injury?  Well, of course it’s all of the above in some way or another, but in this article we can hopefully start to create a systematic approach to filling out a roster.

A bench player’s value is determined by a variety of factors which arise from unique situations.  These include platoon partnering, pinch hitting, spot starting in place of a resting starter and replacing an injured starter.  One has to also consider the opportunity cost of development for younger players who could be receiving greater playing time in the minor leagues.

A general manager should look to start building his bench with players who can provide the most value.  The potential value is not just determined by being a superior talent, but also the potential playing opportunities.  In addition, there is some exclusivity as the multiple players cannot perform the exact same role off the bench.  The value of a player who excels at pinch running is hindered by having a teammate with similar skills as they can’t both be employed in all high leverage situations.  As a result, the GM has to examine how an addition will marginally affect the total team performance, rather than just the player’s individual contribution.  In order to properly evaluate the value of a player, we should look at each component of his value.

Platoon Partnering

A platoon partner is a split between a starter and bench player, but we’ll call him a bench player assuming that a team already has a starter at every position.  This role provides arguably the most value of any bench position, possibly improving production by 100 points in OPS over a few hundred plate appearances.  Take the current Cubs 2B platoon of Jeff Baker and Mike Fontenot as an example.

Baker (career)
vs. LHP .285/.346/.543/.889
vs. RHP .262/.316/.411/.727

Fontenot (career)
vs. LHP .232/.286/.344/.630
vs. RHP 272/.348/.435/.783

It’s pretty clear that the Cubs are getting a pretty solid increase in production with the career numbers showing a 269 point improvement against left handed pitching and a smaller 66 points against righties. Not only does a platoon situation help produce runs in the starting lineup, but the platoon partner is also available for perform other bench functions which we’ll look at later.  It’s pretty obvious that a player that provides a potentially large platoon advantage should have high priority on the bench.

Injury Replacement/Spot Starter

While some might think that pinch hitting is the next important function at the bench, I would argue that an injury replacement or spot starter is more important.  This is because a player has many more potential opportunities to contribute in place of a starter than as a player getting a few plate appearances per week.  Using this reasoning, the best bench option is clearly not the best hitter or fielder, but the player who has the greatest chance to contribute positively.  This would have a tendency to favor outfielders over first basemen and would require some evaluation of the injury risk for the starting lineup.  Using the Cubs case again, Micah Hoffpauir is an inferior choice to Chad Tracy, not because he is a worse hitter, but because he can only provide positive replacement value at 1st base where the relatively durable Derrek Lee plays and rarely skips a start.  Meanwhile, Tracy can play 1st or 3rd at least averagely and even play in the likely event of an Alfonso Soriano injury or off day.  A player with multiple position flexibility (which means not just playing the defensive positions, but playing them well enough to actually add value to the team) also allows for better utilization of the rest of the bench, increasing team value.

Pinch Hitting

Pinch hitting is important, but in most cases, finding a good pinch hitter shouldn’t be the first priority.  Platoon partners and positional backups would be able to handle most situations, and the premium paid for better hitters would far exceed the marginal benefit in a small amount of plate appearances.  Nevertheless, a bench that completely lacks a hitter who can hit right handed pitchers well, or a starter with a terrible platoon split and no platoon partner both create noteworthy opportunities to add value.  If this is a unique need for a team, then it may be worth it to add a player primarily for this purpose.

Pinch Running/Defensive Replacement

While often cited as important elements of a bench, a pinch runner or defensive replacement will have an insignificant impact on the team.  The value is somewhat increased with a particularly slow or defensively inept team, but this role should not be actively pursued as there are extremely few actual situations where a substitution makes any difference.  Additionally, there are almost always players already occupying the platoon partner or backup roles that are capable of pinch running or playing defense.  This role would likely be the main reason for the 2010 Cubs to add Sam Fuld to the roster, despite the fact that he would add little platoon advantage, replacement value over other members of the team, or pinch hitting value.

Opportunity Cost of Development

Finally, adding a player to the 25 man roster in a bench role will almost certainly limit his at bats compared to starting in the minor leagues.  This is an important issue particularly for teams not expecting to contend since a win in the current year is valued at a lesser value than future wins.  Also, players in the minor leagues can still have value as backups on the depth chart in the event of a longer term injury.  On the whole, teams should keep their younger players in the minor leagues and avoid the hindrance of development.  Such is the case with the Cubs and Tyler Colvin.  While he could provide great value as 4th outfielder, it’s clear he has a lot to gain from another year in the minors.

Altogether, a bench should be made up of a players who can contribute positively in the greatest number of potential situations.  This goes farther than the simple addition of good players, but also considers where and when these players could fill in and have an impact.  Additionally, flexibility allows for greater utilization of all players off the bench in situations where they are best equipped to add value.

I’m not a basketball guy by any means, but the devotion of die-hard basketball fans to the value of a big man–even when field goal percentage is at an all time high–has always struck me as a bit perplexing.  Of course, having an interior threat is a huge advantage.  In general, the best teams have the strongest interior threats.  This is because the best teams have the best players, in general.  Having four strong players can separate the great teams from the other contenders.  And I don’t think any team has perfected the five guard offense, which means that interior players are obviously valuable.  The best players in the NBA, and even in college these days, all seem to be either guards or smaller forwards.  The proliferation of the three point shooting game has been one critical element, but it appears to me that to win in today’s game, you need not only to be able to play offense on the perimeter, but that defense on the perimeter might be even more important.

