Understanding how the Replacement Level Concept affects NFL Free Agency
Value over replacement is a concept that has long been a staple of baseball sabermetrics, even as the effectiveness of it’s measures have vastly improved in recent seasons. In football, however, measures of value against replacement are far more confusing and open to interpretation: subjective, if you will. One thing we all can agree on is that the concept is no less real or important to football analysis than it is to baseball analysis. The only differences are in the effectiveness of common representations and calculations of a replacement level figure. Football people have to be able to apply concrete evidence of performance to an abstract interpretation of what is replacement level. If mistakes are made, there will be arbitrage opportunities for shrewd teams.
The main problem in football is that replacement level varies by position, by year. In baseball, it can be stated that a replacement level offensive player is one who produces at 80% of the league average. This is probably the most common representation and will never be a downright improper assumption. There’s no such shorthand method in football. With no minor league system in football (yet), a freely available talent is no different from one who is out of work. From a practical standpoint, it’s really difficult to be out of football one week, and starting for an NFL team the next week, contributing at a level that is anywhere near replacement.
A better operational definition of a replacement level player is a backup at any position who offers no additional value to a team past the fact that he has some experience being that team’s backup. Teams who are successful in the NFL year after year often employ a “next man up” type of attitude to injuries. These teams can take replacement level players, apply them to a defensive or offensive system, and get performance out of them that is inconsistent with conventional (even sabermetric) methods of replacement estimates. It’s my opinion that we have to accept this as a necessary evil: replacement level players aren’t always going to perform at replacement. This is true of baseball as well.
NFL free agency is really our one opportunity during the football calendar year to get a good wide-view picture of how teams value replacement level talent. In particular, what I’ve been concerned with is looking at which positions get most drained by teams who need to stack their roster with players who have experience at the position.
What I’ve found by studying these trends has been pretty eye opening. My findings support the previous assertion that the league-wide idea of replacement level is much, much lower compared to the average for some positions than others. Take cornerback, for example. Corner is a position that I would describe as being “highly skilled”. It takes corners longer to develop as players than defensive lineman or linebackers. But when we apply the concept of replacement to the position, we find that, despite the refined skill needed to excel, players who are very close to the league average (but on the wrong side of it) can bounce around the league just like a replacement level player would. Look no further than Titans/Browns/Bears/Cardinals (just in 2009) corner Rod Hood, formerly a very successful 2nd or 3rd corner for the Eagles, couldn’t hold a job for more than two weeks. It’s not just guys who peaked as no. 2 types. Look at Carlos Rogers, or Bryant McFadden, or Dre Bly, or Shawn Springs, or Brian Williams. At some point, all of these guys were bona fide no. 1 corners on their teams. But in 2009, every one of them posted a replacement level type season. It’s really just the nature of the position: players are quick to rise, and quick to fall. And once a player drops to consistently below average at the position, he’s easily replaceable. The freely available talent that can provide teams with a close to average level of play is everywhere.
On the other end of the spectrum, I have found, lie wide receivers and linebackers (yes, linebackers). Wide receivers with any history of recent success get sucked up off of the open market onto teams within the first few days of free agency every year, and despite this, you still see incredibly high variances in the quality of backup receivers around the league. After Terrell Owens, Antonio Bryant, and Josh Reed sign (probably later this week) for good money, any team in need of a receiver will have their choice between 37 year old Mushin Muhammad, Mike Furrey, or Marty Booker. The quality of receiver that comes at a minimum priced contract is so far beneath the level of an acceptable NFL starter that teams almost have to look to the draft to add players who can play special teams and catch passes.
At linebacker, there’s a reason that Jeremiah Trotter gets dragged out of football purgatory every other season. Replacement level linebackers are plentiful, but those ‘backers who can both lead and go make tackles never are allowed to hit the open market (and when they do, they get Bart Scott/Karlos Dansby type contracts). The OLBs have, admittedly, been a lot slower to sign than in recent years, but Keith Bulluck and Joey Porter aren’t exactly going to have to sign for one year “prove it” contracts. Scott Fujita, Tully Banta-Cain, and Mike Vrabel have been well taken care of. Vrabel, in particular, isn’t anywhere near an average player. If he played corner, he would have had to retire three years ago. Heck, Ty Law has been bouncing around unable to hold a job with a single team since 2006, and he was once a much better player at his position than Vrabel was at his.
You may think of quarterback as a highly skilled position where all the best talent gets bought up as soon as it hits the market, but this is simply not the case. Jake Delhomme and Derek Anderson were starters as recently as last season, but the odds on either of them catching on somewhere as a backup next year are pretty much even. Other replacement type talent like Patrick Ramsey and Jeff Garcia could start the year on teams, even though they did not finish last year on teams. The backup QB market is pretty interchangeable with the former starters market, performance seemingly has less to do with it than coach’s preference for one type of player over another. Such is the life of the former pro-bowler who can only play at -15% of the league average. At that level of performance, your career needs an “in” to continue.
But one position trumps all the others in the market’s recent interpretation of replacement. And when I say “trumps,” I mean it’s so glaring that its’ clear that this position functions differently than all the other positions in NFL free agency. Chad Clifton of the Green Bay Packers just got a 3-year $20 million dollar extension to remain the Green Bay Packers’ left tackle for at least one more season (he’ll receive more than 40% of the total contract value just for this season). Clifton is 34, a one time probowler in 10 NFL seasons. Upon becoming a free agent, Clifton visited the Redskins, who had just watched their offensive tackle of Clifton’s draft class (Chris Samuels) retire after 6 pro bowls.
The difference in skill between Samuels and Clifton is roughly equivalent to the difference in skill between Eli Manning and Kerry Collins. But the Redskins, desperate for a tackle, wanted to seriously consider letting Clifton be the franchise’s left tackle for the next two years in the twilight of his career, that is until they couldn’t beat the best offer of the more desperate Packers. Why was Clifton, a below average player, worth so much to these teams? The answer is that, despite being decidedly below average, Clifton was the only left tackle who hadn’t been locked up by their team ahead of time who hadn’t fallen into the dark depths of the replacement. After him: Levi Jones, Damion McIntosh, and Barry Sims sit on the market, unwanted.
Across the line, the right tackle market has gotten absolutely preposterous. The prized lamb in the free agent class was San Francisco’s Tony Pashos, who also visited Washington, couldn’t agree to terms, and ended up signing a 3-year contract with the Browns. Just one year ago, Pashos was an incumbent right tackle on a Jacksonville team that felt it prudent to spend it’s first and second round draft choices on offensive tackles, as well as to sign a veteran LT. Pashos has never played a position on any line besides right tackle. But seemingly by virtue of being a free agent when every other team has jumped through hoops to seal their top two tackles if they ever had it, Pashos had the NFL world at his feet, just one year after being completely unwanted.
Pashos and Clifton will both be among the vast landscape of the replacement level lineman before these contracts expire, but desperate times call for desperate measures. There is a clear shortage of capable starters at the offensive tackle position in the NFL. While Albert Haynesworth and Julius Peppers have hit the market in consecutive years to sign elsewhere for mega-bucks, teams can hardly find anyone capable of protecting the quarterback. And so they are hiring players who might be able to help by the dozen. Cornell Green, a former Raiders lineman best known for his inability to stop anyone, signed with Buffalo for 3 years and 8 figures. Green is the very definition of replacement level tackle, although apparently the Bills feel otherwise. The Raiders felt the need to send 2009 FA signing Khalif Barnes to the bench after a foot injury and underperformance derailed his 2009 season. This year, he’ll be back under a one year contract, and if the Raiders can’t address the need in the draft, he’s in the starting lineup. Khalif Barnes has very nearly underachieved his way into a promotion.
Players at the offensive tackle position in the NFL don’t have to be anywhere near league-average to command a multi-year contract on the open market. In fact, those who are league-average or close to it do not get anywhere near unrestricted free agent status. It seems like it’s only a matter of time until NFL teams start kicking underutilized backup interior lineman out to the tackle position and letting them compete for playing time as starters.
