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Three weeks ago, ESPN’s Chris Mortensen reported that, if Mike Shanahan was head coach of the Broncos into the offseason, he would have released wide receiver Brandon Marshall, as an alternative to addressing his contract situation.  That’s a bigger bombshell than trading Jay Cutler was.  An outright release of a pro bowl wide receiver who isn’t costing the team anything is basically unheard of.

Of course, I can make a strong argument that based on the evidence leading up to this offseason, Marshall hadn’t really even earned his roster spot, much less a pro bowl roster spot.  Consider:

• In 2007, Brandon Marshall caught 60% of passes that targeted him for 7.79 YPA
• In 2008, Brandon Marshall caught 57% of passes that targeted him for 6.99 YPA
• Between those two seasons, Brandon Marshall was targeted on (hide the children) Three hundred and fifty one passes.
• There are quarterbacks who started 14 game seasons who didn’t throw that many passes total.
• Brandon Marshall missed the first game of 2008 with a suspension.

So what does this mean?  It means that the Broncos offense, which was productive, was performing at suboptimal levels, and it was doing so because a mediocre player like Brandon Marshall was the focal point of the passing game.  Now, add to that the fact that the player in question has a reputation as a completely juvenile prick, and well, your team would be better off without the pain in the ass than with it.

So reportedly, it was Mike Shanahan’s call to dump Marshall, and it’s because of the regime change that Marshall is still a Denver Bronco today.  Marshall still isn’t pleased with his contract situation, and he probably shouldn’t be considering the role he has held in the past.  Of course, Josh McDaniels came in and demoted Brandon to the 3rd WR, which 1) helped to discipline a young man whose career was heading in a questionable direction, and 2) it’s put him in a position where he can succeed in helping the team win games, receiving yardage be damned.

And with one catch and open field run, Marshall arguably made the leap from unpolished, overused talent to productive wide receiver in the NFL.  He might still be only the No. 2 WR on the Broncos, but he’s always been a dynamic deep threat.  He’s just starting to turn those big plays off of intermediate passes.  Marshall should be very thankful to McDaniels for getting his career on track, and particularly apologetic for his prior transgressions.  If Mike Shanahan had been around to ship Marshall on his way, it could have been a career altering move and Marshall, who would have made more than he’s making this year, would never have seen the big bucks.  With his team 4-0 this year, and as the star of the Dallas game, Marshall is on the verge of a big payday, that is as much to the credit of those around him (Pat Bowlen and Josh McDaniels in particular), as it is to the refining of his skills.

But don’t be fooled: Marshall is a much better player now than he has been in past years and past offenses, and though he might still be a meathead, the self improvement is primarily a product of hard work and a great opportunity.

I know Aaron Rodgers was not (primarily) at fault for the second half collapse of the Packers last year, and I’m perfectly aware that Rodgers is getting absolutely no help from his pass protection unit this year.  Those are things that don’t (or at least shouldn’t) reflect on the quality of a quaterback’s play.  Rodgers, or anyone in his position, would struggle behind the Green Bay offensive line.  That’s a given.

But with all the aggregate evidence since week one of last year, I think I’m ready to conclude that Aaron Rodgers is not a top quarterback.  At least not yet.

Rodgers is a very fundamentally sound player who feels pressure and generally throws accurate passes.  Those are all traits of a good quarterback.  He seems to anticipate routes decently and has a quick release.  But Aaron Rodgers is a big time ball holder.  And in that case, he reminds me a lot of Marc Bulger.

Marc Bulger was a pro-bowler once upon a time.  Actually, twice: in 2003 and 2006, and he was pretty darn good in between as well.  In some respects, and in the opinion of many, he was a system guy on an extended stay after Mike Martz was dismissed.  Bulger is a well coached player who knows everyone’s role on the field and is a steady player who rarely has a personal missed assignment.  But Bulger was a ball holder, and though those players can have great years, having a high sack rate puts your career on a razors thin edge between success and failure.  Bulger was successful in this league for a long time, and he was a successful quarterback when he was roughly two standard deviations above the mean in completion percentage.  When he was doing that, setbacks in the offense doesn’t much matter.

But over the last two seasons and a handful of games, Bulger has become a 56% passer, and the ball holding tendencies he has always had is now killing drives.  Bulger played to the quality of his offense, and as his teams became under talented, Bulger moved from asset to liability.

And so it is for Aaron Rodgers.  In the same offense that Brett Favre once called the most talented team he ever had been around, Rogers completed 63.6% of his passes and posted a 93.8 passer rating.  But the continued emergence of Greg Jennings and stability of Donald Driver had a lot to do with that.  Those players are a constant on this team, and Rogers has really good numbers again this year.  But the rest of the receivers are in flux, and Rodgers’ sacks are costing the team wins, pure and simple.

How much of the ridiculous 11.8% sack rate is Rodgers?  A lot of it, but probably about 3.5% is directly attributable to below acceptable offensive line play and sample size issue.  But he’s holding the ball longer this year, and tonight, on the same field as Brett Favre, he certainly does not look as comfortable in his offense as Favre looks in his.  Can you blame him?  I don’t know.  His defense has not helped very much.