I’m most definitely a football guy, as the post distribution on this here sight might have had you guessing.  In football, a sustainable running game is huge competitive advantage over teams who can’t run the ball, but the best five offenses in the game every year are all throw-first teams, and the bottom five offenses every year all lack the ability to throw the football.  Perfecting the running game can separate you from the other ten teams around the median, all of which can throw the football, but need that balance to be able to sustain drives.

Running can make the difference between winning and losing in football, but it doesn’t make the difference between the Raiders and the Chargers.  If the Raiders woke up tomorrow morning with an offense that could sustain a 4.6 YPC average, they would still not be the favorite in the division, or really even a threat.  They would become much less of a pushover for the Chiefs, but the Chargers would just do what they have always done to them (the Raiders haven’t beaten SD since 2003 — the year before Drew Brees became Drew Brees).  It seems silly to cite a declining running game as the reason for underachieving expectations in football.  Sure, the decline might have been a factor, but no team is throwing all of it’s eggs in that basket at this point.  It’s a crutch.

It’s no secret that excelling at middle infield has become sort of a forgotten art in baseball.  There are great infielders in the game today, among them Derek Jeter, and Chase Utley, and Dustin Pedroia.  2009 was a year where all sorts of second basemen and shortstops got in on the fun: Aaron Hill, Ben Zobrist, and Marco Scutaro all had excellent years by any standard.

But baseball execs do not speak with words.  They use dollars to communicate.  And the dollars show that the most valuable players in the game don’t play the middle infield.  The highest paid players in baseball do two things primarily: they pitch and they hit.  Second basemen who can hit get paid like corner outfielders…while corner outfielders who can get get paid like first basemen and top pitchers.

But the most striking thing about middle infielders and salary structure might be that, with the exception of the elite players at those positions, salary structure seems to correlate best with how long these guys have been with their organization.  Orlando Hudson signed with Minnesota last week for one year-$5 million just a year after signing with the LA Dodgers for one year-$3.4 million.  The point of mentioning this is not to suggest that $5 million dollars is chump change or that Hudson should be paid more for what he offers.  Hudson has the 6th highest contract value on the Twins according to Cot’s Baseball Contracts.  He and shortstop JJ Hardy are about $2 million behind Carl Pavano in 2010 salary.  And the Twins are one of the only teams in baseball who value their middle infielders in the tier right behind their superstars, Joe Mauer and Justin Morneau.  They are also, coincidentally, a team that is quite comfortable simply going with farmhands at the position year after year if they don’t have an “elite” option.

Hudson is a similar player in career value to A’s second baseman Mark Ellis, who is the third highest paid player on cash-strapped Oakland.  Ellis is one of two players for the A’s who commanded a contract extension beyond arbitration years.  Oakland, historically, plays the baseball market very well (if you’re reading this article, you probably won’t ask for a reference regarding that claim), but it’s very safe to say that Mark Ellis probably would not have been able to beat $12 million on the open market without signing for 4+ years.  I’m confident this is because, while even in a bad year Ellis can justify his contract (value of a marginal win aside), the league wide perception is that even the league’s worst teams have a farmhand that is worth at least as much as Ellis.

Placido Polanco was able to land 3 years-$18 million this offseason, which is obviously a bigger contract than Ellis or Hudson have been able to land, but not on a per-year basis.  Polanco is well worth the money spent, but one of the biggest underlying factors in the move for Philadelphia is that now, Chase Utley can be moved to a position where his contract doesn’t stand out quite as much from the rest of the pack.  The Polanco deal actually decreases the average contract for a second baseman significantly.

Right now, the second highest-paid second baseman in the game is Robinson Cano, who is something like the 7th highest paid position player on his own team.  The first and third largest second baseman contracts in MLB history (according to Cot’s, and excluding Utley) belong to Brian Roberts, a former Orioles farmhand turned superstar, turned overpaid leadoff man.  In fact, the most valuable second basemen in the game tend to be as noteworthy on the open market as the light-hitting second basemen whose only true value to a baseball team is their ability to play other positions.

To this point, the focal point has been on second baseman, but the same phenomenon is found in the shortstops market as well.  The biggest difference is that overall salary structure is much higher for the shortstops because having the ability to stand out there at short and hit homers has created an overvalued player of sorts. Michael Young, the player I have linked to here, has actually exceeded his contract in terms of marginal value every year since coming up in 2002, according to FanGraphs.  But at the price of a premium shortstop, Young is now a third baseman coming off a career year with the bat.  It seems doubtful he will ever be worth the yearly value of his contract for it’s duration.

Like at second base, there’s no market here below the elite level (Jose Reyes/Miguel Tejada/Hanley Ramirez/Jimmy Rollins/etc).  Marco Scutaro got two years-$12.5 million on the open market from Boston, and he was the best of the free agent class by far.  Those who make it to the elite level are not there because of defense, and tend to be moved to a position that maximized the value that teams have overpaid for.  Derek Jeter is a rare exception, for reasons that have to do in large part with intangibles.

While teams have been quicker to pull the hook on shortstops than on their second baseman (based on anecdotal, but pretty clear turnover at the SS position), teams are still by and large satisfied with limited production at the position as long as the incumbent can field the position.  Turnover at the shortstop position tends to happen not when a player isn’t hitting, because each organization is loaded with shortstops who can’t hit above 7th or 8th in the major league lineup.  But when a player ceases to be a true shortstop, and is redefined as a light-hitting baseball player without a position (not to be confused with the much more valuable utility player who can still play a poor man’s shortstop off the bench), then teams move on without that player.  This tends not to happen as much with second baseman.

