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After finishing the season on a five game winning streak, and ranked (albeit 25th), the Ole Miss Rebels are ready to take the next step, and led by head coach Houston Nutt and QB Jevan Snead, they are more than worthy of preseason top ten ten recognition, and have legitimate BCS bowl aspirations.

Or so I’ve been told.

DE Greg Hardy and Snead are legitimate first round NFL prospects, but this is the SEC.  A pair of future NFL talents does not guarantee success.  Pretty much all other teams in the conference can match that.

The Rebels began last season with an incredibly unimpressive 4-4 start, but within that start, they upset Florida by a point, and  lost to then No. 1 Alabama by only 4 points.  In the eyes of many, those performances were justified when the Rebels went on a 5-0 tear to finish the season, emphatically capping their best effort of the season by putting a 47 spot on the Texas Tech Red Raiders, who were in the National Championship discussion prior to that.

The fact that they had four great games to end the season added to the fact that they ran with the two best teams in the SEC last year has many convinced that they are the third best team in the SEC, and the most serious challenger for Alabama in the SEC West.

Of course, given the eight month layoff between their bowl game and opening kickoff of the 2009 season, the fact that they looked like a top team at the end of the year seemingly has little relevance.  If they had played their best games in the middle of last season, and had ended with losses to LSU and Texas Tech, it’s safe to say that only a handful of people would have even put them in their top 25.  Beating Florida would have been every bit as impressive as it was, and yet, the same team with a stronger performance in the middle of the season, but weaker at the end of the season would be considered the 8th or 9th best team in it’s own conference.

I’m open to arguments from Rebel fans as to why the team’s improved play in it’s final five games has special significance, and I suppose the team could improve over last year’s level of play, but outside of Snead at quarterback, I don’t see what separates this team from the South Carolina’s, LSU’s, and Tennessee’s of the world.

Any explanation for the team improving would have to explain how they can replace the productivity of NFL first rounders DT Peria Jerry and LT Michael Oher.

So is Snead the answer?  He completed only 56% of his passes for 8.45 yards per attempt, and an obscene 26 TD’s.  I guess there’s room for improvement in his completion percentage, something he’s going to need to improve on to be a legitimate NFL prospect.  But unless he simply gets better at doing what he’s already good at, throwing downfield for yards and TD’s, there’s no way he can get more production than 26 passing TD’s out of his talent.

To me, Snead is near the ceiling of what can be accomplished at the college level.  Now, his NFL prospects are another story.  He’s got plenty to prove to NFL scouts about his ability to translate his skills to the next level, and he’s got 13 games to prove it.  But it seems that, based on his 2008 numbers, any improvement in his ability to read coverages and make accurate passes isn’t going to help him throw for better than 8.45 yards per attempt and 26 TD’s.

If anything, Snead numbers might take a small step back this year.

There’s no Florida on the schedule this year, which is probably the biggest help in getting them into BCS contention this year, but it also means that they have to win 10 games in 12 tries to have any shot to make it in.  Even with no Florida and a soft non-conference schedule, I see only half their games in which they can go in as a unanimous favorite.  This includes: all four non-conference games, and the season finale at Ole Miss.

Even if they can beat Alabama, something that few are predicting, and even if they manage to somehow start 5-0, it’s still not very likely they can finish 5-2 or better.  Between Arkansas, Auburn, Tennessee, and LSU, 2-2 in that stretch seems rather optimistic (though not quite like a 5-0 start).  And even if they manage to beat Alabama, start 5-0, go 2-2 in that stretch, and win the SEC West, their BCS bid still ends if they fail to win the SEC Championship…and the likely favorite to win the SEC East is the Gators.

Still, some are taking the opportunity to give the Rebels some love before they can prove it unwarranted.

They are probably among the top third of teams in college football at this point.  That just doesn’t make them a very good bet to surprise in the SEC

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Far be it a bad thing when a player who was his team’s MVP last season triumphantly returns to the lineup amidst a tight AL Central division.  The White Sox enter action tonight in third place, but only 2.5 games behind the Detroit Tigers for first place in the AL Central.

He’ll make the White Sox better.  Perhaps noticeably better.  It’s just not going to matter.

In Quentin’s absence, the White Sox have been a pretty darn good defensive team.  Scott Podsednik is a plus left fielder, signed off the scrap heap to play there after Quentin’s injury.  Neither Brian Anderson nor Dwayne Wise has the bat to play in a major league outfield, but both are better defenders than Podsednik.  With Quentin returning with his questionable range in left, the White Sox will push Podsednik over to Center Field, where his glove really doesn’t play well.  Jermaine Dye, already the team’s biggest problem on defense, will make up the third piece of a horrible defensive outfield.  Overnight, the White Sox go from being strong at four defensive positions, to being strong only at shortstop (Alexi Ramirez) and first base (Paul Konerko).  Given the fly ball tendencies of Mark Buerhle, John Danks, and most of the bullpen, this is a troubling development.