But Aaron Rodgers is no one’s franchise quarterback at this point.  He’ll probably make it to a pro bowl or two in his career, and there will be better days ahead than last year’s 6-10 disappointment, hardly Rodgers’ fault.  But when I watch Brett Favre, I see a lot of the Brett Favre of past days.  And when I look at Rodgers, I see a lot of glory-day Marc Bulger.  For better or for worse.

After forcing a one-game playoff to decide the AL Central at the Metrodome on Tuesday night, it’s time to give the Twins some credit.  Win or lose.

I’m not much of a Twins fan.  In fact, in many ways, I despise the Twins.  But they draw my ire because they are successful.

How do the Twins do it?  They really have a simple plan.  They take advantage of the competitive advantages of being in the AL Central.  Ignore the Royals for a second; stupid is as stupid does.  If you have not considered this question before, ask yourself which team in the last decade you would rather root for given only their accomplishments:

Team A – 4 division championships, 8 years over .500, no finish below third place since 2000, one playoff series victory

Team B – 2 division championships, 5 years over .500, one playoff series victory, 3 fourth place finishes

The differences between the two teams is not in the competition they play, as team A is the Minnesota Twins, and team B is the Cleveland Indians.  The Indians and Twins have similarly strict budgets, but the Indians cycle through rebuilding every few years in an attempt to remake themselves.  It hasn’t always worked.  The 2oo7 version of the Indians was quite good, but the underlying performance factors did not support a 96 win team.  That team also extended a bunch of bad contracts to players like Johnnie Peralta and Travis Hafner.

The Twins do it differently.  Their superstars come and go: they essentially received nothing but mid-tier prospects for Johan Santana, but the Twins never concern themselves with being great in any given year.  If you play your games in the AL East, you, well have more of a budget to work with, but you have to concern yourself with being a top five team in the league in any given year to be competitive.  If you aren’t great, you’re wasting your money.  For the Blue Jays, that principle costed J.P. Riccardi his job.

Life is different in the AL Central.  What the Twins do is entirely different from what the Tigers do, which is very different from what the Indians do (and what the Royals do shouldn’t concern anyone).  And while the outcome of the game on Tuesday proves absolutely nothing, you’d have to argue that the Twins’ method of doing business has been the most optimal.

So how does the Twins’ plan work?  Well, you have to start with defense.  When they go outside the organization to acquire talent, defense is a primary consideration.  This isn’t any different from what the Tigers do, except in the fact that the Twins have been doing it much, much longer.  This year, Minnesota ranks in the middle of the pack in defensive efficiency, but the plan remains the same.

You also have to consider that the team has been lucky to develop the amount of superstars that they have.  Between Johan Santana, Joe Mauer, and Justin Morneau, we’re talking about one league MVP, another who will be league MVP, and a multi-time Cy Young winner.  It’s no secret why the Twins have been able to compete despite their budget.  But the second part of the Twins plan is that they know that every one of those players is expendible in the long run.  The Twins won’t give Joe Mauer a Travis Hafner type extension simply because he’s the best hitter in baseball right now.  They’ll probably get a value signing on Justin Morneau, but if they don’t they’re not married to him.  And closer Joe Nathan, such a huge part of the team’s success, is liable to be a trading chip as soon as the Twins have their next non-competitive season.

The Twins can compete with or without their superstars.  Obviously, this isn’t to discredit the season Mauer is having: without his awesome-ness, this playoff race would be over already (read: MVP).  But he very well might not be on the roster in 2011, and the Twins can justify it.

Finally, its that because the farm system is so strong, and the division is so perenially weak, the Twins can be legitimately projected to win 70-74 games, and go out and win the division at the end.  That’s the third part of their plan.  They don’t have to project as buyers or sellers, and they don’t even have to make a move at the trade deadline to be buyers.  They can “buy” from their farm system.  That’s something the Indians have never been able to do.  The Indians usually exhaust the resources in their farm system, go to compete, and then if they get off to a slow start, they’ll go out and replenish the farm system.  The Tigers will reach down to their system whenever they need to, and they also draft well enough to make that viable.

The Twins don’t need to draft expensive to draft well.  By being fiscally responsible, they put themselves in a position to take on a small portion of other teams bad contracts in August without having to trade any of their talent (see: Mahay, Ron).  They don’t put money into the draft like the Tigers do, and they don’t really even out-scout other teams.  They out-develop them.  They are patient with underperformers who don’t cost them a lot.  If you fail to develop with the Twins, you probably aren’t cut out for this league.  They don’t give out very many bad contracts.

The last time the Minnesota Twins won more than 95 games in a season, the AFL was an outdoor football league.  But by being unconcerned with trying to force greatness, the Twins are a very good organization who fields a strong team year in and year out, and doesn’t get deterred by a sub-.500 season or two.  After all, some teams with similar financial resources can have a bad decade or so.  There’s not a whole lot of pressure to perform, and frankly, the Twins need it that way.  On Tuesday, you’ll get to see if they can pay it off with a playoff berth.  And if they don’t, well, it’s not a crippling loss like it would be for the Tigers.  And that just might be the decisive competitive advantage.