Rod Hood (age 28), who in the most conservative estimates, offers play at -10% of the league average cornerback, has been on four teams since playing in Super Bowl 43 with Arizona. Chad Clifton (age 34), who in the most optimistic of estimates, offers play at -10% of the league average LT, is offered a 3-year contract by two different teams and gets $8 million to play this season. When you consider that corners take longer to develop than offensive tackles, we’re left with only two reasonable explanations: either NFL decision makers act completely irrationally, or a league average offensive tackle offers ten to twenty times more value over replacement than a league average cornerback.
And that’s what’s astounding in the NFL labor markets today.
What, if anything, is the Moral of the 2005 Texans’ Story?
There’s a pretty good article in yesterday’s San Francisco Chronicle, guest written by Houston Chronicle columnist Richard Justice. The subject: David Carr’s career, in wake of his signing with the 49ers to “compete” for the starting job.
If there is a fault in the analysis performed here by Justice, it’s that he basically exonerates the Texans from overdrafting Carr at first overall in the 2002 draft (my analysis on the class can be found here). Justice’s sharp criticism of the work done by Charley Casserly and staff between the Carr selection and the disaster of a season in 2005 is pretty much on point. Of course, the fact that the Texans bucked conventional wisdom and made the best draft pick in their short history just a year after Carr was drafted, giving him a superstar wideout in Andre Johnson via the third overall pick, is ignored.
Carr’s developmental career path was completely normal through the first three years of his career: he was never going to be a franchise passer in the truest sense of the term, but at the conclusion of his best season–to that point– in 2004, Carr was already an above average passer. Above average is very valuable in NFL dollars, and Carr could have passably fulfilled his billing as a first overall draft pick if he had stayed at that level. But by the end of the 2-14 2005 season, the Texans were just looking for some way they could salvage the David Carr investment, and at that point, they probably wasted an 8 million dollar roster bonus (in Carr’s rookie contract) trying to salvage what value had already been lost.
As far as I can tell, the only thing that actually changed in 2005–from 2004–is that the Texans ended up succumbing to their offensive line weakness. Sure, Carr’s play was a limiting factor on Andre Johnson that year, but no more a limiting factor on Johnson than in both 2004 and 2006 (this is evidenced by the emergence of Johnson into a top level WR as soon as Matt Schaub took over at QB). In 2005, the Texans could run the ball just as well as they could before, probably even better. Dominick Davis (Williams), who would not play another snap after 2005, was every bit as productive that year as he was in 2004.
More to the point, Justice is criticizing the leadership of the Houston franchise for allowing the offensive line to reach offensive levels. In 2004, David Carr was sacked on more than 10% of his dropbacks, and no observer batted an eye at it. The line was fine in 2004, and that number kind of typifies David Carr as a passer. In 2005, the two guards from the 2004 team ended up combining for 28 starts at the tackle positions. The 2005 Texans, despite having a QB and a WR drafted in the top three picks of their respective NFL drafts, were a team that were not built to throw the football.
The fact that they had to throw the football was more due to a complete and utter defensive collapse than anything wrong with Carr, Casserly, or the offensive coaching staff headed by Chris Palmer, but the suggestion by Justice is valid: why invest two top picks exclusively in a passing game, and then not build a team to throw the football? But a more intense look at the draft patterns of the Texans suggests that the Carr project might have been doomed from the start.
Consider: the chances of the Texans landing a player as dynamic as Andre Johnson at any point in their first four drafts was not very good. Maybe as high as 30%. Well, at the point that the Texans landed Johnson, they were one pick into their second draft, and had already landed 4 above average NFL players (including Carr, at the time): Johnson, guard Chester Pitts, and receiver Jabar Gaffney. Later that draft, they landed tackle Seth Wand and Davis/Williams. At this point, the Texans turned their draft attention strictly to the defensive side of the ball for the duration of the next two years.
This is pretty much Justice’s point. The Texans ignored the offensive side of the ball in two straight drafts. This caused Carr to not progress as expected, it caused Johnson’s breakout season in 2004 to be followed by two largely disappointing years before his 2007 14.1 average yard per catch (injury shortened) season. According to Justice, the Texans’ owed it to Carr and they owed it to themselves to keep putting talent on the offense, and after consecutive years of adding only defensive players, the management of the team got what they deserved when the team went 2-14.
The more important thing to get out of this is just how hard it is to build a team around a quarterback, even if you pick up the “best” quarterback in the draft. As an expansion team, the Texans could have picked Julius Peppers, the consensus best player in the draft, or they could have gone for the quarterback and start the building process from there. Carr’s tragic flaw is, and will always be, his desire to want to hold onto the ball for a second too long. Because of that flaw, he’s a tough choice at No. 1 overall. But he’s not by any means a horrible pick: Carr gave Houston a bunch of above replacement seasons that they could not have gotten from quarterbacks off the scrap heap. It just so happens that 2005 was not one of those seasons.
Here’s the moral of the story: teams that are considering picking a quarterback in the upcoming couple of drafts need to understand why the Texans won 5 fewer games in 2005 than in 2004. Because of the spot where David Carr was drafted (1st overall), his contract, and the Texans’ place in the league after the 2004 season, the team had no choice but to turn Carr loose and to throw him to the wolves, so to speak. The results were positively disastrous.
Compare for a second the amount of homegrown talent on the 2-14 2005 Texans offense, to that of the 11-5 2005 Bengals offense. The Bengals spent two first round picks in the top ten on offensive tackles. The Texans: none. But the homegrown talent on defense is pretty similar. The difference is most stark when you look at that Bengals team, and see all the talent that was drafted–by the Bengals–prior to Carson Palmer being the first overall pick in 2003. This list involves both tackles, the top two receivers, and the running back. Palmer was the part that brought it all together for Cincinnati, making the Bengals offense of 2005 and 2006 one of the best units in the NFL.
Teams considering Sam Bradford at the top of this draft should best be doing a self analysis to see if they have the parts of their future team already in place. If you’re the St. Louis Rams, you have two first round tackles on your roster. Can Alex Barron and Jason Smith be your tackle tandem of the future? What about Donnie Avery? Does he have Chad Ochocinco type breakout potential at wide receiver? Can you land a competent guard, tight end, or second wide receiver in the second round? If your best self-analysis measures answer yes to all these questions, perhaps Sam Bradford is the piece who will bring all the parts together. If Barron, and Avery are not parts of the next strong Rams team, then maybe picking for your need at quarterback over value is going to be repeating the same mistake the Texans made. If Avery and co. aren’t NFL type talent, Bradford will probably suffer the same fate as Carr when thrown to the wolves.
If the Detroit Lions have an offensive breakout this year, it will be because of their decision to make Matt Stafford the part that brings all of their offensive pieces together: first round tackles Jeff Backus and Gosder Cherilus, first round receiver Calvin Johnson, and first round TE Brandon Pettigrew, and homegrown RB Kevin Smith. If the Lions do not break out this year on offense, it will be due to the fact that they overestimated the usefulness of players like Cherilus and Calvin Johnson and Pettigrew in developing a young quarterback. The Lions have a high percentage of Detroit’s GDP hinging on the fact that Stafford’s development will not stall.
The 2005 Texans teach us that an expansion team, and teams in similar position, need to be focused on adding talent above need, because even a well-researched, easily-defensible pick at a need position can and will go awry if a team runs out of goodwill and needs to throw it’s investment to the wind in hopes of winning games. The Texans Proverb:
Lucky is the team that is merely a quarterback away from being a winner, as their problem is easily solved. Unlucky is the team who has a quarterback and nothing else, for their fans should never know that they had a quarterback at all.
Alex Smith, meet David Carr. You have much to learn about each other’s plight.