Turnover, however, is not really what I’m talking about.  Like the second baseman, the salary structure is completely out of whack at shortstop.  The aforementioned Twins have in consecutive years 1) extended farmhand Nick Punto for $4 million a year for two years, and then 2) not only offered arbitration to Stephen Harris, but bought out his first two years.  The only way either Punto or Harris will see extended time at shortstop this year is if a much more justifiable gamble on JJ Hardy doesn’t pay off, but both moves are still bad for optimal salary structure.  Meanwhile, defensive whiz Adam Everett has now played for the Tigers for $1 million and then $1.55 million in consecutive years, both open market contracts.  Jack Wilson, another defense-first player, will make $5 million a year over the next two years for the Mariners (he at least knows how to hold a bat).  Another open market contract.

These shortstops are coming on the extreme cheap for two reasons: because players are receiving extensions through arbitration for simply being a good organizational soldier, and because the obscenely low middle infielder replacement level standard seemingly justifies any extension on a shortstop (you’re still the exception here, Dayton Moore).  Organizations across the country have always been thin on shortstops who are actually prospects as shortstops, but pretty much everyone who plays the position for a whole year finishes with positive value, based on his positioning if nothing else.

Players who actually provide defensive and offensive value at shortstop (such as Scutaro) should be in much higher demand than the market suggests they are, but middle infielders are simply not paid as other baseball regulars, at least not to be regulars.  It’s the reason that Scott Boras can look at Dave Dombrowski in the eye and suggest that 2-3 WAR player Johnny Damon should receive his $7 million dollars in a lump sum instead of deferred payments, and the team that couldn’t afford (2.5-3 WAR) Polanco can’t just laugh in his face.  Damon is being offered more money for the 2010 season than either Curtis Granderson or Polanco made one year ago, has no other offers on the table, and yet, it’s the contract’s net present value–not dollar amount–that is keeping the sides apart.

Middle infield wins and corner outfield/infield wins are simply not valued on the same scale.  Having organizational goodwill does nothing for an outfielder that cannot hit or field.  Replacement level outfielders are much more likely to be non-tendered in their arbitration years than similar valued infielders.  It’s simple: outfielders, third basemen, and first basemen are still the currency of baseball.  While the defensive market is valued pretty well on the whole, players are still paid by their value to a batting order.  And while there is clearly a difference between players that hit 7th, 8th, or 9th in a strong lineup, and those who hit there in a weak one, the differences are not reflected monetarily in players that can’t hit higher in the order on that weaker lineup.

Which returns us to the original question: are middle infielders in baseball the equivalent of the post defender in modern basketball, or run defenders in modern football?  Are the differences between the best baseball teams and worst baseball teams pretty much independent of the players who play in the middle infield for those teams?  I ran a quick regression on shortstops and second baseman 2009 WAR vs. team wins, and I found that, overall, there’s a weak correlation between this one year sample, and team wins in 2009 (r-squared = 0.21).  The correlation is significantly stronger with shortstops than with second baseman.  It’s not a very large sample, but based on the evidence, it seems tentatively okay to conclude that teams do win largely independent of their two middle infielders, and of second baseman in particular.  That’s not saying much, but you could probably predict wins a lot better looking at the value of a team’s three best hitters or three best pitchers than their middle infielders.

So when you evaluate a move such as the Cardinals taking OF Skip Schumaker and turning him into a full time second baseman, you can kind of see the attitude by baseball executives towards those middle infielders encapsulated.  The move means little in terms of good-for-team or bad-for-team, rather, it’s an example of a team going out of its way to keep a player within the organization.  Schumaker didn’t make very much difference in the outcome of the NL Central–which was won by St. Louis.  The Cards failed to advance in the playoffs because Albert Pujols slugged .300 and Chris Carpenter and Joel Pinero combined to give up 8 earned runs in 9 innings.  Maybe if they invested heavily in middle infielders, they could have made it a round further.  Or maybe next time, Pujols will hit two homers in three games.  Superstars will always decide the outcome of small sample occurrences, and the available evidence suggest that, while the salary structure of the middle infielder might be off, it’s probably not worth holding your breath until they get equal treatment under salary law.

When given the benefit of hindsight, it appears that one of the biggest trends in the recent history of the NFL Draft is that the volatility between the quality of quarterback classes is the biggest determinant of whether a class is strong or weak.  To an extent, this is the truth.  There are critical variables, but generally speaking, when scouts tend to miss on the quality of a quarterback, they usually miss on the quality of an entire class.  1999, 2007, and 2009 are all examples of classes that underachieved even the most timid projections for the class.  Conversely, 2004, 2006, and 2008 are all strong quarterback classes, and produced multiple franchise-type passers.  2002, though, does not appear to fit this narrative.  Allow me to explain myself.

It’s a class that produced no superstars, and the three first round picks who have turned out to be ‘busts’ in hindsight, but the quality of the class is much stronger than it appears if you throw out names like Harrington, Ramsey, and Carr.  A missed quarterback class would imply that the teams missed their evaluations and overdrafted middling players at the top of a draft.  On the surface, that would explain Carr, Harrington, and Ramsey.  But, per usual, a deeper look demands a more creative answer.

Here’s the 2002 NFL Draft quarterback class, among the players who tossed more than 250 career passes:

Early Rounds

• David Carr, Houston Texans, Round 1, Pick 1
• Joey Harrington, Detroit Lions, Round 1, Pick 3
• Patrick Ramsey, Washington Redskins, Round 1, Pick 32

Middle Rounds

• Josh McCown, Arizona Cardinals, Round 3, Pick 81
• David Garrard, Jacksonville Jaguars, Round 4, Pick 108

Late Rounds

• JT O’Sullivan, New Orleans Saints, Round 6, Pick 186

And that’s not really an impressive group of quarterbacks lumped into any sort of group.  One pro bowl trip.  One season above a 90.0 QB rating.  Exactly why isn’t this a weak class?