Of course, the Sox hope to make up for this defensive decline by adding Quentin back into a lineup that might still be among the most feared in the AL.  The White Sox have been led this year by their pitching and defense, but back in June, a month into Quentin’s time on the DL, the White Sox were as many as seven games below .500, and the pitching and defense were no better or worse than they’ve been since then.  The key is that, over the last 5 weeks, the White Sox lineup has gone from one of the worst offenses in the AL to a middle of the pack AL lineup.

Spearheading the improvement: the same middle of the order that’s been doing it for them since 2006.

• Jim Thome (Age: 38)
• Jermaine Dye (35)
• Paul Konerko (33)
• A.J. Pierzynski (32)

In my eyes, there’s a reason why the White Sox couldn’t produce offensively over the first two months of the season, and in making a prediction on which way the team will trend over the next two months, I feel better relying on the first two months of evidence than the last month and a half of out-of-this-world play from the middle-aged White Sox.

In this respect, Quentin (26) provides the middle of the White Sox lineup with a stable, young bat who can help the team produce, but I think that expecting last year’s production for the rest of the year out of him is wishful thinking.  In fact, the most realistic projections of Quentin’s performance for the rest of the season suggest that he’s going to add about half-a-win with the bat over the rest of the season.

Ultimately, the regression of the older players, as well as the value-limiting effect (plus regression) of Podsednik in Center Field is going to knock the White Sox off of their current pace, and from here, I think the defensive decline in the outfield is only going to worsen it.  Getting Carlos Quentin back is, in a vacuum, a positive development, but I think it coincidentally marks a turning point in the White Sox season, a point at which they fall out of realistic contention  in the AL Central.

The Kansas City Royals are, pending today’s result, 0-5 against the Tampa Bay Rays this season.  That’s not all that surprising, in itself.  But what if I told you that, the Royals led three of those games at the end of seven innings?

The Royals have taken one run leads into each of the last three matchups with the reigning AL Champs, and they’ve blown saves all three times.  Most significantly, they haven’t been able to get the game to closer Joakim Soria, who was available to pitch in all three games.

Let’s assume that Soriawould have started the ninth inning in any situation where the team had a lead.  That might have been a stretch in the first game (June 3), becuase he would have pitched back to back days after coming off the DL.  It’s reasonable to expect that from the highest payed player in the bullpen, two consecutive pitching days, but you could make an argument that it’s not worth the potential risk.

Anyway, how often should a team be expected to get to the ninthinning witha lead when taking a one run lead into the eighth?  At least two out of three times is reasonable, no, the status quo.  It’s expected that most games that get that far should be converted into saves by the closer.  But you could argue that the Royals should actually be better than the status quo given the tool of Joakim Soria in the bullpen.

Blame for the failures of the team in this situation falls on both the players who are actually blowing the save (Jamey Wright, Juan Cruz, John Bale), but also on gross bullpen mismanagement by Royals manager Trey Hillman.  In defense of Hillman, he’s really got only three types of setup men to rely on: those who are posting out of character high home run rates, and those who are posting high home run rates that are perfectly in character, and those who walk so many batters that they can’t possibly be considered in these setup situations.

So, we’ve established that Hillman has his hands tied.  But we also know that if the problem is getting the game to Soria, the manager can choose to stretch his best reliever up to two innings to convert these close losses into wins.  It’s at least the logical conclusion for trying to convert those close games into wins.

Possible reasons that would prevent the manager from stretching his closer to a multi-inning role include the fact that it could limit options for pitching him in consecutive days, the need the establish a trust in the other members of his bullpen, and the decision to mitigate the risk of injury, choosing instead to pitch the player in a very standard role.  The motif that connects all these reasons: fear.

Fear of losing one’s job, of mortgaging the future for a win here or there, of losing the trust of the rest of the bullpen, of potentially limiting his options tomorrow.  Fear of failure, even if the right decision is made.

All those are legitimate reasons to avoid stretching your best reliever to his limits in order to convert those blown saves into saves.  But, in my opinion, they are also fears that are ignored by the best managers.  The best realize that their actions may have long term consequences, and make the decision in the best interest of the team anyway.  Trey Hillman may very well be treating 2009 as a lost season for his Royals, but if in a meaningless season, he’s too fearful of potential consequences to make the right decision, why would he be more likely to make the best decision in a situation with more scrutiny?

Instead of three potential wins, the Royals lost three games, and more embarrassingly, Soria did not pitch in any of them.  Not even in mop up.  Revisionist history might be screwing the Royals over here, and there’s nothing to suggest that if they once again fail to make the right decision, that the much-maligned bullpen won’t get it to Soria this time.  Anything can happen in baseball.

As I write this, the Royals currently lead the Rays by a score of 3-2 in the middle of the 7th inning.  It’s likely that the team, once again, will take a one-run lead into the eighth inning against the Rays for a 4th straight game.  And it’s probable that if they don’t learn from their past mistakes, they will once again lose to the Rays.  Ironically, it’s a different kind of fear that might save them: the fear of making the same mistake three days in a row.

But the damage has already been done.  The Royals play every game on the margins, and can not afford to blow as many saves as they do.  They need to treat every late inning lead like they are protecting it in the World Series, and only then will the team be properly managed.

UPDATED:  0-6.  Still no Soria.  What a crappy team.