The Calero Conundrum: What we can learn about the reliever market
To most Mets fans delight, Kiko Calero was signed to a minor-league deal that could earn him up to $1.5 million. Many across the internet including those at Fangraphs and the Hardball Times have speculated on why he didn’t sign earlier. Naturally, the conclusion was that there were some rather large concerns about the health of his arm and shoulder. Still, most thought that the risk was more than worth the small cost he was commanding in the market and any team who landed him would get a ’steal’. Well, the Mets seem to have inked a solid reliever to a rather small contract. 
Calero has a career 9.6 K/9 and 132 ERA+, and if he performs near that level for a good portion of the season, he will easily be worth his value. Nevertheless, the Calero situation has shone light on the greater reliever market which helps explain the relative lack of interest.
Relief Pitcher as a Position
In today’s major leagues, there are two primary roles which garner a lot of money and attention, the closer and the left-handed setup man. A player who can fill either of these roles effectively and has historically proven the ability to do so will likely earn a larger amount of money than other relief pitchers. While Calero has been good, his ’stuff” isn’t terribly impressive and probably keeps him from being considered a closer candidate. Additionally, the role of a bullpen ‘anchor’ is often given a slight premium, although these players are in many cases insurance policies for the current closer.
Look around the league this offseason and you’ll see some examples of this. John Grabow got a 2-year $7.5 million deal, Jose Valverde landed a 2-year $14 million contract, and Fernando Rodney got $11 million over two years. Each of these players is left-handed or has shown the ability to consistently get saves in the past.
The Age Factor
Calero is 35 years old. At that age, some decline is likely, especially given the fact that 2009 was his best year. But the concern about his age goes beyond just the projected 2010 performance. For players with an injury, the potential payoff of a successful and healthy season is not just in the current year, but in a future contract. For Calero, there is less of a chance that he will be healthy and productive at age 36, 37 and 38, lowering the potential return for taking such a risk.
The Utility of the Back of the Bullpen
While a strong left hander, a closer and another ‘anchor’ are important bullpen ‘positions’ for a lot of teams, the rest of the bullpen often has a different shape. Teams would like to employ cheap and home-grown options and often have the choice of many young relievers and future starters who need major league experience. Once again, this goes beyond the current season, but also has an eye on the future. A reliever who doesn’t fill the critical roles in a bullpen is taking up space which could be used to develop arms that can pay huge dividends later on. If an older reliever becomes ineffective over the course of a season, they are often ’stuck’ using him and cannot replace him without a release. It’s interesting to point out that the new Calero contract allows for him to be sent to the minor leagues freely.
Conclusions
These three factors show that the reasons for the lack of interest in Calero can be explained not just by injury, but by market forces as well. Some may argue, and with a lot of merit, that some of the valuations such as the ability to ‘close’ are not really indicative of the player’s value. For the most part, I agree. Calero was a great deal for the Mets in 2010, and should solidify their bullpen greatly. For those wondering why he came cheap, it can best be attributed to arbitrary distinctions amongst relievers in the market, a scope beyond 2010 (despite the fact that the contract is only for one year), and as many have said before, the injury risk.
LiveBall Sports Mock Draft #1
I refuse to religiously post mock updates on LiveBall Sports.
So here’s the plan: this is going to be THE OFFICIAL LiveBall Sports 2010 NFL Mock Draft. It will remain this way until there is hard evidence to suggest the mock is out of date. If a team trades a pick, it’s out of date. If I want to add a round to it, but I decide the first round is too inaccurate to just add to it, it’s out of date. If a team declares who it is taking, and it is in conflict with what my mock projection says (this will not happen–the declaration that is, not the incorrect part), it is out of date. As long as the mock is not dated, it remains the official LiveBall Sports mock draft.
That is all.
1. St. Louis Rams: Sam Bradford, QB, Oklahoma
If this doesn’t happen, either the rest of the league is wrong on Bradford or the Rams are. I don’t care how good Ndamakong Suh is, there is really no possibility that Bradford gets away from the Rams.
A Combine-Week Look at NFL Teams who Could Surprise in 2010
Now isn’t the time for 2010 football season prognostication. It’s time to focus on baseball projections and the March Madness tournament and the NFL Draft. Primarily.
But before the point of no return is reached, I thought this would be a good time to identify a few football teams who underachieved the expectations of their fan bases in 2009, but actually would make pretty good playoff sleepers in 2010. The key to this exercise is to separate the twenty teams that missed the playoffs into four categories:
- Teams that performed poorly and don’t have very much talent in reserve (example: St. Louis)
- Teams that performed poorly, but have the talent to compete in the near future
- Teams that performed well above their actual winning percentage in 2009 (example: Washington)
- Teams who performed well enough to make the postseason in 2009, but lost out on tiebreakers (example: Houston)
This article is concerned primarily with teams from groups #2. Teams from groups #2, and #3 are both going to figure to be competitive this year, but I’m trying to identify the teams who will actually make the leap forward in 2010. Not the teams who could have been competitive in 2009 under different circumstances. The “hot” picks for the playoffs are going to come pretty exclusively from group #4, as this is just the way that the mind of the prognosticator works.
I’ve chosen to look at just ten teams as “underachievers” from 2009. The bottom eight teams in the NFL last year were pretty well defined by any objective system: Chicago, Tampa Bay, Seattle, Kansas City, Seattle, Oakland, St. Louis, and Detroit were the bottom eight teams rated by both Generic Win Probability and DVOA. I have chosen to add to this list of eight teams small market Jacksonville and Buffalo, because both featured units (Buffalo – offense, Jacksonville – defense) that belonged in the same class of the other bad teams. No team on this list managed so much as a .500 record last year, however, it is not exhaustive of the sub .500 teams. Washington went 4-12, and Miami went 7-9, but it’s pretty much in agreement that those teams belong lumped in closer to the .500 teams (Tennessee, Cincinnati, and San Francisco types) than to the underachievers.
Denver is pretty much in it’s own category as an overachieving team that, in a large ten game sample to finish the year, did not outpace it’s 2-8 record. They could easily be in this discussion if treated like a 2-8 team instead of an 8-8 team, but somewhere, the team that started 6-0 still remains.
The next step is to try to separate which teams have the talent, and which teams are still caught in the middle of a rebuilding project with no clear direction. Oakland comes to mind as a team with no clear direction (or purpose…the Raiders don’t really even exist to make money). Kansas City and St. Louis are teams where the only talent on the roster has come from the first round of the last four NFL drafts. The talent development has been uninspired. There’s a little bit more promise right now in Buffalo and Cleveland, but in both cases, that could be just empty promise.
The remaining five teams are the five teams I feel are best suited to make a playoff push in 2010, despite poor performance in 2009.
5. Jacksonville Jaguars
Jacksonville is a bit directionless right now, but they are unquestionably one of the more talented teams on this list. David Garrard has an aging skill set, but as a proven leader and relatively consistent quarterback, he’s not a weakness, and more importantly, he has given the Jags back to back 16 start seasons. He’s well removed from his magical 2007 season, but the Jags infused their offense with offensive tackles last season, who should help solidify his line this year.
Jacksonville’s issue has been defense ever since they drafted S Reggie Nelson, who appears a bust at this point. But with the tenth overall pick, Jacksonville appears that they will have the option between picking a potential superstar at receiver, such as Dez Bryant, or a corner like Joe Haden, or another potential defensive superstar. Jacksonville doesn’t pick in the second round, but the team at the heart and center of the Tebow debate might be willing to throw in their 2011 first rounder for the right to get in position to draft him.
The talent of players such as Mike Sims-Walker and Maurice Jones-Drew is pretty undeniable. The Jacksonville offense will not be below average as long as Jones-Drew and Garrard are healthy, so once again, they’ll be competitive if they can throw a defense together.
4. Tampa Bay Buccaneers
The Buccaneers sit in a really good spot to make a splash in the draft, with regard to landing an impact player, being one of three teams on this list of five who figures to have acquired their franchise quarterback last offseason. In Josh Freeman, they might end up having the best of the bunch. Problem is that Tampa Bay is neither productive on the lines right now, nor at the receiver position. They’re on this list because that’s fixable. It’s not like they’ve shunned the offensive line over past years, although Donald Penn and Jeremy Trueblood are a below average tackle combination, and the entire unit was lackluster. The offensive line might need to draft an anchor, such as Russell Okung, but it wouldn’t be terribly shocking if they were a strength in front of Freeman next year. The team could also draft another Oklahoma State player, Bryant, with the 3rd overall pick.