It’s a context thing.  Look at the teams making those draft picks.  In 2001: the Redskins were one of the five worst offenses in the NFL and that was with an effective running game, the Lions were running out a combination of Charlie Batch, James Stewart, and Johnnie Morton, the Jaguars were two years removed from the height of their power and declining into a transition period (Tom Coughlin would be fired within a year).  The Cardinals were the Cardinals back when their team nickname was an insult.  The Texans didn’t even exist.

Usually in a given draft year, some teams with offensive infrastructure will get into the action near the top of the draft.  But the closest thing to that happening here was the 5th round selection of Craig Nall by Green Bay.  Nall would be touted as a future starting quarterback at different points in his NFL career, but here we are post-2009, and he’s yet to throw 50 career passes.  The players who did play in this draft played on some of the worst offenses in NFL history, and the exceptions to the rule came when the players were backups.

This is also strange.  First round draft picks who fail in their first stop as NFL quarterbacks tend to bounce around the league for awhile, and oftentimes end up somewhere without a lot of clout, but quite productive.  For the class of 2002, these players got strangely pushed to the road following their initial quarterback stints.

David Carr was not a great first overall selection.  Twice in his career, he posted sack rates in excess of 13%.  He holds the all time record for times sacked in a single season with 76 in 2002.  His sack index for that year, on a scale where 100 (percent) is average, is an incredible 44.  David Carr also never really had a line in Houston, but if his ability to get rid of the football was a standardized exam, Carr would have scored in the 10th percentile.

Carr was never part of a massive offensive improvement in Houston, but when the passing rules relaxed in 2004, Carr looked for the world to be a franchise quarterback.  He threw for 7.6 yards per attempt with 2nd year WR Andre Johnson leading the charge, and RB Dominick Davis-Williams leading the charge.  His sack rate had risen significantly from his career low before (he led the league in sacks in an otherwise stellar season), and could have been viewed as a warning sign of the future, but no one saw what happened to the Texans in 2005 coming.

He took another 58 sacks in 2005 as the team regressed to 2-14 (most of the decline was defensive, the Texans were the league’s worst defense in 2005).  Ultimately Carr was not the kind of quarterback who could play from behind without the benefit of a running game. Carr came with an amazing ability to attempt 26-29 passes a game no matter how many times the Texans actually called pass plays.  If the team ran the ball 40 times a game, they could keep Carr off his back entirely, and if they threw 45 times a game, Carr would eat the ball about ten times.

Carr turned out not to be worthy of the first overall pick, but it’s safe to say that the Texans screwed up developmentally after the 2004 season, and could have had the offense they currently have with Matt Schaub two years earlier with David Carr if they hadn’t taken his development for granted.   The next guy on this list, however, is even tougher to judge in hindsight.

Joey Harrington was one of the least successful passers in the history of professional football.  He also, depending on who you ask, might not deserve any blame for a mess created by Matt Millen.  For Harrington’s sake, he was grossly underrated in his first two years the league, when in a stripped down version of Steve Mariucci’s offense, Harrington was the least sacked QB in the NFL.  Both years.

Harrington’s ultimate failures these first two years were undeniable.  He had thrown for only 5.3 yards per attempt and completed a paltry 54% of his passes.  Not taking sacks is one thing, actually being productive is another entirely.  Harrington was not productive in his first two years in the league.  In 2004, the Lions drafted Roy Williams with the 7th overall pick, and suddenly, Harrington became productive.  He threw 19 TDs to only 12 picks, and posted a QB rating of 77.5.  In the first half of the 2004 season, Carr and Harrington were both among the league leaders in passing yards.  The 2002 draft class was slow to develop, but on pace to be just fine.

Then again, it was the Lions.  Harrington needed to take the next step to reach his draft potential, and in 2005, the Lions offense was horrendous.  Tai Streets and Az Hakim gave way to Mike Williams and Scotty Vines.  Harrington managed to improve his completion percentage again (Joey Harrington never actually regressed in completion percentage in his career), and probably never regressed, but the Lions weren’t going anywhere fast.  The Bears picked off Harrington five times in a Week 2 game, and he lost his job five games into the season.

Harrington was probably a bust.  You can look at his completion percentages and his yards per attempt over his career, and suggest that he got way more opportunities than he actually deserved.  But you can also look at it this way: after escaping Detroit in 2006, Harrington went on to start double digit games for the Dolphins in relief of Daunte Culpepper, and then the Falcons in relief of Michael Vick.  In both years, the improvement in the offenses was instantaneous.  By simply adding a degree of professionalism to the offense, teams that were starting Joey Harrington began to produce.  And by 2008, both teams had gone from rags to the postseason by bringing in new quarterbacks–players who were better than Harrington, but in the same mold.  The Lions had the timing/rhythm offense the whole time, and couldn’t get to mediocre.  And a lot of that’s not Harrington’s fault, even if he’s ultimately a draft bust.  The Lions, meanwhile, have not made it to the postseason since Harrington was drafted, and their best quarterback seasons since have been from Jon Kitna.  Glad they figured it out.