13th, 1st, 3rd, 16th, 16th.  The chronological rank of the Bears’ defenses, ranked by points against, under head coach Lovie Smith.

If the Smith-era Bears fail to win a championship, they will be remembered as unique for two reasons: 1) having a consistently excellent special teams unit, with Devin Hester as the face of the unit, and having a historic scoring defense, despite considerable player turnover throughout the era.

The Bears have now missed the playoffs in two consecutive years, and Devin Hester’s career on special teams appears to have gone the way of, well, every other special teams superstar.  The Bears are still producing an excellent group of units, led now by Danieal Manning, a second round safety who busted on defense, but found his niche as a kick returner.

The Bears special teams is expected to be excellent again, but then again, I’m not writing about the Bears’ special teams.  With a viable, but still somewhat underwhelming offense, led by a developing gunslinger in Jay Cutler.  The one unit that very well may decide the fate of the NFC North is that unique Chicago defense.  This unit appears to have peaked in 2005 and 2006, the two years they went to the playoffs.  Since then, they’ve been middle of the pack in points against.  Since the long term trend shows a declining unit, would it be reasonable for us to conclude that Lovie Smith’s downfall will be marked by the collapse of a once great defensive unit?

Reasonable: yes.  Likely: not so much.

Points against simply doesn’t tell the whole story regarding the Bears defense in the Smith-era.  It suggests a lot of variance that I have reason to believe may have been overstated.  The Bears scored an average of 20.9 PPG in 2007 and all the way up to 23.4 PPG in 2008, good for 18th and 14th in the NFL respectively, despite high turnover totals in both seasons.  34 and 26 in those seasons respectively.  This just doesn’t jive with the prevailing logic of the team: that the 2007 Bears were a terrible offensive team, and that the 2008 Bears were improved-but-still-below average.

We can break down the offense: 3 QB changes + Cedric Benson’s team leading 4 rushing TDs in 2007, uninspired, but improved offense in 2008 led by Hester, Orton, and Forte; clearly though, you either have to believe that the Bears were lucky to have produced a positive point differential last year, or that they were good.  And by good, I mean, had a top defense, since that’s the unaccounted for variable that is the subject of this column.

Let’s say that the 2008 Bears weren’t lucky and consequently, their Expected Win total of 8.7 last year (for a 9-7 team, mind you) was well earned.  This implies–via process of establishing the offense, loosely, as belowaverage–that the Bears were a top-quartile defense in 2008.  In fact, if we apply the same standard and adjust for three downright terrible offenses in the Smith-era, we can extrapolate that the Bears have been a top quartile defense (or “top ten,” if you prefer) in each of the last five years.  Simply by their virtue of being able to score points with offense that have proven unable to get themselves on the scoreboard, I would imagine that up to a third of the total value of the Bears defense is simply not measured by points against.  It looks like the Bears have consistently outproduced this measure over the long run, and not to mention that this effect has held through a scheme change away from the cover-two.

Of course, you don’t have to buy this argument.  It’s far from established fact that having a point scoring defense is a repeatable skill, and the fact that the Bears defense has been such a prolific scoring defense does not mean they will continue to be one.  And frankly, if you don’t think the Bears are one of the defenses in the NFL who can consistently add to the team’s points scored total, then it’s more likely than not that the Bears will hover around the second quartile on defense (9th-16th) over the rest of the Smith-era, until say, a complete outlier season ends up outing Smith and his entire staff.

Of course, the defensive core on this team is as strong as it’s ever been, and most of the team is still in it’s prime, and they have not failed to add talent in the draft every season, often ignoring the offense in an attempt to add young pieces to the defense.  The amount of draft value alone would suggest that the Bears are NOT a declining defense.

But in the NFL, if you aren’t actively improving your team, the pace at which the game evolves will force your demise.  And the Bears have for 5 years managed to defeat this macro-trend, albeit in varying degrees.  The pessimist among us would certainly suggest that, sooner or later, futility will catch up to the Bears defensive unit, and for this to happen in the very year that they finally go out and get a franchise quarterback, well, you could sell some books with that narrative.  However, it just seems a little unrealistic to conclude that the Bears are a declining unit when a lot of the evidence suggests that they are more likely to vault to the top of the NFL this year than they are to fall into it’s bottom half.

Since 2006, no NFC Quarterback has been more productive than Tony Romo of the Cowboys.  Not Kurt Warner, Donovan McNabb, Brett Favre, or even Drew Brees.  He’s not without his flaws, certainly, interceptions and turnovers among them.  But considering the investment: an undrafted signing in 2003, he’s been one of the best value signings of the last decade.

Which brings me to a bet made the other day by a friend: that the Lions quarterback will have comparable or better statistics than Tony Romo (the most valuable QB in the NFC over a three year period) will this season.  Keep in mind that we don’t even know who the Lions quarterback is going to be this year.  On the surface: it’s an insane, unwinnable bet.  However, the reason I’m writing about this is because things often aren’t what they seem.