The defense needs to get better play from it’s safeties, but moving Jermaine Phillips back there and getting back a healthy Will Allen should do the trick. The 3rd overall pick is also an excellent spot with regards to landing a game changing defensive tackle in this draft.
3. Seattle Seahawks
I picked Seattle to go to the super bowl last year, but this designation is about more than just saving face. The Seahawks are without a left tackle after Walter Jones (probably) retired, but with a left tackle, Seattle already has the bits and pieces of a very strong line. They weren’t able to run the ball last year with any consistency, but that issue can be solved by getting a running back in the draft. A bigger problem is that, even with protection, Matt Hasselbeck struggled to 1) stay healthy, and 2) be productive. It’s hard to watch great players go through the part of their career where they are hurting their team, but it appears that Seattle is at that point with Hasselbeck, who is 35. This doesn’t really appear to be a receiver issue either. As odd as it is to say, it appears that the two largest weaknesses on the Seahawks are at left tackle and quarterback.
The defense is a lot easier to figure out. Seattle’s front seven is as good as advertised, but the only pass rusher of the bunch is Darryl Tapp. Seattle needs a secondary pass rushing threat, or preferably, someone who is good enough to make Tapp the secondary threat. And also, the secondary is complete garbage.
But the remaining talent of the Seahawks is still undeniable, and at the very least, this coaching change should bring in someone who is actually interested in fixing the problems that the organization can diagnose.
2. Chicago Bears
By acquiring Jay Cutler in a trade last offseason, the Bears made the future of the organization into the present. And by hiring Mike Martz to run the offense, a move that I feel is inspired if not incredibly obvious, the Bears figure to have their best offense in 2010 since, maybe ever.
As bullish as I am about that offense, the defense is going to be a concern if the Bears are going to surprise their division and make the playoffs. For the amount of resources the Bears put into their defensive line, basically a high pick every season, they’re getting very mediocre results from it. The linebackers are quite good, and should return Brian Urlacher in the middle this year in place of Hunter Hillenmeyer, but like Seattle, there’s no consistent complementary pass rusher, and the secondary is largely garbage.
The Bears will always been competitive in cold weather, but I believe an improvement in their results on the road will make them a very dangerous team next year.
1. Detroit Lions
This is the team that’s not like the others. The Lions have been horrendous forever, and though they had an honorary “winning season” in 2007 (7-9 record), Detroit posted a generic win probability of 28%, which is horrendous. Not quite as bad as their next “season“, but still awful. The tricky thing with projecting the Lions for mass improvement in 2010 is that, I have to admit, the 2009 Lions were no better than the 2008 Lions. Both teams had a projected 2-14 record based on both their pythagorean records and win probabilities, but only one was lucky enough to be historically bad. The Lions may have vastly overachieved in 2007, but they haven’t been anywhere near that level since.
One trend is clear about the Lions: when they won in 2009 (the two games they did win, plus the Vikings game that they were alive in the third quarter of), Matt Stafford was successful. To project a massive improvement in the Lions from 2009 to 2010, it goes without saying that Stafford is going to have to be successful a lot more frequently. And, certainly, he can be. The Lions had a surprisingly good offensive line last season, giving Stafford plenty of time to make his decisions. In part because of Stafford’s wildness, no Lions receiver enjoyed a strong 2009 season, even after Calvin Johnson was a pro bowl alternate on the 2008 0-16 team. Stafford is going to have to be more productive in 2010, but he can do that if his receivers help him. There just wasn’t very much of that for the 2009 Lions.
The defense, per usual, is a concern and will prevent them from being a truly serious contender. But the Lions will be able to outscore a lot of teams in 2010, and perhaps they can outscore opponents given just the talent that is currently there. And that makes them different from the other bottom of the barrel finishers in 2009. St. Louis, Kansas City, Oakland, and perhaps Cleveland and Buffalo aren’t going to be winning any shootouts against quality teams this year. The Detroit Lions very well might. Which makes them a controversial, but defensible surprise choice to push for the NFL playoffs in 2010.
NFL Free Agency and the Uncapped Year
When NFL free agency was in it’s infancy, the institution of a free market system in the NFL completely changed the way the business side of the game worked. A lot like the business of social media serves to prove today, no one disagreed that free agency was a valuable tool to anyone who could learn how to work the system, it’s just that no one really knew what they were doing.
Some teams figured it out sooner than others. The Packers signed DE Reggie White to a 4 year-$17 million contract in 1993, which would have been the equivalent of $25 million when adjusted for inflation in 2008. For reasons involving league revenues, NFL salaries have inflated far faster than the value of a standard traded good in the US. When the salary cap debuted in 1994, the maximum spent per team could not exceed $34.6 million. In 2009, the salary cap was officially listed at $128 million per team, but due to violations in the prior year regarding salary floors, it was effectively closer to $134 million per team. League salaries have increased nearly 300% over the salary cap era. Inflation in the dollar accounts for only a 50% increase over the timeframe.
In today’s NFL cap dollars, White’s deal is worth an equivalent of $16.5 million per year, or 4 years-$66 million. This is not dissimilar to the value of Albert Haynesworth’s contract with the Washington Redskins (7 years-$100 million), except there’s an even greater percentage of Haynesworth’s money that’s effectively fictitious.
The point of this analysis is to show that a team like the Eagles might have been able to value White’s contribution to the team in terms of wins, and then reached the very logical conclusion that there’s no way an NFL defensive player is worth that much money. The exact same arguments have been brought against the Redskins brass this year, particularly in the wake of a 4-12 season. It’s coincidence that “highest paid” type deals have remained so proportional in value to the beginning of free agency. Now consider: White was a first team AP all-pro 6 straight years from 1986 to 1991. In 1992, he was a second team all-pro in a contract year, and he finished behind Minnesota’s Chris Doleman and teammate Clyde Simmons in the AP voting. It wouldn’t have been indefensible to see White’s age and factor that into a value analysis. Haynesworth signed with Washington at age 28. White signed with GB at age 32.
And you know what, when Reggie White went to Green Bay, he never had consecutive 10+ sack seasons until the very end of his tenure there. That record contract he signed: he was extended before he won the super bowl with the Packers. Of course, Clyde Simmons ended up posting a 5 sack season in 1993, and then leaving Philadelphia. Reggie White is one of the most valuable players in NFL history–probably one of the five most valuable–and this analysis isn’t to say he’s not. It’s to show that Green Bay may have in-fact overpaid for White on the open market. This doesn’t make his loss any easier for Philly fans to swallow, as the Eagles won 8 and 7 games the two years following his departure. Titans fans aren’t relishing their 8-8 finish this year after getting rid of Haynesworth, but the same argument holds: it’s possible that the Redskins overpaid, even after factoring in market conditions.
The simile here is about uncharted waters. When free agency was in it’s infancy, lineman started collecting contracts once thought preposterous for players of that position. Agents were laughed at for suggesting that a player who doesn’t touch the football should earn seven figures in a single season. Fifteen years later, Steve Hutchinson, an offensive guard, signed for a half million dollars over seven years. Hutchinson is now reaching the backloaded end of that contract with the Vikings, and they’re more dependent now on his production than at any point before.
Hutchinson got lucky. His contract expired following the 2005 season, which happened to be perfectly timed with all this contract madness. Because it gets at the heart of what I’m really writing about tonight: this CBA and the uncapped year.
The whole idea with CBA agreements is that two sides representing the entirety of the NFL labor market come to a compromise that allows both to reap the benefits equally (or if not equally, at least fairly) of a product that is a cash cow in the US. The issue in 2006 was that there was no safeguards or soft landings in the extension the sides agreed to in 2002. The NFL financial landscape was relatively static from 1993 to 2002, but following this point, revenues shot through the roof creating a dynamic market situation where large market teams and small market teams were no longer on a level playing field: only litigation (such as revenue sharing) could maintain the competitive balance of the NFL. And up until that point, parity was as much a part of football as referees or fines.