Now, here’s the part where the class gets odd.  Patrick Ramsey was considered by the Washington Redskins to be the best quarterback in the 2002 draft, and was drafted by the team to be Steve Spurrier’s fun n’ gun passer of choice.  And in his case, the results were instantaneous.  He only completed 51.5% of passes as a rookie, but he led the league in yards per completion, and his 6.8 yards per attempt were more than respectable for a rookie.

One thing that is really not debatable is that the talent of the Redskins declined from 2002 to 2003.  The team added Laveranues Coles and G Randy Thomas in the offseason, but they got rid of RB Stephen Davis who went on to enjoy an excellent year with the Panthers, giving Trung Candidate the job.  Ramsey seemed to make his receivers better, but the decline was pretty inevitable.  No one ever really found out if Steve Spurrier offense worked or not in the NFL.  Ramsey had been the most productive player of the entire QB class to this point, but had just as many questions to answer as any other quarterback.

The Redskins offense was embarrassingly bad in 2004.  This was hardly Patrick Ramsey’s fault as he had been forced to the bench by Joe Gibbs in exchange for Mark Brunell, who the team traded for.  Ramsey started the team’s final seven games in relief of an ineffective Brunell, and was really playing in a professional system for a first time.  The team was terrible, and Ramsey was below average, but significantly better than Brunell.  Mark Brunell would go on to have a great season and a half as a Redskin, but we never would find out if the team would have been better off with Ramsey.  The best offense Ramsey ever played with was the 2002 Redskins.  He was excellent in relief of Brunell in 2005, but what does that really mean?  His only start was in week one against Chicago…he didn’t finish the game, and that team went on to intercept Harrington five times the next week.

Ramsey has seen the field only one other time since leaving Washington.  He relieved Jay Cutler in a game in Detroit in 2007, and was quite good in relief in a losing effort.  There’s nothing really definitive you can say about Ramsey’s career, even now.  His performance as a passer is inversely related to the playing time he received.  The better he performed, the less he played.  Such was life in Washington in the middle of the decade.  Ramsey probably wasn’t a bust, but no team wanted to take him on as a QB of the future.  Not even, you know, the team who spent that first round pick on him.

How can you rank the first round quarterbacks in the 2002 class.  You just have two cases of questionable management, and one case of “what the f*ck.”  Carr had the two best seasons of the bunch.  Harrington had the third best season, Ramsey the fourth and fifth, Carr the sixth, Ramsey the seventh, and Harrington and Carr enjoyed the worst five seasons split evenly.  Was Ramsey a better player than Carr?  Was Carr a better player than Harrington?  It seems obvious on the surface that Ramsey was more productive than Harrington, but how much of that was the Lions being the Lions?  I’d rank them Ramsey, then Carr, then Harrington, but maybe I’ve got it completely backwards.  After all, Harrington kept getting the chances after being released, while Ramsey got basically nothing.

These weren’t poor prospects, but there were two clear overdrafts, and three cases of horrendous management.

The rest of the class is pretty standard with other years.  David Garrard was a fourth round choice of the Jaguars.  When he was taken, he was taken to be Mark Brunell’s backup and potential successor.  As it turned out, the Jags took Byron Leftwich to succeed Brunell, and Brunell then…ended up taking over for Ramsey, while Leftwich WON with Jacksonville, only to be replaced later by Garrard.  I’m telling you, the teams that took QBs in 2002 really had no idea what they were doing.

Garrard was basically irrelevant until 2005, which happens to be when Leftwich was just getting good.  Leftwich couldn’t finish a full season, so Garrard gave the Jaguars league average performance off the bench for two years.  Average performance is valuable, in fact, it earned both Matt Schaub and Garrard starting jobs in 2007 when the Jags unceremoniously dumped Leftwich.  Garrard responded with a career year and one of the best quarterback seasons ever in 2007 (QB rating: 102.2!), kept it going into 2008 although maybe without the WOW factor of the prior year, but after 2009, 2007 appears to be a flash in the pan.

It wasn’t until 2009 though that Garrard became the most successful passer in the class, surpassing Carr who was the unquestioned starter of his team for five seasons.  The advantages to being the first overall pick, now a highly underrated backup quarterback.  The difference of course is that David Carr was never at any point a league average starter while Garrard is still about league average.  Statistics are excellent for describing our narratives without using words: David Garrard, the 108th pick in 2002, has enjoyed the most success in the class.  Joey Harrington, the 3rd pick, has enjoyed the least.  That’s pretty conclusive.  Can we just go and say that Garrard was a better player than Harrington?  While that’s probably accurate, Garrard’s successes and Harrington’s failures do not prove that Garrard would have been a better pick than Harrington.

And furthermore, there’s a David Garrard in EVERY draft class.  Brian Griese, Aaron Brooks, Marc Bulger, Sage Rosenfels, Kyle Orton, Derek Anderson, Matt Cassel, Bruce Gradkowski, Tyler Thigpen, etc.  Not one of those players is going to wind up the best QB in their class.  This is because few players take the career path of David Carr or Patrick Ramsey, and for two players in the same class to not-succeed-without-failing is pretty much exclusive to 2002.

As far as first overall picks go, Carr clearly exceeds Alex Smith and JaMarcus Russell in value while failing to reach Carson Palmer and Eli Manning.  Then there’s Tim Couch and Michael Vick, who never made it as passers.  Most observers would take Michael Vick’s career over David Carr’s and I think I would as well, but Carr was the better passer.  Carr was simply one in a long line of quarterbacks to go first overall in a class where there was no good first overall type.

Not having an elite stud that everyone can agree on doesn’t ruin a class.  2004 might be the best quarterback class ever, and the best player in the class (excluding JP Losman, for a moment) is the only one without a ring.  Can you tell me who the best quarterback in the 2006 class is?  Probably not.