I guess a good place to start would be to decide if we can determine which Lions quarterback is more likely to start.  Daunte Culpepper is in a tough spot: he’s trying to resurrect his career on a franchise that became the first to lose 16 games in a single season, and spent the first overall draft pick on a quarterback, which makes any gains that Culpepper makes by virtue of system useless to him in the long term.  But, the offensive coordinator is Scott Linehan, who coached Culpepper in his best years with the Vikings, when Culpepper could be mentioned with the best players of the pre-Manning/Brady era passers.  His career has gone downhill very fast since his record setting 2004 season, but reports are unanimously positive on his preparedness this year.  Stafford, on the other hand, is a highly touted rookie who, according to many scouts, needs seasoning on the practice field before he plays in games.

Knowing Jim Schwartz’ philosophy, Stafford will play as soon as 1) he is ready to play, and 2) the Lions have little to gain with Culpepper anymore.  Culpepper is not going to be on this team in 2010, so for there to be a situation where Stafford plays not at all, the Lions would have to be competing for a playoff spot in 2009, which seems unlikely.  In all reasonable cases, Stafford is going to play sooner than later, but thanks to the hire of Linehan, I think Culpepper is going to get a shot.  In the most likely case, both quarterbacks should get about half a season.

Of course, if Culpepper gets pulled for Stafford’s future prospects, it’s safe to say he probably did not resurrect images of his 2004 season.  So if this bet is to be won, two things need to happen: Culpepper needs to avoid having a horrific 5 INT game (like he did in Cincinnati in 2005), and Stafford must do the same, while Tono Romo produces his worst statistical season of his career.  There are reasons to believe that both of things may occur.

For the first time in his career, Tony Romo will not be playing behind a pro bowl line, and his one pro bowl receiver will be his tight end.  The Dallas OL posted a 4.5% adjusted sack rate (ASR) in 2007, and that number rose to 5.8% last year.  The players on that line are aging badly, and the Cowboys only used one pick on a lineman this year: a 4th rounder on Ball State’s Robert Brewster, who does not figure to make an immediate contribution. In addition to this, the Cowboys running backs and tight ends are, on the whole, not a very helpful pass blocking unit.  Marion Barber is the best of the bunch in that respect, and it’s the weakest part of his game.  The offense is about Romo, and spreading the field, not about protecting the quarterback.

The receiver situation is significantly worse, as any move toward the middle of the pack in that aspect relies on either an unexpected rebound from Roy Williams, who may simply be a poor fit in the Cowboys offense, or a big jump in development from third year player Miles Austin.  Jason Witten is going to be good for his normal production, but with a declining unit around him, Tony Romo’s numbers are the ones that will be affected, not Witten’s.  The Football Outsiders’ projections have Romo’s Net Yards per Pass figure declining by 0.6, a significant amount.  That’s enough to take him from a top ten quarterback in 2008 to a middle of the pack NFL quarterback in 2009.  Put simply: Tony Romo is likely to miss the 90.0 threshold in QB rating for the first time in his career.

Of course, that’s only one element of the bet.  It may very well be the hidden element; one who bets on Romo outproducing the Lions probably is naturally expecting top ten production from Romo, but this bet also requires marked improvement from the Lions quarterbacks over last year.  The most productive Lions QB from last year, Dan Orlovsky, was good for 5.7 net yards per attempt, or roughly 3/4 of a yard less than this year’s Romo projection.  Orlovsky has moved on to Houston, leaving the Lions to replace his production with Culpepper and/or Stafford.  Orlovsky had a QB rating of 72.6, which would have been unacceptable in the context of the bet.  There is, however, reason to believe that Culpepper can improve on the baseline set by Orlovsky and at least challenge the numbers that I expect Romo to produce this season.

When this bet was made, it was made under the assumption that Culpepper would get all the snaps in Stafford’s rookie year.  Now, Daunte Culpepper has always put up the numbers.  In fact, if you want a cautionary tale for Tony Romo’s career, look at Culpepper.  It wasn’t the sudden inability to produce that turned Culpepper into a journeyman, it was the inability to hold onto the football.  The most probable way this bet is lost involves Culpepper starting off strong, but leading into the bye week with two or three 3 turnover games, costing him his starting job six games in.  If Matt Stafford starts between 11 and 8 games this year, it’s probably not a good indicator for the Lions, compared to say, if he wins the job out of training camp, or the Lions remain in the playoff hunt until after Thanksgiving.

The Detroit offensive line isn’t great, but it’s better than the one that Dallas will run out there.  The Lions are strong at the guard positions, very mediocre at the tackles, and have a top of the line center in Dominic Raiola.  They signed RB Maurice Morris, a good pass blocker, to back up Kevin Smith.  The selection of TE Brandon Pettigrew in the first round shows a flexibility to build their passing offense around the concept of protecting their quarterback as opposed to spreading the field.  Pettigrew also brings them a middle of the field presence, which Culpepper has never had, and in his third year Calvin Johnson looks to establish his place among the game’s best receivers.  For all the flack the Lions are going to catch for their 0-16 offense from a year ago, this is not a winless unit.  More significantly, it’s the strongest offensive unit that Daunte Culpepper has had since leaving the Vikings.