Parity, though, had to be the first thing to go. Officially, the NFL had kept it’s salary cap after agreeing to a labor deal that was positively received at the time, but the practical idea of a salary cap was violated by the actual agreement. Ask the Commish’s Al Lackner puts it thusly:
In 2005, it was set at $85.5 Million. Last year it was originally set to be approximately $94.5 Million. However, an extension to the CBA brought with it a new formula, which saw an expansion to approximately $102 Million. The cap in 2007 was $109 Million. In 2008 it was $116.7 Million. In 2009 it will be approximately $127 Million , which is up from the $123 originally projected.
The game was awash in cash from 2003-2005. The cap had been written to move with league revenues, but it wasn’t out of proportion until after this agreement. From $34.6 million in 1994 to $85.5 million in 2005 is a significant jump, an average of $4.5 million a year, or basically one additional highly paid player per team, per year. Since 2006? An average of $8.5 million per year. The rate of increase in the salary has doubled since 2006. Trust me when I say that team payrolls have not increased by an average of nearly 10 million dollars per year. Why do you think small market teams like Jacksonville, Kansas City, and Buffalo are paying players like David Garrard, Matt Cassel, and old Terrell Owens, respectively, $6-9 million a year? If you’re thinking about the kind of cost-benefit analysis that Green Bay and Washington did on premier defensive players in the first and last years of the salary cap era, you’re missing the point.
After the 2005 season, the salary cap failed to be a salary cap. Yes, teams like Carolina, Denver, and Washington had some of their veteran releases dictated by creating salary cap room to function with, but the vast majority of teams (read: everyone else) have either been functioning independent of the cap, or trying to be in compliance with the salary floor.
What’s most flooring about the whole process, pardon the pun, is that in 2009, the NFL’s salary floor was a preposterous 87% of the cap value. In other words, the league salary floor was $112 million in 2009. In 2007, the SALARY CAP was $109 million. Being an owner of a small market franchise in the NFL is one of the toughest jobs in sports.
The cap came into being as a ploy by the owners to limit salaries in the new free labor market system in the NFL. Now, it’s a major drain on the bottom line for the bottom third of owners in the NFL. Large market owners are okay with this because it forces small market teams to spend their shared revenue and then some, but the small market franchises would be more valuable in the absence of a cap/floor. And then if there was going to be a repealing of the floor, it would be a good chance for the large market owners to try to get out of shared revenues.
And so we arrive at the uncapped year in such a dynamic market. The union doesn’t want to give back any of the gains it made in 2006. The small market owners need the cap to function like it did in the past, or they need it gone entirely. And the large market owners, who pretty much win as long as there is still football, just want things to be sustainable for the future. The party who really have no stake in the golden goose at this point, the small market owners, are a distinct minority between two much larger parties who are trying to come to a compromise that probably doesn’t exist.
Whether they will agree to something in time to save 2011 football is a case for another day. Let’s look into the crystal ball and see who might benefit in this highly dynamic free agency year. The league legislated any number of protective measures to prevent salaries from exploding to irreplaceable levels at 2010. Preventive measures against 4th and 5th year pros, measures against the most successful teams from 2009, and of course, the removal of the salary floor. Will it work?
I think it will work. Nothing can prevent desperate teams from giving out dumb contracts to undeserved players, but in terms of players that are comfortably above the league average, I see about 15 names available in free agency. About 5 players on that list are expected to receive the franchise tag and remain with their current teams for another year. Among the players actually expected to hit the market, we’re talking about DE Julius Peppers, TE Ben Watson, WR Kevin Walter, RB Darren Sproles, QB Chad Pennington, and DE Kyle Vanden Bosch. Peppers was going to be the highest paid player in this class regardless, but he probably won’t see Haynesworth money. Watson, Walter, and Sproles should all sign lucrative deals somewhere, but none are going to be too far above the $6-$8 million per year range. Pennington isn’t going to get a deal longer than 2-3 years and the chance to compete for a job. VandenBosch’s value is down from it’s peak two years ago, as is Packers DE Aaron Kampman.
On my “79 scale”, (79 is a fringe starter, while league average ranges from 82-85) I have no player in this free agent class rated above 92, and only five players at a 90 or above, with no less than two of those players expected to wear the franchise tag or otherwise not hit the market. Last year I had 10 players with a 90 rating, with four getting the franchise tag.
Let’s review last year’s list. Of the 6 players who changed teams with a rating of 87 or higher by my system, only one (Leonard Weaver) made the pro bowl with his new team. Two, Derrick Ward and Chris Canty, did not make any noticeable impact with their new teams. The other three (Haynesworth, TJ Houshmandzadeh, and Jim Leonhard) all had an impact with their new teams, but none were even as much as a pro bowl alternate. The best free agent signing of last offseason was probably Bart Scott to the New York Jets, or maybe Jason Brown with the Rams.
Haynesworth might still end up being a great signing for the Redskins, but for right now, he’s a good case defense for why the uncapped year isn’t about to significantly alter the NFL’s salary structure in one season. Peppers is getting his money, and a bunch of other unrestricted free agents will cash in with large market teams, but that’s not the uncapped year working. That’s just NFL free agency.
What about old faces in new places? The Jets signed a pair of Ravens last offseason, and then installed Rex Ryan’s pressure-heavy schemes in New York. They led the NFL in total defense. Maybe players with an “in” can capitalize on the uncapped year?
Let’s see. Mike Shanahan is in Washington now, and he brought Jim Haslett as his DC. Dick Jauron is coaching the secondary in Philadelphia. Mike Martz is the offensive coordinator in Chicago. Jim Zorn is coaching the quarterbacks in Baltimore. Maybe they’ll take some players with them.
This is good news for Ben Hamilton, former Denver Broncos guard, and Casey Rabach, former Redskins center. They will be taken care of this year. Barry Sims might be able to get a job with the Bears now, as may Brandon Manumaleuna. And if Marc Bulger gets cut, there’s a backup job available in Chicago.
It’s obvious though that there will not be any bidding over the players who have scheme “ins” with a new franchise. The one thing that is really clear about free agency this year is that there are no bargains. But beyond that, there’s about ten players worth getting into a bidding war over. Total. 80% of the players eligible for free agency are past the valuable portion of their careers, and the remaining 20% is looking at a bidding pool that is reduced by 75% this year. Money isn’t going to fly all over the place, and teams aren’t going to forget about the draft because they can buy mature talent.
It’s still true that the labor situation and markets are very dynamic at this time, but the craziness has already ensued. It’s possible that the market will continue to correct this year, but teams were going nuts in free agency from 2006-2008. The beneficiaries were not Darren Sproles and Kyle Vanden Bosch. The beneficiaries of the dynamic market were Steve Hutchinson, LeCharles Bentley, Edgerrin James, Nate Clements, Asante Samuel, Darren Howard, Adam Archuleta, Nate Burleson, Adalius Thomas, Daniel Graham, and Michael Turner.
Yes, the uncapped year means less restrictions on team budgets, but any team that feels an increased sense of freedom in 2010 has missed the boat–by four years.
How the Cubs Can Manage a Youth Movement
The Chicago Cubs are far from a young team at the moment. As currently constructed, Geovany Soto is the only everyday starter who will be under the age of 29 at season’s end. However, for the first time in a while, the Cubs appear to have a relatively strong minor league system with some talents that could contribute in the near future. In addition, several contract expirations will force a decision of the part of new ownership and possibly change the face of the team.