David Carr is probably one of the best 40 quarterbacks in the league right now, and it wouldn’t be a stretch to place Ramsey or Harrington in the same class if they were still in the league.  David Garrard is one of the best 25 quarterbacks in the NFL.  That’s four quarterbacks who, if they were all active, could being among the best backups or back end starters.  The 2003 class wasn’t that deep.  The 2001 class wasn’t as deep.  Certainly not 2007.

The 2002 NFL Draft QB class was stronger than at least a third of the classes of the decade, and will perhaps represent the median if the 2009 class fails to live up to expectation.  All the great passers in the NFL came from other classes, and that includes the fact that Drew Brees and Carson Palmer came from classes I consider to be worse.  But that doesn’t address what could have been if the teams who had taken players in this class could have actually developed them.  And I suspect that this will remain a problem for teams in the future.

I missed on my super bowl pick this year.  This is nothing new, of course.  Since 2000, my picks for the big game were as follows (in chronological order): Giants, Rams, Raiders, Panthers, Patriots, Seahawks, Bears, Patriots, Cardinals, and now Colts.  I have bolded all the teams who actually won for your viewing pleasure.  That Gorilla that took the Saints hasn’t been alive as long as I’ve been picking SB games this decade, but it’s been roughly as right as I have over this timeframe.

I thought the Colts would win.  I thought it was possible that the Colts could blow out the Saints.  I even went as far as predicting that if each team lost it’s quarterback, the Colts’ advantage would become more decisive.

But no matter how I crunched all the evidence, there was no way to possibly suggest that the Saints had a worse than 40% chance to win the game.  And, yeah, that’s not supported by the final line on the game (5 points).  So when I picked the Colts, I did so based on the “blowout principle” which essentially states that, even if the game probabilities are split, taking the team that I believe has a greater chance to win an uncompetitive game makes the pick both smarter and safer.  Moving the line, though from two points to five points hardly makes the game blowout proof.  So, it appears that Super Bowl 44 represented a market inefficiency between all the information we had, and how the game was perceived.

The way the Colts had performed in the playoffs, they deserved to be favored.  But, had the super bowl been played in New Orleans, the spread of five points still suggests the Saints would have been favored.  That can’t be right.  Maybe the Colts should have been slight favorites on a neutral field, but I’m thinking two points max.

The inefficiency described here resulted in a bet against the spread that I witnessed at the Super Bowl party I was at.  The bet was a friendly one for an insignificant sum of money, enough to make the outcome matter to two neutral parties, not enough to cause any anxiety for the loser.  The bet initiator was all too happy to willingly offer the spread to allow for an agreement.  In this instance, it might have been more fair to just bet the game straight up.

To put this in further perspective, consider the Colts response to the Saints after the 2-pt conversion to go up by 7.  Did the Colts throw caution to the wind and start slinging the ball downfield in an attempt to make the final five minutes look like last year’s super bowl?  No. The Colts clearly had the idea to slow down their offense and work to eat up all the remaining time off the clock, score, and (presumably) play for overtime.  This response was to the Tampa Two Coverage scheme the Saints were playing most of the game.  The Colts not only didn’t try to generate a big play, they specifically tried to avoid getting chunks of yardage and giving Drew Brees the last chance to win in regulation.  The Colts, most probably, were going to be successful in forcing overtime if not for the great individual win by the Saints that caused the interception.  And if that happened, the super bowl would have been decided by a margin of three points one way or the other.

It was a pretty close game, either way.  The final three minutes were anti-climatic, but it was a game that featured more move-and-counter-move strategies than any super bowl in recent memory.  Which was kind of predictable, if both teams were understood well.  The difference in the game was essentially, that the two point conversion was overturned, and that Reggie Wayne’s route go jumped by a little known second round corner.  That’s not what a lot of people predicted would happen.  But furthermore, that’s not really an upset.

It was the close game that everyone wanted to get, that people expected to see.  Peyton Manning did not have the final moment of glory.  But more than that, the Saints, in two and a half quarters, erased a 10-0 deficit and led by a full touchdown in crunch time.  The Colts have been great at the end of game situations over the last four years or so, but the Saints had won on the field well before Tracy Porter finished the game on the scoreboard.

That simply would have not happened if the Saints weren’t the better team.  A lot of things can happen in a football game.  The Saints were in all likelyhood going to be in the game in the fourth quarter.  But they won because they were able to force the Colts to play for overtime.  And anytime you can marginalize a powerful opponent into working hard, and smart, just to have a chance at winning a coin flip, it can be summarized that the Colts would have been incredibly lucky to have come back.  A great team, but also a lucky team.  And the Saints won by 14 because instead of getting lucky, the Colts were unlucky.

The Saints won the game because they were better.  Don’t call it an upset.

Despite my best efforts, Peyton Manning and Drew Brees are still the two biggest players in this game.  There are other important players: Reggie Bush, Pierre Thomas, Jahri Evans, Carl Nicks, Will Smith, Jonathon Vilma, Darren Sharper, Jabari Greer, Gary Brackett, Dwight Freeney, Robert Mathis, Raheem Brock, Charlie Johnson, Jeff Saturday, Joseph Addai, Reggie Wayne, Dallas Clark, Pierre Garcon, Austin Collie, Mike Hart–all of who could collectively decide the game, and we probably wouldn’t even know it.

Still, Manning and Brees are king, and are the storyline with regards to this game.  We will probably know at the end of the day that one guy outplayed the other, and if there’s any justice in the world, that team will win the game.