That, in part, is why Daunte Culpepper has a decent, if turnover-prone, projection from Football Outsiders.  He’s projected for a respectable 6.2 net yards per pass attempt in the Lions offense, which would put him up in the middle of the pack over the whole season.  But he’s projected by the same source to fumble 10 times and throw 16 interceptions, and you and I both know that there’s no way that Culpepper makes it through this whole season without cutting down on the turnovers.  If Matt Stafford plays, he’ll probably be less prone to the turnover than Culpepper, but an increased sack rate might contribute to a lower level of productivity.

In essence, this bet boils down to a few unlikely things occurring, and the probability certainly says it’s a going to be a losing effort, especially at 1 to 1 odds.  But based on a few factors, such as the health of both Daunte Culpepper and Tony Romo, the coaching plans by the Lions for their quarterbacks, and the overall decline of the Cowboys’ passing game, I find this a far more interesting bet than you would think because underlined by a bunch of critical story lines regarding the 2009 NFL season, and it’s a fun way to make a statement if you really buy into the new Lions offense–what this all this optimism really is, at it’s core.

The 2009 Washington Nationals might want to start looking at their baseball history.  Specifically, the case of the 2003 Detroit Tigers.

The 2003 Tigers lost 119 games, losing more than 70% of it’s contests.  Three years later, they represented the AL in the world series, and in the mind of most, were the favorites to win it.  The Nationals may not lose 120 games this year (they probably won’t), and they might not be at the top of the NL in 2012 (it’s unlikely, to say the least), but the model of the Detroit Tigers might help the Nationals build a plan to improve, and do so quickly.

If we quickly look at the Tigers that year, they featured only three regulars from the season produced above average OPS+ figures: 1B Carlos Pena, who has since become arguably the most prolific power hitter in the AL with the Tampa Bay Rays; 3B Eric Munson, and DH/1B Dimitri Young, who needs no introduction.  No regular pitchers produced above average ERA+ figures.

But just because that one Tigers team was littered with replacement level hitters and terrible pitching didn’t mean that the team had no contributors.  The catcher on that team was Brandon Inge, who the Tigers turned into arguably the league’s best defensive third baseman.  LF Craig Monroe ended up having three productive years following the 2003 season.  RF Bobby Higginson was the superstar on this Tigers team, but the 2003 season was really the beginning of the end for him.  It’s too bad it didn’t come sooner, because currently productive Marlins outfielder Cody Ross was a young player in the Tigers system who couldn’t get ABs.

The Nationals are, at a glance, much better off in that respect.  For one thing, the Nationals are by no means a poor hitting team.  In fact, they are probably another middle infielder away from a league average lineup.  The defense has been horrific all year (no fault to Ryan Zimmerman), and the pitching has been worse than that.  More significantly, once you get past John Lannan in the rotation, none of their young talent has appeared to be remotely promising.  Jordan Zimmerman at least appears to be holding his own in that rotation, but the rest of the contributors are veterans who are not in the teams long term plans (Ron Villone/Joe Beimel).

The Nationals likely aren’t going to find themselves penny pinching like, say, the Marlins anytime soon, so they can always reasonably expect to replace the contributions of the veterans they are getting right now.  The first part of the formula for the Nats to get to respectability is to sign major league quality pitching.  Last year, they drafted Missouri P Aaron Crow in the first round, and did not sign him over a matter of roughly a half million dollars.  This year, Crow was drafted by the Royals.  This only makes the prospective signing of first overall draft pick Steven Strasburg more critical.

The second part of this equation is the challenging part: the Nats will remain uncompetitive until they can improve their team defense.  Unlike some other teams in the league, the Nats don’t simply have to develop and sign better defenders.  They have to do so without significantly hurting their own offense.  They helped this out some by trading for CF Nyjer Morgan from the Pirates, but LF Adam Dunn will continue to be a butcher with the glove (and great with the bat), and players like 1B Nick Johnson, OF Josh Willingham, or SS Christian Guzman are hurting this defense more than they are helping.  The positions of Catcher and 2nd Base are already black holes on this team, and the Nationals would likely find it cheaper to acquire defense in those positions than to go out for offense.

Dunn would have considerable trade value to an AL team, so the Nationals would be wise to pursue potential trade options in the offseason.  In the short term, the Nationals could add 2B Mark Grudzielanek as a free agent, as though he is 38 years old, he’s still an above average defender.   The defensive shortstop market is strong this offseason, and it should not be hard to replace Guzman with a better defensive player who can handle the bat, such as Marco Scutaro.  These are all short term things that the Nats could do to achieve respectability in the short term, but the 2003 Tigers became the 2006 Tigers became a world series participant because they developed their pitching, and did it quickly.

In 2003, the Tigers had perhaps their worst pitching staff in team history.  In 2006, they had maybe the best.  The only difference, really, was the development of Jeremy Bonderman and Nate Robertson into frontline starters, and the drafting and subsequent ROY-like season from Justin Verlander.  If Strasburg ends up being the Nats version of Verlander, then a John Lannan, Stephen Strasburg, Jordan Zimmerman rotation makes an intriguing top end on a playoff contender.