Who Could Be Leaving
It seems like Aramis Ramirez and Derrek Lee have been stationed at the corners for a decade. Over the years, we’ve seen Dusty Baker and Lou Piniella try to squeeze any productive left handed bat between them in the lineup whether it be Jacque Jones, Kosuke Fukudome, Jeromy Burnitz or Milton Bradley. While these players have come and gone or changed roles, Lee and Ramirez have been a consistent duo. Derrek Lee bounced back from a rough 2008 to to put together his best year since his ‘05 season in 2009. The bad news is, he’ll be 35 by the end of this season when his contract expires. Looking forward, years like 2008 look a lot more likely than 2009.
For Ramirez, he has a large player option for 2011 with a mutual option in 2012. He took a hometown discount when he signed the extension and likely won’t fetch any more on the open market. Since arriving, he has been the most consistent contributor for the Cubs, even maintaining a .905 OPS last year despite coming back from a shoulder injury. Ramirez is 3 years younger than Lee and will more than likely outlast him on the north side.
Additionally, Kosuke Fukudome is signed through 2011 and will be turning 34 around the beginning of the 2012 season. Unless he shows continued improvement in his early 30’s over the next couple of years, the initial 4-year deal will likely be the only one he receives from the Cubs.
Besides those big three players, Ryan Theriot is on a year-to-year basis, recently losing the first arbitration hearing the Cubs have had in nearly two decades. Jeff Baker and Mike Fontenot are by no means long-term solutions, and Marlon Byrd just signed a 3 year deal. As for Alfonso Soriano, he’s not going anywhere.
On the starting pitching front, Ryan Dempster and Carlos Zambrano are locked up for a good while, Randy Wells has just a year of service time accrued and Ted Lilly is finishing up the last year of what’s been a very productive deal (2007 playoffs aside).
What’s to Come
If you haven’t heard of Josh Vitters, Starlin Castro or Jay Jackson, they are the hottest prospects in the Cubs’ system. Castro has held his own at age 19 in AA ball, but will need at least a year to work on his defense and develop some power before anyone can consider playing him full-time at shortstop. Josh Vitters has displayed a great swing with tremendous power in A ball, but leaves a lot to be desired with his defense and BB rate. Jay Jackson has been outstanding in the high minor leagues, registering a 10.1 K/9 and 2.95 ERA over his brief minor league career. One also has to mention former top pick Andrew Cashner who excelled in his first minor league shot at starting. Still though of by many as a future reliever, he is said to be working on a changeup and will be starting in the minors this year. Another former top pick, Tyler Colvin put together a solid ‘09, but has the same problem as Vitters with a low BB rate.
Further down the line are players like shorstop Hak-Ju Lee and outfielder Brett Jackson who had great seasons in 2009. Both show tremendous skills and have a strong chance to reach the majors. Other players like SP Chris Carpenter, SP Chris Archer, OF Kyler Burke and 2B Ryan Flaherty could also contribute down the line.
The Plan
The first decisions will have to be made at the end of the 2010 season. With Derrek Lee’s contract expiring and Josh Vitters close, but not completely ready for the majors the Cubs have a few options. Lee is entering into a free agent class of first basemen that includes Paul Konerko, Adam Dunn and Lance Berkman to name a few. Because of this and the current market, Lee could be brought back at a large discount in a 2-year deal. However, another possibility could lie in what becomes of Chad Tracy or Micah Hoffpauir this year. If either show the ability to produce, they could be used as stop-gaps while Vitters develops fully. While some might say this is a risky proposition, it is equally risk to expect continued production out of a first baseman in his mid-30’s. With Vitters’ arrival in either 2011 or 2012, the Cubs could begin Aramis Ramirez’s transition to first base, unless Vitters does not improve at third in which case it would become his home. Xavier Nady is another possible stop-gap solution who will likely come cheaper, with less years attached, and more positional flexibility if he is signed beyond 2010.
If Ryan Theriot becomes too expensive, the team can also go with current AAA shortstop Darwin Barney, or go with Andres Blanco in the short run if he shows improvement. Both could produce at Theriot levels at younger ages without blocking Starlin Castro’s arrival.
At the same time, Ted Lilly’s rotation spot could easily be filled by Jay Jackson with several other starters waiting in the wings.
After 2011, Kosuke Fukudome will either be extended or move on to another team. If the Cubs are to continue to get younger, this would be an opportunity for either Brett Jackson or Tyler Colvin to begin playing in the OF. At the same time, some other aforementioned minor leaguers could be ready to fill unexpected holes in the rotation, the outfield or infield.
In many ways, this transition could be seamless, as long as management isn’t insistent on holding onto older players. While it is risky to assume production out of young players, it is equally risky to invest a large amount of money in an aging veteran. Additionally, with the money freed up through expiring contracts, there will be enough available to resign younger players and even look to plug holes temporarily through free agency. A lot is still in the air, though. Will Ramirez opt to remain a Cub? Will Soriano produce at all in the final five years of his contract? Will Soto return to his 2008 form and become one of the better catchers in the game? These are critical questions whose answers will ultimately force the Cubs’ decision makers to either find some in-house, young solutions or search for temporary and expensive answers in free agency.
The Basics of Bench Building
A good bench is often cited as one of those necessities for a championship baseball team. However, we are too often given vague descriptions of what truly constitutes a solid unit. Is it good pinch runners and late inning defensive replacements? A good pinch hitter that can negate the value of an opposing left handed reliever? Or is it guys who can fill in in the case of injury? Well, of course it’s all of the above in some way or another, but in this article we can hopefully start to create a systematic approach to filling out a roster.
A bench player’s value is determined by a variety of factors which arise from unique situations. These include platoon partnering, pinch hitting, spot starting in place of a resting starter and replacing an injured starter. One has to also consider the opportunity cost of development for younger players who could be receiving greater playing time in the minor leagues.
A general manager should look to start building his bench with players who can provide the most value. The potential value is not just determined by being a superior talent, but also the potential playing opportunities. In addition, there is some exclusivity as the multiple players cannot perform the exact same role off the bench. The value of a player who excels at pinch running is hindered by having a teammate with similar skills as they can’t both be employed in all high leverage situations. As a result, the GM has to examine how an addition will marginally affect the total team performance, rather than just the player’s individual contribution. In order to properly evaluate the value of a player, we should look at each component of his value.
Platoon Partnering
A platoon partner is a split between a starter and bench player, but we’ll call him a bench player assuming that a team already has a starter at every position. This role provides arguably the most value of any bench position, possibly improving production by 100 points in OPS over a few hundred plate appearances. Take the current Cubs 2B platoon of Jeff Baker and Mike Fontenot as an example.
Baker (career)
vs. LHP .285/.346/.543/.889
vs. RHP .262/.316/.411/.727
Fontenot (career)
vs. LHP .232/.286/.344/.630
vs. RHP 272/.348/.435/.783
It’s pretty clear that the Cubs are getting a pretty solid increase in production with the career numbers showing a 269 point improvement against left handed pitching and a smaller 66 points against righties. Not only does a platoon situation help produce runs in the starting lineup, but the platoon partner is also available for perform other bench functions which we’ll look at later. It’s pretty obvious that a player that provides a potentially large platoon advantage should have high priority on the bench.
Injury Replacement/Spot Starter
While some might think that pinch hitting is the next important function at the bench, I would argue that an injury replacement or spot starter is more important. This is because a player has many more potential opportunities to contribute in place of a starter than as a player getting a few plate appearances per week. Using this reasoning, the best bench option is clearly not the best hitter or fielder, but the player who has the greatest chance to contribute positively. This would have a tendency to favor outfielders over first basemen and would require some evaluation of the injury risk for the starting lineup. Using the Cubs case again, Micah Hoffpauir is an inferior choice to Chad Tracy, not because he is a worse hitter, but because he can only provide positive replacement value at 1st base where the relatively durable Derrek Lee plays and rarely skips a start. Meanwhile, Tracy can play 1st or 3rd at least averagely and even play in the likely event of an Alfonso Soriano injury or off day. A player with multiple position flexibility (which means not just playing the defensive positions, but playing them well enough to actually add value to the team) also allows for better utilization of the rest of the bench, increasing team value.