It would not be right to suggest that these two teams are here exclusively because of their quarterbacks.  They are not.  They both have stronger defenses than they have ever had in the past, highly efficient (and important) kicking games, and the Saints can run the ball on seemingly whoever they want to.  But both the Saints and the Colts have one last game to win–regardless of how and why they are here–and both will rely very heavily on their superstar quarterbacks to get it done.

On top of the responsibility each holds for the performance of their team, this game means so much to each in the historical sense.  I’m sure Peyton Manning doesn’t give two darns about whether he will be considered the greatest quarterback ever to play the game, or merely one of the greatest, but if we’re going to talk about his team, the Indianapolis Colts, in the same breath as the New England Patriots and Pittsburgh Steelers this decade, the Colts have to win this game.  Furthermore, while I’m sure Manning wouldn’t give the time of day to anyone who asked him about a third title at this point, Peyton is at an age where the only way he is going to be able to win that many titles is to win this game.  If he has two at age 33, then yeah, three before he retires is quite reasonable.  Getting two titles after age 34 would be practically impossible, and while the smart money is on Peyton winning this year, and then again in 2010 (since the Colts will open next with basically the exact same roster as this year but with a healthy team), the idea that he might not be a multiple time SB champ seems preposterous now, but becomes very realistic if he can’t win this game.

On the other hand, think of what this game feels like from Drew Brees’ perspective.  He doesn’t play for a juggernaut like the Colts.  He plays for the historically irrelevant New Orleans Saints.  While Peyton can sit there and wonder what could have been if he loses this game…what better chance is Brees ever going to have to win a title?  The Colts could be back in this game next year regardless of outcome.  The Saints almost certainly will not be.  Brees is a good enough player as to where he could find himself back in another super bowl as a role player–or perhaps a backup–six or seven years down the road.  If Brees can just win a football game tomorrow, he’s a champion, and a probable hall of famer.  If he fails to win tomorrow, he’s probably not going to retire with a ring, and then he’ll have some trouble getting enough votes to get into Canton–the pull for him will be there regardless.

Joe Montana won zero rings after the age of 33.  Terry Bradshaw didn’t win any after 31.  Tom Brady last won at age 27.  He might win again next year at age 33, but father time is clearly shrinking the window the Pats have, and if he is to win, he’ll have to beat Manning along the way.  Aikman had all the rings he would ever have by 29.

John Elways end-of-career run stands as the lone example of a legend getting his at the end of a long career.  Elway had some great passing seasons near the end, but mostly, it appears the AFC got just weak enough to give him an opening.  And it wasn’t much of an opening, since the Packers were heavily favored in SB32.  But if you can get it down to just one game, anything can happen.  And that’s the attitude that Brees and the Saints need to win.  You’ve had a spectacular season where you’ve exceeded all expectations, even your own.  The team who you will line up against is not the Cardinals or the Vikings or the Panthers, they’re actually an accomplished team.  But they’re not some historic team who can’t be beaten.  The Saints must understand that there is very limited shame in losing, but the biggest factor here is the opportunity.

No NFC team has repeated as conference champions since 1997.  No NFC South team has ever won the division in consecutive years.  The Saints aren’t really even built to sustain a dynasty.  The offense, yes.  Who knows about the defense?  They could be dead last in the league next year.  Or they could be a little bit better.

But the Saints have the opportunity to be the 2002 Bucs in history, or they can go the way of the 2003 Panthers.  Both options are sub-optimal than to simply being where the Indianapolis Colts are.  They’re not even on the same playing field as the Saints.  And that’s the mindset that the Colts need to take to this game.  That team over there: desperate.  We are the best team in the match-up.  That’s the kind of thinking that needs to occur for the favorites.  And then it needs to transfer to the field.

If the Colts leave the Saints in the game, were going to have a hell of a super bowl to watch.  And the Colts might pull it out anyway at the end, but it’s not like the Saints are worried about that.  If the Colts ever let Drew Brees have one drive to win the super bowl, they’ve played their cards wrong.  Because if the Saints get that sort of advantage: their best unit, their best players against the Colts trying to hang on to a slim lead, that’s the way an upset will happen.

It’s such a realistic possibility that there really is no “upset” in this game.  The Colts should win.  But if the Saints are in the game, everyone watching, Colts fans included, will know ahead of time that this game can go either way.  That’s a league-wide phenomenon.  The best computers, the vegas spreads, the former players, no one can sustain a picking rate higher than 2/3s.  That doesn’t mean that there are no such thing as favorites in football, but it does mean that, when you have two teams and only one title, the game should be good.

And unless the Colts just have the winning gameplan right from the first snap, it’s going to be good one.  And it’s going to come down to Brees, the clock, a four point deficit, Manning on the sidelines, super bowl immortality in his grasp–

…and a Kelvin Hayden interception.  Colts 39, Saints 35.

As far as super bowl match-ups go, Drew Brees vs. Peyton Manning is pretty epic.  They are really 1a and 1b in terms of most valuable players in the NFL.  According to my simple player progression system, it was Brees who entered the season expecting greater things, and Manning’s 4th MVP comes in a bit of an upset.  Of course, he’s Peyton Manning, and he’ll develop on his own curve.

If one team or the other team loses their quarterback early in the game, the other team gains a decisive advantage.  But for this exercise, neither team gains a relative advantage because we’re going to remove Brees and Manning from this equation.  Don’t think it’s possible that the game could come down to this?  Ask Mack Brown what he thinks.  In all seriousness, it’s actually quite likely that the game itself gets decided by an injury or two, although for either quarterback, let alone both, to be involved would be downright improbable.