Like any other team, a long term plan for building the Nationals will center around drafting and player development, but if the Nationals are looking for a savior, Strasburg is as good a face as any for the role.  As most Nats fans will understand, signing Strasburg is simply the first step, as a marked improvement is as much about identifying the Brandon Inge’s and Nate Robertson’s of your team from the Eric Munson’s and Nate Cornejo’s.  The Nats are a young team, but they aren’t a young, talented team, and that disambiguation the difference between the Rays of two years ago, and the Nats of two years from now.  With good management, the ability to draft and sign amateur talent, and slowly weed out the bad players, the Washington Nationals can be saved.

Andrew Brandt of the National Football Post has the lowdown on the Cassel contract:

Cassel was due to make $14.65 million this season, fully guaranteed (he will still make about the same number, around $15M). Had he played out the year and been tagged with the franchise tender next year, a scenario that was not unlikely, he would have made 120 percent of that number in 2010, or $17.58M guaranteed. Thus, had Cassel not done an extension, he could have reasonably expected – barring injury or a dramatic drop in performance – to make $32.23M guaranteed over two years.

Instead of that $32.23M, Cassel will make $28M in guaranteed salary and roster bonus, all earned in the next two years. However, if he’s on the roster on the opening days of the 2011 league year, there is a $7.5M guaranteed option bonus in the third year of the deal, 2011, bringing the “functional guarantee” to $35.5M for the six-year, $63M contract.

…

As to the $63M, it’s very similar to what Aaron Rodgers made from the Packers last fall ($65M) after starting seven games for the team. Rodgers, however, was playing for less than $1M. Cassel was playing for $14.65M.

At the end of the day, it appears to be a deal that works for both sides. It’s a strong deal for a player with one year as a starter under his belt and a good deal for the Chiefs to lock up one of the prime assets in the sport – a young and proven quarterback – in a time where, despite the economy, asset values of ascending young quarterbacks will only continue to rise. Somewhere, Eli Manning, Philip Rivers and Jay Cutler are watching with great interest.

Two thoughts on this one:

1) The New England Patriots put the franchise tag on Matt Cassel.  Not the Kansas City Chiefs.  Part of the reason that Cassel had limited trade value in terms of the compensation received from the trade is that the team that was on the receiving end HAD to pay Cassel either the $14.7 million, or an equal or greater sum in guaranteed money.  After the Chiefs decided that they could afford to invest that much money in a single player, a potential franchise player, then they made the move to acquire Cassel.  But from the Patriots perspective, he was a necessary salary dump from the very day he was tagged.  The tag itself heavily decreased the value of Matt Cassel, but from the Pats perspective, it’s the only way they could cash in on Cassel, who was otherwise an unrestricted free agent.

Understanding that, the Chiefs acquire Matt Cassel on a contract that essentially becomes a one year $15 million deal, with a one year $17 million option.  He comes with that.  The 15 million represents the smallest amount the Chiefs can give Matt Cassel.  But once you write that off as a sunk cost, the 2009 season becomes a free evaluation period of Matt Cassel.  If he’s a bad fit in that role, he can be non-tendered at the end of year, benched in the middle of the year, whatever.  It goes down as a losing gamble, but all it cost you was a second round pick, and a whole lot of someone else’s money (more on this below), not to mention the two years of Mike Vrabel that you also got in the trade.

The Chiefs extension of Cassel gave up the option year in exchange for a conversion of the contract into a two year absolute guarantee, then an option year, and some inflated salaries on the back end of the deal.  On the surface, this seems like a fair trade off.  Just putting the franchises faith in Cassel now before the price potentially skyrockets later.  But it’s not quite that simple.

2) My second thought is that, we’ve reached a point where the NFL salary cap is not a relevant figure to about 75% of the teams in the NFL.  The Chiefs are included in that figure.  The key principle here is in the revenue sharing.  The Chiefs fall on the end of the spectrum where, every year, the top end of the teams payroll is coming out of the shared revenue they receive from larger markets.  The Chiefs are not spending to the salary cap on a year by year basis any more.  In 2005 and 2006, they were a cap-strapped franchise.  Just three years later, this rebuilding franchise is closer to the salary floor.

To the majority of NFL teams, the NFL’s salary floor is the more relevant figure.  This years’ salary floor is approximately at 115 million dollars: or right around last year’s salary cap.   The NFL has a salary floor for two reasons: a) to prevent small market teams from squatting on, not spending, their shared revenue, and b) so that the players get a bare minimum piece of the pie.

This is relevant because, as I mentioned above, in making this extension, the Chiefs moved most of the money owed to Matt Cassel from that shared revenue pie, to a deferred signing bonus which is highly dependant on the terms of the new collective bargaining agreement.  The short term benefit is that it frees up some salary cap space, but the Chiefs simply aren’t going to use that space.

Very possibly, the Chiefs might have tried out Matt Cassel for a season, liked what they saw from him, and ended up giving him the same deal he just got one year later.  What would this have cost team?  $14.7 million in shared revenue and some otherwise unused salary cap space?  Where do I sign up?!