Pinch Hitting
Pinch hitting is important, but in most cases, finding a good pinch hitter shouldn’t be the first priority. Platoon partners and positional backups would be able to handle most situations, and the premium paid for better hitters would far exceed the marginal benefit in a small amount of plate appearances. Nevertheless, a bench that completely lacks a hitter who can hit right handed pitchers well, or a starter with a terrible platoon split and no platoon partner both create noteworthy opportunities to add value. If this is a unique need for a team, then it may be worth it to add a player primarily for this purpose.
Pinch Running/Defensive Replacement
While often cited as important elements of a bench, a pinch runner or defensive replacement will have an insignificant impact on the team. The value is somewhat increased with a particularly slow or defensively inept team, but this role should not be actively pursued as there are extremely few actual situations where a substitution makes any difference. Additionally, there are almost always players already occupying the platoon partner or backup roles that are capable of pinch running or playing defense. This role would likely be the main reason for the 2010 Cubs to add Sam Fuld to the roster, despite the fact that he would add little platoon advantage, replacement value over other members of the team, or pinch hitting value.
Opportunity Cost of Development
Finally, adding a player to the 25 man roster in a bench role will almost certainly limit his at bats compared to starting in the minor leagues. This is an important issue particularly for teams not expecting to contend since a win in the current year is valued at a lesser value than future wins. Also, players in the minor leagues can still have value as backups on the depth chart in the event of a longer term injury. On the whole, teams should keep their younger players in the minor leagues and avoid the hindrance of development. Such is the case with the Cubs and Tyler Colvin. While he could provide great value as 4th outfielder, it’s clear he has a lot to gain from another year in the minors.
Altogether, a bench should be made up of a players who can contribute positively in the greatest number of potential situations. This goes farther than the simple addition of good players, but also considers where and when these players could fill in and have an impact. Additionally, flexibility allows for greater utilization of all players off the bench in situations where they are best equipped to add value.
The relative value of a Middle Infielder in top-level Baseball
I’m not a basketball guy by any means, but the devotion of die-hard basketball fans to the value of a big man–even when field goal percentage is at an all time high–has always struck me as a bit perplexing. Of course, having an interior threat is a huge advantage. In general, the best teams have the strongest interior threats. This is because the best teams have the best players, in general. Having four strong players can separate the great teams from the other contenders. And I don’t think any team has perfected the five guard offense, which means that interior players are obviously valuable. The best players in the NBA, and even in college these days, all seem to be either guards or smaller forwards. The proliferation of the three point shooting game has been one critical element, but it appears to me that to win in today’s game, you need not only to be able to play offense on the perimeter, but that defense on the perimeter might be even more important.
I’m most definitely a football guy, as the post distribution on this here sight might have had you guessing. In football, a sustainable running game is huge competitive advantage over teams who can’t run the ball, but the best five offenses in the game every year are all throw-first teams, and the bottom five offenses every year all lack the ability to throw the football. Perfecting the running game can separate you from the other ten teams around the median, all of which can throw the football, but need that balance to be able to sustain drives.
Running can make the difference between winning and losing in football, but it doesn’t make the difference between the Raiders and the Chargers. If the Raiders woke up tomorrow morning with an offense that could sustain a 4.6 YPC average, they would still not be the favorite in the division, or really even a threat. They would become much less of a pushover for the Chiefs, but the Chargers would just do what they have always done to them (the Raiders haven’t beaten SD since 2003 — the year before Drew Brees became Drew Brees). It seems silly to cite a declining running game as the reason for underachieving expectations in football. Sure, the decline might have been a factor, but no team is throwing all of it’s eggs in that basket at this point. It’s a crutch.
It’s no secret that excelling at middle infield has become sort of a forgotten art in baseball. There are great infielders in the game today, among them Derek Jeter, and Chase Utley, and Dustin Pedroia. 2009 was a year where all sorts of second basemen and shortstops got in on the fun: Aaron Hill, Ben Zobrist, and Marco Scutaro all had excellent years by any standard.
But baseball execs do not speak with words. They use dollars to communicate. And the dollars show that the most valuable players in the game don’t play the middle infield. The highest paid players in baseball do two things primarily: they pitch and they hit. Second basemen who can hit get paid like corner outfielders…while corner outfielders who can get get paid like first basemen and top pitchers.
But the most striking thing about middle infielders and salary structure might be that, with the exception of the elite players at those positions, salary structure seems to correlate best with how long these guys have been with their organization. Orlando Hudson signed with Minnesota last week for one year-$5 million just a year after signing with the LA Dodgers for one year-$3.4 million. The point of mentioning this is not to suggest that $5 million dollars is chump change or that Hudson should be paid more for what he offers. Hudson has the 6th highest contract value on the Twins according to Cot’s Baseball Contracts. He and shortstop JJ Hardy are about $2 million behind Carl Pavano in 2010 salary. And the Twins are one of the only teams in baseball who value their middle infielders in the tier right behind their superstars, Joe Mauer and Justin Morneau. They are also, coincidentally, a team that is quite comfortable simply going with farmhands at the position year after year if they don’t have an “elite” option.
Hudson is a similar player in career value to A’s second baseman Mark Ellis, who is the third highest paid player on cash-strapped Oakland. Ellis is one of two players for the A’s who commanded a contract extension beyond arbitration years. Oakland, historically, plays the baseball market very well (if you’re reading this article, you probably won’t ask for a reference regarding that claim), but it’s very safe to say that Mark Ellis probably would not have been able to beat $12 million on the open market without signing for 4+ years. I’m confident this is because, while even in a bad year Ellis can justify his contract (value of a marginal win aside), the league wide perception is that even the league’s worst teams have a farmhand that is worth at least as much as Ellis.
Placido Polanco was able to land 3 years-$18 million this offseason, which is obviously a bigger contract than Ellis or Hudson have been able to land, but not on a per-year basis. Polanco is well worth the money spent, but one of the biggest underlying factors in the move for Philadelphia is that now, Chase Utley can be moved to a position where his contract doesn’t stand out quite as much from the rest of the pack. The Polanco deal actually decreases the average contract for a second baseman significantly.
Right now, the second highest-paid second baseman in the game is Robinson Cano, who is something like the 7th highest paid position player on his own team. The first and third largest second baseman contracts in MLB history (according to Cot’s, and excluding Utley) belong to Brian Roberts, a former Orioles farmhand turned superstar, turned overpaid leadoff man. In fact, the most valuable second basemen in the game tend to be as noteworthy on the open market as the light-hitting second basemen whose only true value to a baseball team is their ability to play other positions.
To this point, the focal point has been on second baseman, but the same phenomenon is found in the shortstops market as well. The biggest difference is that overall salary structure is much higher for the shortstops because having the ability to stand out there at short and hit homers has created an overvalued player of sorts. Michael Young, the player I have linked to here, has actually exceeded his contract in terms of marginal value every year since coming up in 2002, according to FanGraphs. But at the price of a premium shortstop, Young is now a third baseman coming off a career year with the bat. It seems doubtful he will ever be worth the yearly value of his contract for it’s duration.
Like at second base, there’s no market here below the elite level (Jose Reyes/Miguel Tejada/Hanley Ramirez/Jimmy Rollins/etc). Marco Scutaro got two years-$12.5 million on the open market from Boston, and he was the best of the free agent class by far. Those who make it to the elite level are not there because of defense, and tend to be moved to a position that maximized the value that teams have overpaid for. Derek Jeter is a rare exception, for reasons that have to do in large part with intangibles.
While teams have been quicker to pull the hook on shortstops than on their second baseman (based on anecdotal, but pretty clear turnover at the SS position), teams are still by and large satisfied with limited production at the position as long as the incumbent can field the position. Turnover at the shortstop position tends to happen not when a player isn’t hitting, because each organization is loaded with shortstops who can’t hit above 7th or 8th in the major league lineup. But when a player ceases to be a true shortstop, and is redefined as a light-hitting baseball player without a position (not to be confused with the much more valuable utility player who can still play a poor man’s shortstop off the bench), then teams move on without that player. This tends not to happen as much with second baseman.