The crux of this question is less about the actual players who would try to step into the shoes of a downed superstar, and more about the team-wide ability to shift into a gameplan involving field position and defense.  It’s so rare in the game today for the quarterback position to drive everything a team does that less than 1/6 of the league would be majorly affected by playing without their starting QB for half a game.  Unquestionably, the Saints and Colts are two of those teams.

On offense, the Colts would see the greater dropoff without Manning in part because of the rookie struggles of the man who would replace him, Curtis Painter.  It would take a lot more than a sprain or a small fracture to actually have Peyton Manning actually leave the game, but once he’s out, the Colts become an offense that huddles and runs the football.  There would be no tempo to the offense, and the Saints could exploit match-ups in the Colts offensive line to get to Painter.  The Colts would have to rely on a steady diet of three step drops and field goals and field position for the first time this year.

But the Colts have been there before.  In fact, the last time they played in Miami, they played a Monday Night thriller against the Dolphins back in Week Two.  The Dolphins nearly won the game, and dominated on both lines and in time of possession.  But the Colts won by controlling the air game and generating big plays against a young, weak Miami secondary.  The Colts had to take what the defense gave them until, eventually, they were able to break the Dolphins’ stranglehold on the game in the fourth quarter.  The Dolphins made the Colts play their game, and still lost, thanks in no small part to Manning.  But while Manning set up his teammates, it wasn’t Manning who actually made the plays.  Dallas Clark and Pierre Garcon both had touchdown receptions of over 45 yards to make the difference and neither were difficult throws.

Put in another way, Painter may not be able to get the job done, but he would still have all the tools to be successful.  Gregg Williams’ defense specializes in harassing and punishing rookie quarterbacks who are not yet sophisticated enough to protect themselves.  That would include Painter, but the Colts could just as easily respond with an attack designed to make the Saints defense pay for being over-aggressive.  The Saints can’t really control how willing the Colts would be to let Painter decide the outcome of the super bowl, so they could not prepare to just attack Painter, nor to completely ignore him.  Because the Colts would still largely have the talent advantage, the Saints do not gain a schematic advantage that they don’t already have with Manning under center.  They would just benefit from not having to be under assault from Manning most of the game.

On the other side, a Brees-less Saints offense would not have very many tools in the passing game.  Enter Mark Brunell at quarterback.  Brunell, at age 38, is a much better quarterback than a rookie Curtis Painter.  But he doesn’t have the sort of accuracy or anticipitory ability brought by Brees to the table, and his entry into the lineup would marginalize the Saints receivers greatly.

Where Brunell would be able to help the Saints is in the turnover category.  With a good concept of where the pocket is, and the ability to read any coverage the Colts would throw at him, Sean Payton would not have to dial down the Saints playbook for Brunell.  However, it’s the vertical (seam routes) aspect that would take the biggest hit.  Brunell can not make the same throws against the coverage that Brees can, and the fact that the Saints receivers are an athletic group that can adjust to where Brees puts the ball is largely irrelevant.

Brunell is still good enough to keep the defense honest, but he would spend most of the time handing off as the Saints try to pound a smallish Colts defensive front that is just quicker than they are offensively.  This is the biggest adjustment that either team would have to make without it’s quarterback.  Due to Brees’ decision making and accuracy, the speed of the Colts defense is largely irrelivant in their game, as Brees can react faster than they can, allowing the Saints offense to be proactive.  With Brunell, the Saints offense becomes reactive, making the right decisions, but only after allowing the Colts defense to dictate where the ball goes.  If they can pound the rock, they will win.  If they can’t, they won’t be able to sustain long drives.  Field position will decide the game.

Brunell is a better quarterback than Painter is, and is probably a better quarterback than Painter will ever be.  But if the Saints lose Brees, they aren’t even an average team.  Peyton is the league MVP, but no team relies more on it’s quarterback to be there for them than the New Orleans Saints.  Ultimately, the game would be decided by the team that is more prepared to deal with the adverse conditions, but without speculating on which coaching staff can handle the situation better, the Saints would see the negative effect on not only their offense, but their defense.  If they could run the ball, they would win.  But without the threat of the vertical, quick-strike passing game, the Colts defense becomes the most dominant unit on the field.  They’re quick enough to take away the Saints run with seven guys, without the threat of the pass, and once they control the ground, then the Colts coaches can decide what they want to do with Curtis Painter and risk-levels.

The Saints are a very good team, but they are not the Jets.  They are here in no small part because of the schematic advantages they have enjoyed over their opponents.  This super bowl match-up is more intriguing than other games in recent years because it’s hard to say if the Saints enjoy any such advantage over a team like the Colts.  In other words, it’s a match-up driven super bowl.  Without Brees, the Colts hardly need Peyton Manning to enjoy those match-ups.  I conclude that such a scenario would offer Mark Brunell a chance or two at the end of the super bowl to be the hero and win it for New Orleans, but the Colts defense would ultimately be too fast and too well-coached for a team without it’s quarterback to overcome.  I cannot say the same for the New Orleans defense, which inevitably spent the entire week preparing only for Peyton Manning at quarterback.  Granted, it doesn’t take much preparation to handle what Curtis Painter can throw at you, but the very fact that it would be completely different makes the Colts skilled players hard to stop.

Inevitably, if both Drew Brees and Peyton Manning missed a majority of this game, the Indianapolis Colts are the team I think would overcome their loss the quickest and win the Super Bowl.