One final thought…

We talk about franchise quarterback money reaching insane levels, such as $10 million a year for a young franchise quarterback such as Matt Schaub, David Garrard, Aaron Rodgers, or Matt Cassel.  That’s not an elite list of quarterbacks, mind you.  Those are four players with one good season to their name each, one of which was paid entirely on his prospects.  Of course, that’s kind of a misnomer: they were all paid on their prospects.  Let’s not mince words here: for players who even sniff playoff success at the QB position, we’re talking $15-$20 million a season.

I mean, we rant, and we rave about players at the top of the draft who have never taken a snap in the NFL, and are getting $20, $30, or even $40 million in guaranteed money on their rookie deals.  We forget that the teams are taking them have the option to choose from more or less 1/4 of the entire college football pool, and settled on one of 3 or 4 people who they considered the very best of the best…and then those players are paid for who the teams think they can be.  Well, the quarterback market has gotten even worse than this, as the list above shows.  But unlike the NFL draft, which is simply skewed to overpay the players in the top ten, the quarterback market is being thrown off to the point where flashing NFL quality skills means you earn 8-10 times what your comparable 2nd or 3rd round prospect gets.

The reason this is happening in the market is the obscene salary floor.  The teams are not ALLOWED to hold on to the money, so the small market teams are being forced to spend in excess of their total revenues.  It’s manifesting itself in the quarterback market, but defensive players such as DeAngelo Hall, Nnamdi Asomugha, Terrell Suggs, and Albert Haynesworth are getting in on the action as well (although this isn’t as ridiculous).

The NFL salary cap and salary floor must go.  If it means that NFL revenue sharing must go as well, then so be it.  Small market teams still have the power to improve their team through the draft, and in the meantime, there are major Moneyball type market niches being created in terms of QB fungibility, with second tier players being left out of the league entirely because of the ridiculous premium the market has placed on finding that ONE player who can make a team.

And it’s that last sentence that essentially explains the otherwise ridiculous Cassel extension in it’s entirety.

It’s probably not an exaggeration to say that the trade of Yuniesky Betancourt from the Mariners to the Royals resulted in more decisive and significant local backlash than any other trade of the past two years.  But while the fundamental mistakes on the Royals’ end, specifically GM Dayton Moore were numerous, they weren’t as epic at length as they were at first glance.

Quoth Rany Jazayerli:

Trading for Yuniesky Betancourt didn’t have to be such a disaster. I see the Royals’ line of thinking here: Betancourt is a phenomenally talented player who might benefit from a change of scenery, and his price has never been lower. The fundamental mistake the Royals made was that they didn’t appreciate just how low Betancourt’s stock had fallen. If they had traded Saito alone – and made the Mariners pick up $6 million instead of just $3 million – this would have been a perfectly reasonable trade. And judging from the condolences I received after the team from front office types – no, not anyone who used to work at Baseball Prospectus – they still would have had the best offer on the table.

As a Redskins fan, I could explain to you in-depth how hard it is for executives to learn how to balance ones perception of value with another.  I’ve watched a football team miss on a players perceived value by up to two or three rounds in compensation seemingly year after year.  A 2nd rounder for Jason Taylor.  A third rounder for T.J. Duckett. A first and a third rounder for Lav Coles.

I mean, hell, just this year the K.C. Royals traded fallen/flatlining pitching prospect Tyler Lumsden for OF Jordan Parraz, a legitimate hitter in the low minors.  The point is: the issue with reconciling scouting perceptions of players, specifically potential acquisitions, with reality is not a trait found to be inherently lacking in bad personnel people.  It’s a legitimately difficult part of the job, perhaps the most difficult part.

Clearly though, as Rany points out, this is what occurred in K.C. this week.  The fact that Dayton Moore thinks (thought briefly?) that Betancourt can be a good player, specifically on defense, matters far less than his inability to realize that the Mariners (who just had a regime change last year, btw), did not think that he could be a good player.  If you have reason to believe a player is more valuable than his team thinks he is, don’t let any amount of statistical analysis stop you from pulling the trigger.  But, certainly, don’t give up MORE than they think he’s worth.

Ultimately though, Dayton Moore is not going to lose his job over a single gamble in the middle of a lost baseball season for a franchise that has enjoyed nothing but lost baseball seasons since the early 1990′s.  The worst possible outcome of this trade would pretty much just be the status quo for the Royals.  I mean, yes, it would hinder the team from getting better in the short-term, but few except die-hard Royals fans would actually notice.

The losers, in all of this, are those Royals fans.  The reason the mainstream media didn’t even bat an eye at this trade is just that: no one cares about the Kansas City Royals.  So the team makes a move that, on the surface, reeks of ignorance if not incompetence; the Mariners are winners, everyone moves on with their lives.  The local backlash, as strong as it is, measures about a 1.3 on the national sports Richter scale.  A few blogs ponder some possible motives for the trade, and then, that’s it, people move on.

Royals fans get to live out this monstrosity, as they follow the team throughout the rest of the summer, into next year, and thanks to arrogance, likely into 2011.  The Mariners, as an organization, are winners, the Royals subsidize the losing to their fans, and nothing is really wrong in the baseball world.

Okay, let’s say I can tell you–right now–that the Seattle Seahawks will win 10 games in 2009.