Turnover, however, is not really what I’m talking about. Like the second baseman, the salary structure is completely out of whack at shortstop. The aforementioned Twins have in consecutive years 1) extended farmhand Nick Punto for $4 million a year for two years, and then 2) not only offered arbitration to Stephen Harris, but bought out his first two years. The only way either Punto or Harris will see extended time at shortstop this year is if a much more justifiable gamble on JJ Hardy doesn’t pay off, but both moves are still bad for optimal salary structure. Meanwhile, defensive whiz Adam Everett has now played for the Tigers for $1 million and then $1.55 million in consecutive years, both open market contracts. Jack Wilson, another defense-first player, will make $5 million a year over the next two years for the Mariners (he at least knows how to hold a bat). Another open market contract.
These shortstops are coming on the extreme cheap for two reasons: because players are receiving extensions through arbitration for simply being a good organizational soldier, and because the obscenely low middle infielder replacement level standard seemingly justifies any extension on a shortstop (you’re still the exception here, Dayton Moore). Organizations across the country have always been thin on shortstops who are actually prospects as shortstops, but pretty much everyone who plays the position for a whole year finishes with positive value, based on his positioning if nothing else.
Players who actually provide defensive and offensive value at shortstop (such as Scutaro) should be in much higher demand than the market suggests they are, but middle infielders are simply not paid as other baseball regulars, at least not to be regulars. It’s the reason that Scott Boras can look at Dave Dombrowski in the eye and suggest that 2-3 WAR player Johnny Damon should receive his $7 million dollars in a lump sum instead of deferred payments, and the team that couldn’t afford (2.5-3 WAR) Polanco can’t just laugh in his face. Damon is being offered more money for the 2010 season than either Curtis Granderson or Polanco made one year ago, has no other offers on the table, and yet, it’s the contract’s net present value–not dollar amount–that is keeping the sides apart.
Middle infield wins and corner outfield/infield wins are simply not valued on the same scale. Having organizational goodwill does nothing for an outfielder that cannot hit or field. Replacement level outfielders are much more likely to be non-tendered in their arbitration years than similar valued infielders. It’s simple: outfielders, third basemen, and first basemen are still the currency of baseball. While the defensive market is valued pretty well on the whole, players are still paid by their value to a batting order. And while there is clearly a difference between players that hit 7th, 8th, or 9th in a strong lineup, and those who hit there in a weak one, the differences are not reflected monetarily in players that can’t hit higher in the order on that weaker lineup.
Which returns us to the original question: are middle infielders in baseball the equivalent of the post defender in modern basketball, or run defenders in modern football? Are the differences between the best baseball teams and worst baseball teams pretty much independent of the players who play in the middle infield for those teams? I ran a quick regression on shortstops and second baseman 2009 WAR vs. team wins, and I found that, overall, there’s a weak correlation between this one year sample, and team wins in 2009 (r-squared = 0.21). The correlation is significantly stronger with shortstops than with second baseman. It’s not a very large sample, but based on the evidence, it seems tentatively okay to conclude that teams do win largely independent of their two middle infielders, and of second baseman in particular. That’s not saying much, but you could probably predict wins a lot better looking at the value of a team’s three best hitters or three best pitchers than their middle infielders.
So when you evaluate a move such as the Cardinals taking OF Skip Schumaker and turning him into a full time second baseman, you can kind of see the attitude by baseball executives towards those middle infielders encapsulated. The move means little in terms of good-for-team or bad-for-team, rather, it’s an example of a team going out of its way to keep a player within the organization. Schumaker didn’t make very much difference in the outcome of the NL Central–which was won by St. Louis. The Cards failed to advance in the playoffs because Albert Pujols slugged .300 and Chris Carpenter and Joel Pinero combined to give up 8 earned runs in 9 innings. Maybe if they invested heavily in middle infielders, they could have made it a round further. Or maybe next time, Pujols will hit two homers in three games. Superstars will always decide the outcome of small sample occurrences, and the available evidence suggest that, while the salary structure of the middle infielder might be off, it’s probably not worth holding your breath until they get equal treatment under salary law.
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Why the NFL’s Proposed OT Rules Changes are Misguided
Even though the NFL is the best marketed professional sport in the United States, the league is clearly not averse to doing things that generate bad PR. They’ll fine players for acting unprofessionally, even if there was no intent to show anyone up. They will maintain blackouts in local markets to protect the distribution of the league product, even for teams who cannot sell out their stadium. And they still have the damn tuck rule.
So I was a little surprised this morning to hear that the NFL competition committee will vote on a rule change to overtime specifially designed at giving the team that doesn’t win the coin toss a chance to respond before the game ends.
It’s a terrible, horrendous mockery of a rule.
First, the implication that the overtime rules must be changed is based of a premise that the current rules aren’t fair. It’s a false premise. If two theoretically even teams–playing at a neutral site–enter overtime together, they both have an even chance to win the game. Perfectly 50-50. It’s the very definition of fair.
What has people ticked is that, before a down of football is played, a non-football event decides which team has a relatively small advantage over the other. The coin toss does give one team a statistically significant advantage over the other, but not a particularly decisive one. It takes a 50-50 proposition and makes it about 60-40 in favor of the team that wins the toss–maybe as much as 65-35 in an offensive heavy environment.
This advantage is the cause of such outrage, so much that the competition committee has to decide on a rule change regarding the very way that we will decide football games…but only in the NFL PLAYOFFS. Remember, this rule is not good enough to decide a majority of football games, only the most critical ones.
Under the current rule, coaches have the option to avoid overtime if they think they can do better than 50-50 to win the game in regulation. One of these options is the two point conversion. If a team is down by seven, and scores a late touchdown, they can take an extra point with 99% accuracy [ex. point val = .99], or they can try a two point conversion with a 48% chance of success (plus or minus the quality of the offensive and defensive elements) [ex. point val = .96]. Essentially that’s a very similar probability to go win the game in one play vs. sending it to an overtime period.
The only real advantage to sending a game to overtime in this situation is to increase the sample of plays a team gets. So if a team goes to overtime, and ends up losing the coin toss, it’s not like they’ve been screwed over. They knew going into overtime that this outcome was a likely possibility. And they’ve got to suck it up to win the game. The penalty for failure to adapt to a dynamic situation is losing a close game. No one is not okay with this outcome.
Fans of the losing team in these close overtime games are the ones who make the most noise about the overtime rules, but ultimately, it boils down to a case of leaguewide sour grapes. Enter a preposterous rule change suggestion. A rule that, by it’s very nature, is designed to make the game no more fair.
Entering overtime, the probability of two equal teams on a neutral field winning is still identical: 50% each. This rule change makes the outcome of the coin flip far less important. But now instead of one team getting an advantage at the beginning of the period by receiving the kick, each team gets an unequal, unfair advantage. The team that gets the ball second gets an unfair advantage of knowing if they will need to score a touchdown, a field goal, or even at all. They have the advantage of getting another DOWN if they trail in overtime, as the entire game becomes four down territory at that point. Who the heck considers that to be fair?
Of course, this makes this one drive by the second team every bit as critical as the first drive of overtime under a current system. A team that punts on that drive in a tie game, or a team that kicks a field goal to tie on that possession, essentially hands the sudden death advantage to the team who got the first possession. I ask again: what overtime “problem” has this new rule suggestion actually fixed? Is the NFL not going to have a sudden death overtime? Are they planning on going to the non-football college rule?
The only actual solution to the current overtime is to make it a timed football period of finite length, either ten or fifteen minutes, and not make it sudden death. The downside to this is that overtime games will go significantly longer than they currently do. Oh, but wait, that’s also an unintended effect of the new rule proposal.
For a league that has been slow, at best, to embrace positive change, this would be the kind of jump-to-conclusions-solution that hurts the competitive balance of the league, and more significantly, panders to those fair-weather fans unable to stomach a fair result that goes against their team of choice.