Those ten wins would be 150% more than the four they won last year.  Those six additional wins would seem, to fans of the Seahawks, like 8 or 9 wins added because of the fact that the team would be not only winning more games, but because the lowered expectations that come with a 10+ loss team will vanish.  In essence, they would have to be a team on par with the division winners they have produced in past years, and five months from now, we could look back at the 2008 Seattle Seahawks and wonder exactly what the hell happened to cause that mess.   The 4-12 team would essentially be forgotten.  There’s no way, right?

Let’s face it: if the Seahawks win ten games in 2009, no one will be surprised in the slightest.

Does that mean it’s fair to say we’ve reached a point where there’s no such thing as a surprise team?  Hardly.  I think though, that the standards for a surprise team have been increased.  The bar has certainly been raised.

The 1999 Rams are widely regarded as the first salary cap era team to flip the league on it’s head.  Though the cap itself was instituted in 1993, the 90′s were dominated by the Dallas Cowboys, San Francisco 49ers, and Green Bay Packers back in a decade which was ruled by the NFC (yes, just ten years ago).  Furthermore, the strength of the Rams that year had little to do with the salary cap and revenue sharing, however, the fact that the team was so dominant that year can be partially attributed to the cap-related downfall of the aforementioned powerhouses in their conference.

The Rams were a surprise team because they went from 4-12 in 1998 to 13-3 in 1999 in an era where that simply did not happen.  Note that the circumstances could not be replicated.  Kurt Warner had, to date, the best season ever by a quarterback, and in my opinion, still the best.  The Rams traded for an all-pro running back that year using a top five draft pick to land him.  Their first draft choice in 1999 was a receiver by the name of Torry Holt.  They didn’t exactly come from no where, but because they didn’t have an established quarterback in either Trent Green or Kurt Warner going into the season, they weren’t suspected, and more directly they weren’t suspected because when this happened, having only 4 wins the prior season was a death sentence.

Now, let’s fast forward ten years.  How many surprise teams have there been since the 1999 Rams?  Are you counting the 2001 Patriots? The 2001 Bears?  What about the 2003 Panthers?  The 2004 Chargers?  The 2005 Bears? The 2005 Bengals? The 2006 Saints? The 2007 Giants? The 2007 Packers?  The 2008 Falcons? The 2008 Cardinals?  All of those teams fit neatly into one of two categories: 1) mediocre regular season teams who went on an unexpected run of playoff success, 2) surprise regular season startups who failed to accomplish anything substantial in the playoffs.

The great teams don’t pop up out of obscurity.  In 2008, the 10 highest-finishing teams in Total DVOA included 9 teams who have appeared in the super bowl in the last decade, and the San Diego Chargers, who have been one of the best teams for the last five years.  Going back a year adds the Packers, Jaguars, and Cowboys to the mix, but no one was shocked to see those franchises in the postseason.

Not correctly predicting an outcome doesn’t make the outcome a surprise, necessarily.  It’s tough to predict who might make the super bowl.  If there was reason to believe that the Colts, Chargers, Patriots, and Steelers would all fail to win the AFC this year, no one would pick them.  However, the consensus is that one of those teams will represent the AFC in the super bowl.  The fact that 12 other teams would be considered underdogs does not make it a surprise occurrence that a team other than the four favorites might go to the super bowl in the better conference.  It’s just so happened that the aforementioned group is SO dominant that only the 1999 Titans, the 2000 Ravens, and the 2002 Raiders have come out of the AFC since the retirement of John Elway.

Very often, it’s the circumstance surrounding a run that created it.  Some circumstances are traceable and projectable (this is essentially the type of projections that Football Outsiders makes annually), others require inside information and the lack of bias to uncover, and thusly are uncovered only after the fact by revisionists.  But circumstancial factors are not surprising in nature because we all know they have a great impact on the game of football and sports in general.  The aptitude of the predictions that come from the evidence do not change the fact that circumstances create variance in win/loss outcomes.

In a sport that bills it’s college draft as a made for TV event, has turned OTA’s into a newsworthy annual occurrence, and promotes it’s network as a 24/7/365 source of football-related news, normal variance is not a surprise.  A surprise team would have to be one of the ten worst teams from the preseason power rankings run to a 12-4 record and destroy other powerhouses in the playoffs en route to a super bowl championship.  Essentially, the Cleveland Browns would have to beat the Steelers and Patriots in consecutive playoff games to reach the level of the 1999 Rams.  And you know what, it’s been a decade since the last, true worst-to-first NFL success story.  It could happen.

But with a liberal use of media-driven labeling non-withstanding, surprise teams are no more frequent in the NFL than in any other sport, and acutally, probably less frequent.

Happy that I sat and watched the final 7 innings of the MLB all-star game. I was pulling for the AL most of the way, because, well, Zack Greinke is awesome.

Zack had a 10 pitch 4th inning, so he contributed to the overall shortness of the game. He struck out David Wright looking, and then Shane Victorino on a classic slider. It was epic.

After Roy Halladay struggled to keep the NL off the board for two innings, you’d think there would be some outcry in the media that perhaps Joe Maddon didn’t do right by starting him over Greinke, but alas, second guessing appears to be used only in situations more trivial than these.